




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





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## **HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR**








"VERDUN"

*From the painting by Rosset-Gra*

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# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY  
**FRANK H. SIMONDS**  
AUTHOR OF "THEY SHALL NOT PASS"—VERDUN



*FULLY ILLUSTRATED*

VOLUME THREE  
VERDUN AND THE SOMME

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GARDEN CITY                    NEW YORK  
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY  
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## CONTENTS

### CHAPTER I

#### THE NEW PERIOD

PAGE

- I. THE Two CONTESTS: Expectations of a sudden decision following a tremendous success, vanish—Verdun and the Somme in turn hold stage of the world—Arras and Rheims, Amiens and Verdun definite circumstances in the minds of people of all classes in all countries—While German armies advance through Poland and Serbia, while Mitteleuropa is being constructed, the world audience fixes its attention on the trenches of Flanders and Champagne—Meaning of eastern movements overlooked but renewal of Germany's assault on France understood—Defeat of Germans at Verdun one of the great achievements of the war—The Somme the first expression of the true military power of an organized Britain—The campaign of 1916 one more attempt to break the western deadlock and abolish war of positions—Incidental Allied successes rendered valueless when Russia betrayed Rumania and when German, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops occupied Bucharest and Constanza and opened the road from Berlin to Constantinople—German retreat in the west made necessary by British advance over the Albert Ridge—German peace proposal.
- II. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1917: Both coalitions seek decisive triumph by arms alone—Each contending party endeavours to break morale of the enemy by propaganda, peace proposals, etc.—Russia makes her last fight—The expiring flicker of the Romanoff régime—Russian Court and Czar under German influence—Russian people drift rapidly toward revolution—With the end of the Campaign of 1916, both contestants have to confess a measure of defeat, neither's strategy has brought a decision—Domestic protests on either side—Confidence declines—Each government daily on trial before suspicious public—Leaders accused of incompetence in conducting military and diplomatic enterprises—End of period in which unity expresses the will to win of the peoples at war—War-weariness grows apace—Failure of the 1916 Campaign leads to profound modifications of spirit and purpose in 1917.
- III. THE OLD AND THE NEW: High price paid for German rulers' failure to fulfil their promises—Verdun attack fails—Allies slowly force strongest German defences at the Somme—Allied artillery's toll—Collapse of Rumania—Mitteleuropa expanded—Enormous cost to Ger-

many of the delusion that France could be forced to make a separate peace—The Old Europe fought itself to point of exhaustion in first three campaigns of the war—Modification of issues, conditions, prospects—1916 represents final effort of the old order to save itself—Russian Revolution the signal for a change—Battle of Jutland. IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAMPAIGNS: Battles barren of affirmative result—Verdun, most brilliant episode in history, leaves contestants exhausted—Diplomacy and statesmanship of 1914 bankrupt—In 1916 failure of the soldier to win the war and incapacity of the generals entail unmistakable consequences—Growth of popular distrust—Optimism in July and August—Destruction of Rumania—German peace proposal—World talks of peace—Transition from charity of Nineteenth-Century conceptions to confused doctrines evolved by the Russian Revolution—Third Phase of the war marks frontier between an old world and a new and sees America's entry into the conflict. . . . .

3

## CHAPTER II

## VERDUN—THE GERMAN ATTACK

- I. THE GRAND STRATEGY: New year sees German position little changed—No immediate prospect of a Russian offensive—British army, expanded, becomes a menace to German flank in Flanders and Artois, but lacks guns for successful offensive—British failure at Loos—Once more Germans have to deal with France—Elimination of France would mean removal of the British menace—Campaign to be a colossal blow “aimed at the heart of France”—Its failure not contemplated by German leadership.

II. WHY VERDUN? Selection made as result of many conditions—The gun master of the fort—Verdun isolated—Dependent almost entirely on road communication for its supplies—Defects of the position—Reinforcement a difficult task—Verdun itself without value, but its capture might compel abandonment of northern and eastern Lorraine and the line of fortresses from Châlons to Belfort.

III. VERDUN TOPOGRAPHY: Weak point in French line—Weakness increased by French neglect of preparation—Point and character of the attack—The terrain—Real military value of the Verdun position—Phases of the battle.

IV. THE GERMAN PLAN: Preparations for the offensive—Methods used—The element of surprise temporarily paralyzes French High Command—Utter defeat narrowly averted—French territorials versus specially trained, crack German corps—Crown Prince's order to attack.

V. THE FLOOD: Battle of Verdun—Number of guns beyond French aviators' ability to indicate on the map—Phases of the contest—Verdun, in flames and ashes, is hastily evacuated by civilian

## CONTENTS

vii

PAGE

inhabitants—German prospect of supreme victory brilliant—French counter-attack stems flood—The battle over, the siege begins—The counter-attack on Douaumont Plateau a decisive circumstance in a decisive battle. . . . .

13

### CHAPTER III VERDUN—THE FRENCH DEFENCE

I. THE SUPREME ACHIEVEMENT: Perhaps the finest achievement in the two thousand years of French military history—Duration of the attack—French tenacity amazing—“They shall not pass!”—The achievement of the French soldier beyond power of just appraisal—Paris and provinces sense that the life of France is at stake—Kaiser forecasts speedy entrance of his troops into Verdun—The defence a miracle.

II. FRENCH PREPARATION: Certain precautions taken, but several essentials neglected—No third-line defences—Neglect of railway communications fault of the French politician—Automobile transport, planned by General Staff, saved the city—Legend that Germans walked into a trap not true; the attack a surprise—The tragedy of Verdun.

III. THE DECISION TO FIGHT: Doubt as to whether first bombardment was a major attack or a mere feint—By February 24 magnitude of the thrust no longer questionable—General de Castelnau is sent to review situation and to decide whether a new French army should cross the Meuse to defend the eastern hills or the whole French line drawn back from the east bank of the river from Verdun down to St. Mihiel—Joffre favours the latter plan, but Paris, the politicians, the Government, are strongly for accepting the German challenge—Castelnau decides for the defence, recognizing the moral and the military significance of Verdun—Pétain summoned—His arrival restores “delicate” situation—Heroic stand and sacrifices of the “Iron Corps”—The penalty of prior negligence.

IV. THE END OF THE BATTLE: First step in protracted siege—Fort Douaumont taken by Brandenburgers—Balfourier halts German rush—Enemy reserves in men and munitions exhausted—Whole German conception breaks down—Deadly effect of French “75’s”—Arrival of French first-line corps—in her second great crisis France had found a man, Pétain, the defender of Verdun. . . . .

36

### CHAPTER IV: THE SIEGE OF VERDUN

I. THE GERMAN PROBLEM: Considerations that led to the French decision to accept battle on the Meuse Heights—German High Command

has to decide whether or not to continue the Verdun operation—No alternative but to continue—Germany's fears and calculations—Her changed objectives—Seeks to induce premature British offensive; Britain volunteers to attack but Joffre wisely forbids—The siege a struggle, France seeking to give Britain time to organize the Somme offensive, Germany trying to make that offence impossible—Peril of Verdun hastens Somme stroke—Siege of Verdun a figure of speech; the city never invested—Automobile transport system saved Verdun. II. THE NEW FIGHTING: In earlier battles artillery abolishes first- and second-line defences—Bombardment lasts days, even weeks—Trenches abolished—Meuse Heights devastated—Lines of communication blotted out—Suffering of troops, horrors of siege, indescribable—Misery of fighters and desolation of country beyond realization—Verdun itself melts into dust and ashes—The siege a scientific butchery, a new phase of war. III. ON THE LEFT BANK—DEAD MAN'S HILL: German advance halted—Conflict shifts from centre to flanks—Second phase of the contest—“Battle of the Wings”—Struggles costly to Germans—Main French defensive position at Charny Ridge—Surrender of Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304. IV. ON THE RIGHT—FORT DE VAUX: Defence of fort an epitome of whole Verdun epic—Germans falsely report capture of Vaux by attack; invent French counter-attack next day to explain continued French occupation—The fort invested—Communication with outside by carrier pigeons and then, when last pigeon released, by heliograph—Garrison live in underground passages—Enemy reaching ground above pours bombs down staircases—Garrison holds out against gas attacks till food and water run out; then its commander surrenders—Battle of the Wings is ended—Verdun *in extremis*. V. THE ATTACK IN THE CENTRE: Positions of the two contending forces—Final phase of Verdun offensive—Capture of Thiaumont Farm and redoubt—German flood halted at ditch of Fort de Souville—Wedge penetrates southwest of Douaumont—Anglo-French offensive in Picardy causes Germans loss of initiative—Their Verdun game played out—Verdun has served Allied purpose; the military and the moral objectives realized—A moral victory—They had not passed . . . . .

## CHAPTER V

## IRELAND AND KUT-EL-AMARA

I. BRITISH PERPLEXITIES: British public life and sentiment at lowest ebb since Waterloo removed menace of Napoleon—The Irish Rebellion, the surrender of Kut and the Battle of Jutland together disclose governmental ineptitude which leads to fall of Asquith Ministry—Jutland so

**presented by the Admiralty as to appear a defeat—Britain lacks a leader—Chaos—Industrial struggles—British Labour's grievance and struggle.** II. **THE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENTS:** From the outset plain that France, even with Russia's aid, could not reach a decisive victory—In spring of 1916 the war waits on Britain—Popular misapprehension—Statesmen conceal from people the gravity of the situation—British leaders and journals propagate legend that foe is already beaten—Colonies far more alive to situation—Britain not unwilling to make necessary sacrifice to win the war, army not unwilling to bear burden of casualties, but whole nation craves leadership—Rulers afraid to tell people the truth, to trust the masses who were worthy of all confidence—France sees facts unmistakably. III. **THE GREAT AWAKENING:** The truth comes home to British masses after the Irish Rising, the surrender of Kut, and the first belief that the Battle of Jutland had been lost—Disastrous consequences of lack of central or intelligent direction realized—British prestige in east suffers owing to Turkish triumphs at Gallipoli and Kut—Whole of Asia stirred—British fury over Dublin tragedy—Young Ireland stretches out hand to Germany—While France has a grip on realities, readers of the British press (controlled by censor) conclude that people of Germany are starving and on the verge of rebellion to expel their Kaiser—British people lose confidence in their statesmen—In England a sense of little men, eternal talk, words disguising the truth—People appalled by the revelation—Splendid achievements of British people, army, navy, a priceless contribution—Conscious of her mighty potentialities, England longed for a Cromwell and found an Asquith—Relief of Verdun ends period of depression—Britain throws herself into hands of Lloyd George—Internal dissensions in England and in France contrasted with the perfect unity and subordination of domestic differences in Germany—The Allied world in disarray. IV. **THE IRISH REBELLION:** Tragic in its consequences, ridiculous in its comparative insignificance—Causes of the Rebellion—England's efforts to right past wrongs—Generous legislation leaves Irish hearts untouched—Barrier of mutual misapprehension—English efforts at reconciliation fruitless—Ulster in arms—John Redmond's gesture; pledges Ireland to support the war for human liberty—Ireland's prompt response—The golden moment passes—Instead of passing the Home Rule Act, the Asquith Ministry postponed it—Disappointed Ireland throws itself into the arms of the Sinn Fein, which looks to Kaiser as a champion and a liberator—Story of the actual Rebellion—Casualties and consequences—Ireland becomes friendless—Tools of Germany. V. **KUT-EL-AMARA:** Enquiry reveals a new scandal, a new folly—Original expedition a wise step—But policy of adventure reasserts itself and

## CONTENTS

PAGE

a small force is pushed forward to a region whither Turks are able to draw unlimited numbers—The force gallantly attacks superior numbers, is defeated, retreats to Kut, and is besieged—Frantic efforts of awakened officials to save beleaguered army—Relieving force too late—Towns-hend surrenders—The Bagdad gamble ends in a disastrous reverse—Victorious advance of Maude to Bagdad and beyond—Jerusalem occupied—British prestige restored—Kut an unjustifiable waste of men and material—Landmarks of a year.. . . . .

70

## CHAPTER VI

### THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

I. "THE DAY" AT LAST: Greatest conflict in naval history—Circumstances of the engagement—A chance encounter on both sides—The meeting—A threefold operation follows—Flight. II. THE FIGHT: Hipper runs away from Beatty—Beatty runs away when Scheer brings up battle fleet—Scheer flees from Jellicoe—British losses frankly conceded, German losses remain to be established—German fleet escapes owing to lateness of hour and "low visibility"—British fleet proceeds to base, injured ships are put under repairs—Jellicoe resumes customary watch of the North Sea—Summary—British losses—German losses—Enemy's gunnery—Criticism of tactical aspects—The battle develops nothing new, but depreciates value of the submarine. III. THE RESULT: British battle fleet, confident that it had won a great victory, returns to find nation near panic from belief that the battle had been lost—Same impression shared by whole world—Stupidity of Admiralty the cause—Kaiser congratulates Scheer—The facts—The "victorious" fleet continues to hide—The "defeated" fleet resumes its normal functions—Final answer to the claim that Jutland was a German victory—Perception grows clearer that Britain had won the war on the seas—Mastery of the enemy fleet the true naval victory of the war—A great and a small battle compared—An allegory—Jutland a vindication of Britain's claim to naval supremacy, a failure of the Kaiser's challenge years previous to the war: "Our future lies on the sea." . 103

## CHAPTER VII

### THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME—CONDITIONS OF THE CONTEST

I. A SUPREME TRAGEDY: The First Battle of the Somme the graveyard of more men and more hopes than any western field of fighting up to July, 1918—Although a British victory, much of its glory is swept away in March, 1918—The scene of a British victory becomes mem-

PAGE

orable as the field of great British disaster—Britain pays full price for long years of political blindness—Battle a fight between a still-unorganized population and a perfected machine commanded by men versed in the industry of war—Between July and November a period of tragic sacrifice, the cost of unpreparedness. II. THE PURPOSE: Immediate object to relieve Verdun—The battle a contest in attrition—Advance slow and grim—Numbers engaged—Casualties—Germans lose initiative in France and Belgium—First Somme, a strategic success for the Allies, not a defeat of material consequence to Germans—In all but one sense a bitter disappointment to the Allies. III. THE NOYON SALIENT: Created by the fighting immediately following the German retreat from the Marne—The salient geographically described—Railway facilities—Allied strategy—Description of Battle of the Somme—Choice of the Picardy front—Terrific losses. IV. THE BATTLEGROUND: Features of surrounding country—The German line—Elaborately fitted dugouts—Natural advantages with the German—Formidable defences—British point of attack known in advance—French attack not foreseen—Progress of the battle—Meaning of the struggle—Critics at the time described it as the beginning of the end—Now regarded as a sad waste—Murder unparalleled.

113

## CHAPTER VIII

## THE SOMME—JULY 1

- I. THE NEW ARMY: Somme the "first full-dress show" of the New British Army—Features of New Army—Its leaders—After two years of disappointment and humiliation, Britain answers "present" in the roll call of peoples fighting Germany. II. HOPES AND FEARS: New Army an untried experiment—Artillery and ammunition in plenty but experience lacking—British achievement a landmark—New Army dies on July 1—The real costs of the Somme—The struggle a tragic blunder. III. THE SAME OLD PROBLEM: The Somme an effort to transform a war of positions into a war of movement—Previous experiments—Causes of their failure—Problem of penetration solved later by Germans—British artillery not up to task in opening phase of battle—Infantry advance to annihilation—In later phases British artillery masters problem—Germans driven from fixed defences—The dugout a tomb—On July 1 the opening attack conforms to older standards—The British fail. IV. JULY 1: Disposition and composition of the British and the French armies—Numbers engaged—The German force—Details of the fighting—British suffer a bloody check from Gommecourt almost to Fricourt—From Fricourt to Maricourt a measure of success—Fall of Mametz and

PAGE

Montauban necessitates German retirement from Fricourt and as far west as La Boiselle—Details of the French action—French losses insignificant—British losses heavy—First day of Somme a ghastly failure—In one respect only the Allies establish superiority, they seize control of the air. V. HAIG MAKES GRANT's DECISION: His efforts to pierce enemy line and compel a general retirement a failure—Renewal of general attack impossible—To abandon the action altogether out of the question—Haig's decision changes character of the Battle of the Somme—French armies as flank guard—Out of failure Haig constructs success—The Somme, a symbol; contrasted with the Marne and Verdun. . 137

## CHAPTER IX

### THE SOMME—JULY TO NOVEMBER

- I. TO THE CREST OF THE RIDGE: German first line is broken—Fricourt is taken—German second line is broken—Second phase opens—British reach crest of the Ridge—British advance slow—French more successful—Haig, aided by the French, extends lines.
- II. THE END OF THE BATTLE: The third phase—British master final line of enemy entrenchments—Delville Wood, Flers, and Combles taken—German resistance weakens—Micheler's French army active on Fayolle's flank—Fulfillment of Haig's expectations prevented by climatic conditions—End of campaign sees German line still unbroken—One brilliant incident lightens gloom: The taking of Beaumont-Hamel—Proof that British army has learned the lessons of modern offensive action.
- III. THE TANKS: First appearance on the field—Comparison with other engines of war—The tank a movable fort—In its first action it produces consternation yet evokes uncontrollable laughter—Element of surprise promptly exhausted—Tank remains a permanent detail in the new order—Fleet of tanks achieve break-through—Reserves lacking to exploit success—British and French improve form and mechanism of tank, which revolutionizes their method of attack—Actual origin of tank.
- IV. THE ACHIEVEMENT: Both sides, at close of the battle, try to measure its meaning—The situation analyzed—Effects of Russia's fall—German retirement—Devastation—A new perspective—Sterility of Somme campaign—America prepares to intervene.
- V. THE DESERT: Revelation of power of modern weapons of destruction—Havoc at Ypres and Verdun—Once-beautiful landscapes of Picardy transformed into a Sahara—Shell-wrecked Albert—Ruin indescribable—The Marne region—The Somme region—Mametz: not a stone, not a fragment remains—Montauban, Fricourt, scores of villages from Roye to Miraucourt,

## CONTENTS

xiii

PAGE

obliterated—A wartime legend of Picardy finds mournful refutation— Third Battle of the Somme opens. . . . .	159
--	-----

## CHAPTER X

## VERDUN—THE EPILOGUE

I. THE PAUSE: The Crown Prince's promise—The situation analyzed —The furnace of the Somme slowly devours German resources—French attacks directed at Fleury and Thiaumont savagely repulsed—Prepara- tions for counter-offensive planned by Pétain, Nivelle, and Mangin— Their records. II. THE OBJECTIVES: For the first offensive, Douau- mont and Vaux—The terrain—The front line—Mission of the three divi- sions of attack—Distances to be covered—Plan of operation—Hour for the attack—Climatic conditions—The attack one of the finest bits of scientific fighting in all the first four years of the war—Mechanical per- fection unexcelled even in German achievement. III. DOUAUMONT AND VAUX: Descriptive account of the attack—Douaumont taken— Fate of Vaux sealed—Prisoners and booty—Full measure of success dis- closed later—Vaux evacuated—The circle of Verdun defences restored— “They shall not pass” is a boast fulfilled—The soul of the French people revealed. IV. VERDUN ANSWERS THE KAISER: The victory of October 24 gives Verdun security but cost of holding place still unduly high—French prepare for another thrust—Mangin leads swift surprise attack heralded by terrific bombardment—French objectives—Details of attack—Prisoners and booty captured—Nivelle leaves Verdun to suc- ceed Joffre—His stay in the High Command is brief and disastrous— France turns to Pétain, the central figure of the Verdun campaign. V. AFTERMATH: Germans still holding important ground on west bank of Meuse—Pétain, on becoming Commander-in-Chief, organizes third offensive—Germans thrust off dominating hills—Ground is retaken, entirely reestablishing the old situation—Verdun ceases to be of any value in the immediate fighting—Prisoners and booty captured during third counter-offensive—Verdun operation consisted of three phases— First phase—Second phase—Third phase—Verdun from the military and the human side—A national epic. . . . .	181
--	-----

## CHAPTER XI

## ITALY IN DEFENCE AND OFFENCE

I. THE GENERAL ALLIED CONCEPTION: Major strategic conceptions— Allies' plans—Central Powers' alternatives—Great attack on Verdun commences—The Italian situation—The Verdun attack fails—Rela-
--

tions between the operations in France, in Italy, and in Russia—German strategy fails—Austria attacks Italy. II. TRENTINE GEOGRAPHY: Natural features aid Austrians—Inherent viciousness of the Italian situation—The Venetian Plain. III. THE ATTACK: The Trentine offensive—Forces engaged—The preliminary bombardment is followed by a repetition of the Verdun episode—The Italians counter-attack—Brusiloff's guns sound overture to the Russian offensive—Austrian effort dies out—Cadorna's counter-offensive. IV. ON THE ISONZO: Italy's strenuous defence—The Gorizia bridgehead—Thermopylæ—The Gorizia position outlined—Bulwarks of the defence system—Railway systems—Italian advance halted—Italy's lack of guns—The defeat of Caporetto—Italian purpose in the Gorizia offensive—The three separate elements of the Gorizia position—Italy's preparations—Her failure complete. V. GORIZIA: Cadorna's great blow—East and west, Central Powers in retreat—Allied fortunes mounting—The Gorizia offensive outlined—Gorizia taken—Austrians still hold their main positions—Italian rush comes to a halt—Italy has shot her bolt of 1916—Allies' concentric attack lasts little more than a month—Its strain on the enemy promptly met—Italy declares war on Germany; the reasons—Preface to Rumania's entrance—Influence upon the course of the war.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE LAST RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

- I. LOOKING EASTWARD: Russia launches the last campaign of the Romanoff Empire—Interdependence between the eastern and the western operations—Influence upon western events of the Russian blow—Even dying, Russia deals heavy stroke to endurance of shaken Hapsburg Empire—Russian campaign of 1916 examined—In London and Paris the true situation in Russia unknown—Russia abandons Allied cause, and Allies face possible defeat—Russia's armies beyond praise but her Court, rulers, and statesmen corrupt—The scandals of Rasputin—Intrigues of German coteries—Progressive degeneration of national spirit and determination—Russia collapses inward—The last Russian offensive seen in the light of the Russian situation—Allied hopes brought from the heights to a Dead Sea level.
  - II. RUSSIAN STRATEGY: Positions of the beaten Russian forces—Out of chaos Alexieff creates great armies—Russian military strength restored—Erzerum falls before Grand Duke Nicholas—Trebizond taken—Conquest of Turkish Armenia completed—The three objectives of Russian strategy—Austria, after deadly peril, again saved by German intervention.
  - III. BATTLE-

## CONTENTS

xv

PAGE

**FIELD AND ARMIES:** Disposition of armies; their commanders—First phase of the Russian offensive—Numbers engaged—Physical features of the battlefield—Russians at a disadvantage owing to scarcity of roads and railroads—Value of Kovel, Lemberg, and Stanislau as railway junctions—Austrians' trunk and lateral communications give them advantage. IV. JUNE 5: Actual progress of events—Russians bombard enemy lines—All five Austrian armies assailed by Russian infantry; the results—Russian flood sweeps forward—Dubno and Lutsk taken—Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army, routed, loses more than 70,000 prisoners—Pflanzer's army loses more than 40,000 prisoners and ceases to exist—The situation critical—Bothmer's position perilous—German intervention rapid and efficient—A new army created—Defeated Archduke deprived of all but nominal authority—Germans counter-attack—Russian advance checked and thrown back a little—Results of the German stroke. V. THE END OF THE FIRST PHASE: Prisoners, cannon, and booty taken—Territorial gains—The Russian achievement colossal—The attack a surprise to the foe—Signs, recognized by Germany, fail to warn Western powers—Russia's victories had entailed colossal sacrifices—The victorious Russians had outrun their guns and supplies; the routed Austrians had retired upon guns and German reinforcements—Russia's check fatal to her main purpose—While London and Paris acclaim Russian "steam roller" restored to efficiency the real opportunity had passed—The Russian offensive doomed to end in dismal slaughter and unmistakable check. VI. THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE Slows Down: Further phases summarized—German strategy dominates—Aims of Russian strategy—The Kerensky offensive—Loesche's army attacks—Lutsk salient ironed out—Kaledin retakes ground lost in mid-June—Campaign for Kovel ends—Sakharoff defeats Boehm-Ermoli's army, takes more than 50,000 prisoners, captures Brody, and arrives on northern flank of Bothmer's army—In July, Bothmer still holds on—Brusiloff has secured his northern positions—Threatens Bothmer's left flank—Lechitsky turns Bothmer's southern flank—The situation in the middle of August outlined. VII. THE END: Brusiloff's offensive after August 15—Effects of Lechitsky's earlier successes—Results of Rumania's entrance—Last Russian offensive wears itself out—What might have been—The Russian army in the autumn of 1916 a powerful disciplined force, in the spring of 1917 a mob without courage or loyalty.

## CHAPTER XIII

### RUMANIA IS SACRIFICED

I. THE BATTLE OF EUROPE: Rumania declares war upon the Central Powers—The situation as it existed on September 1, 1916—Paris, London, and Rome convinced that decisive victory was at hand—In Petrograd, a suspicion of the truth—Facts contrasted with appearances—Rumania, led into the war by Russian treachery, marked as a victim—Rumanian army thrown against an unshaken enemy able to throw it back in ruin—Because Germany saw the situation in single and unified way she won the Battle of Europe, the campaign, and, almost, the war itself—Comparisons with our Civil War—Cause of the Rumanian failure—Treason of the Ministry of Stuermer and Protopopoff—Destruction of Rumania planned, that Russia might obtain peace—The blindness of Allied statesmanship.

II. THE POLICY OF NATIONAL INSTINCT: Reasons that underlay Rumania's entrance into the war—Brutality of Austro-Hungarian rule in Rumania Irredenta—Facts of the Rumanian situation little understood in the west—Germany's calumny follows on Rumania's failure—Rumania's real aims—Rumania crushed—Bound hand and foot to the Central Powers by the new Treaty of Bucharest—Duties devolving upon Rumania's western allies—Belgium, Serbia, Rumania; the small states sacrificed in turn to the German power.

III. CONSPIRACY: Aged King Carol, at outset of the war, sought to persuade Rumania to enter on the side of the Central Powers—Effects of his death—Attitude of the new sovereign, Ferdinand, and of the new queen—Rumanian policy like that of Italy—Rumania's entrance postponed as a result of Russian reverses and the German invasion of Russia—Situation in June changed by Brusiloff's and Lechitsky's advances—Russia sends ultimatum to Rumania demanding her immediate enlistment or the surrender of all her hopes for territorial and racial unification—Stuermer's purpose now clear—The Russian Court and bureaucracy, fearful of a revolution, seek to save the existing régime—Documentary evidence of the betrayal of Rumania—Bulgaria throws off the mask and declares war as soon as Rumania is deeply committed in Transylvania—When Rumania falls, Germany makes proposal of peace by negotiation—Western nations decline the proffer—Russia falls into revolution, as Stuermer had foreseen—Execution of ministers and agents that had procured the betrayal of Rumania.

IV. THE RUMANIAN OFFENSIVE: Rumania's position when she declared war—The twofold Rumanian problem—Invasion of Transylvania—The danger of the venture—Importance of Bulgaria's attitude—Assured of Bulgaria's neutrality, Rumania sends her armies across Transylvanian front-

## CONTENTS

xvii

PAGE

tier—Disposition of armies—Plans—Objectives of the invasion—Kronstadt taken—Bulgaria declares war—Mackensen crosses Dobrudja frontier, destroys one Rumanian division, and drives covering troops back toward vital Constanza-Bucharest railway—Troops transferred from Transylvania to the Dobrudja temporarily arrest Mackensen—Reinforcements reach Mackensen—Rumania fatally caught between the upper and the lower millstones. V. FALKENHAYN AND MACKENSEN: Invasion of Transylvania at first meets little resistance—Refugees flow to Vienna and Budapest—Commotion in Hungarian parliament—Appeals to Berlin for aid are heard—Germany organizes army for counter-offensive, and Falkenhayn is assigned to command it—Its magnitude—The counter-offensive is launched—Falkenhayn's strategy—The opening blow—Mackensen takes offensive on the Dobrudja front—Constanza is taken—Rumania cut off from her one seaport—The offensive is halted by arrival of two Russian divisions sent by Brusiloff—Falkenhayn checked at the Predeal, the Red Tower, and the Vulcan Passes—First Rumanian Army decisively beaten at Ter Jiu—Rumanians retire behind the Alt—Germans reach positions between the Alt and Bucharest—Mackensen forces passage of the Danube at Sistova—Mackensen and Falkenhayn unite before Bucharest—The Battle of the Argeln—Bucharest evacuated; occupied by armies of the Central Powers—Rumanian army slips out of conquerors' grasp and retires upon lines of the Sereth—Government flees to Jassy—Army losses—Rumanians in retreat fire oil wells and wheat crops—But the defeat of Rumania was absolute.

## CHAPTER XIV

## SALONICA AND MONASTIR

- I. AT SALONICA: Objects of the Salonica Army—Its inability to accomplish results of material value; the reasons—Sarrail appointed to command on new front—Recalled when Clemenceau came to the helm in France—The task in the Orient well nigh impossible—Composition of the force—Salonica turned into an entrenched camp—The harbour transformed—Political complications—Venizelos fails and falls—King Constantine in complete control; his sympathies and influence all with the Kaiser—Impedes Allied army—Circumstances grotesque—Possibility of attack from north and, by the Greek army, from the rear—Intolerable situation continues throughout 1916. II. INCIDENTS: Situation of Allies at Salonica almost incredible—Harbour forts in Greek hands—German air raids rouse Sarrail to take steps to abolish a situation dangerous and absurd—Fort Karaburnu taken over by Allies—

Consular and other agents of enemy powers sent away—Bulgarian army halts a Greek force in its pursuit of French and British troops seeking to rescue Serbs at the Greek frontier—Greek garrison, at command of Greek king, surrenders to Bulgarian force—King negotiates loan of \$15,000,000 from Germany as a reward—Consequences for Salonica Army—Bulgarians, anticipating Sarrail, cross Greek frontier at Florina—Drive Serbs before them as far south as Lake Ostrovo—More Greek treachery—Greek frontier guards retire—Salonica now threatened from the east, from the north, and from the west—Possibility, too, of a Greek attack from the south to join hands with the Bulgars at Lake Ostrovo—Events take a new turn—Greeks of Macedonia rise against their king—Sarrail recognizes the revolutionists—Venizelos reaches Salonica and assumes direction of the new government, which declares war upon the Central Alliance—Constantine still rules in Athens and controls the mainland as far as the environs of Salonica—Negotiations and bickering between Constantine and the Allies—King's hostility grows—French sailors murdered in Athens—General killing of Venizelist leaders by the King's adherents—Sarrail's plans constantly hampered. III. MONASTIR: Army of the Orient takes the field—Original plans upset—Sarrail drives Bulgarians back—Distinguished generalship of Serbian commander, Marshal Mishitch—Monastir occupied—The victory productive of little result—Greek army's activities force Sarrail to send French troops south—Balkan campaign ends—Salonica adventure loses value in the eyes of the Allied General Staffs—The great opportunity of the Allies in the Balkans lost in 1915 when Serbia had been suffered to go to disaster.

CHAPTER XV

## THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

I. THE EFFECT OF FALL OF BUCHAREST: Western hopes go to dust and ashes; optimism is succeeded by gloom and despondency—The campaign of 1916 in retrospect—Allied strategy based on misconceptions—Allied estimates of conditions in enemy countries grotesque—Their errors of judgment and of calculation lead to severe military defeats—Absence of unity of thought, interest, or strategy in the Allied countries—Chaos the result—Disaster in Mesopotamia—Failure at Salonica—Shuffling policy with respect to Bulgaria and Greece—Constantine flouts the Great Powers and wages war under their noses while still preserving his highly placed champions in London and in Petrograd—By contrast, the whole policy of the Central Alliance was made in Germany—Turks, Austrians, Bulgarians, quite as much as the Germans, respond

## CONTENTS

xix

PAGE

to a single impulse—Germany fights one war; her foes, a dozen—The Rumanian campaign the best example of the German method—Allies, hypnotized by western front, unable to perceive that Russia was sinking—Limited vision of Western Powers—Unable to understand themselves or the truth about Russia—Germany's mistakes less obvious and less culpable; only one of them capital, colossal—Germany continues to think in material terms; unable to understand the moral forces aroused against her.	II. THE RESULT:
	Germany won the Campaign of 1916—She suffered local reverses but never was the relative unimportance of geographical incidents more clearly emphasized—German purpose—The framework of Mitteleuropa—Aim of German strategy to retain this edifice—The dangers that threaten; (a) military defeat, (b) too great prolongation of the war—German morale and will-to-win unbroken—The campaign against Rumania has completed the task of rounding out the frontiers of Mitteleuropa—In taking Constanza Germany lays foundation for future domination of the Black Sea—Rumania's resources an important item in Pan-German calculations—The position of Germany at the close of the 1916 campaign—Allied strategy—The moral advantage of the campaign—Effects of the fall of Bucharest—In London and Paris hopes falling, give place to fears, to be substantiated later—Allies now perceive that only their enemy has a clear and ordered purpose—While Kaiser, Field Marshal, newspaper, and pulpit, in Germany march in perfect unison, Allied statesmen quarrel, the pulpit is dumb, the press blind or blindfolded—Yet the masses see what is written on the map, what cannot be suppressed or camouflaged—The end of the campaign of 1916 marks the passing of one phase of the war and the opening of another.
	III. EXEUNT OMNES:
	Removal of Allied politicians and soldiers—Asquith falls; his traits—Leadership of British Empire assumed by Lloyd George; character sketch—Fall of the Briand Ministry in France—Sordid struggle in Russia—Stuermer, of sinister purpose, ousts Sazonoff, the loyal and earnest champion of Allied solidarity—Kitchener dies; his work reviewed—In France Joffre is retired; the reason—Nivelle succeeds Joffre; his stay is short—Pétain succeeds Nivelle—In Germany Falkenhayn falls—Hindenburg and Ludendorff come west—Hindenburg's popularity.
	IV. FRANCIS JOSEPH DIES:
	Countess Karolyi's curse; its fulfilment—The late Emperor's career reviewed—Comparisons with Louis XIV—The effect on the situation of Francis Joseph's death—His successor.

## CONTENTS

## CHAPTER XVI

## THE FIRST GERMAN PEACE OFFENSIVE

- | I. GERMANY'S PROPOSAL:   | PAGE  |
|--|-------|
| Text of the German Note—The Chancellor's explanatory speech—The Kaiser's order to his army and navy.   | II.   |
| II. PRESIDENT WILSON INTERVENES: addresses a Note to each belligerent—Resentment in Allied capitals—Course of American policy and purpose—The situation as it appeared to the world—The moment critical.   |       |
| III. WHAT IT MEANT: Analysis of the German manœuvre—Not prompted by fear of impending defeat—Not due to desire for an international conference—The German did not expect to bring peace by negotiation—German motives analyzed—What it was necessary to make the German people believe.  |       |
| IV. THE RUSSIAN MANŒUVRE: The German proposal envisaged the Russian situation—Stuermer's betrayal of Rumania—Russia exhausted—Germany offers peace—Russian extremists turn to Germany—The main concern of Germany—Analysis of events—Germany employed her peace operations as she uses her heavy artillery, to prepare the way for an infantry attack—Gesture of peace but a prelude—Brest-Litovsk—The "Good German Sword" is drawn from beneath the white mantle of Peace.  |       |
| V. THE AMERICAN ASPECT: Germany's aims in America—The <i>Sussex</i> outrage—Unlimited submarine warfare—German strategy seeks to postpone American entrance into the war—Germany calculates that a peace proffer, if rejected by her enemies, might turn American sentiment against the Allies—The course of the President misinterpreted in Berlin—Germany's motives analyzed.  |       |
| VI. IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE: The peace offensive more serious than in America—Allied nations' belief in existence of a gulf between people and rulers of Germany is at variance with the truth—In Germany, all parties in unison; in Allied countries, discord and lack of common purpose and of equal determination—Great element of men opposed to war as such, some believing any peace better than any form of war—Accept German peace proposal as made in good faith—The result—Decline in moral vitality of the Allied publics; just what the German had sought—Artfulness of German statesmen—The peace proposal falls on a war-weary world—Mission of the propaganda—What German manœuvres accomplished. |       |
| VII. REJECTED: Rejection contained in speeches by British, French, and Italian prime ministers—Rejected even by Russian Government—Allies' explanation of war aims accepted by President Wilson—German press and statesmen signalize rejection of peace proposal by declarations that responsibility for prolongation of the war now rests with Allies—Consequences of the peace offensive—The programme of a German Socialist—Summary.  | . 298 |

## CONTENTS

xxi

### MY TRIP TO VERDUN BY FRANK H. SIMONDS

PAGE

- In this account of his trip to Verdun, written immediately after it occurred, Mr. Simonds gives the intimate, human, personal side of the epic Battle and Siege of Verdun just as in the main text of this history he gives its strategy and tactics, its relation to other battles, particularly the Battle of the Somme, as well as to the past and the future of France and civilization generally. . . . . 325



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

- “VERDUN” . . . . .** *Coloured Frontispiece*  
**WITH THE FRENCH AT VERDUN** 23-30, 47-54

A Review by General Pétain—Henri Philippe Pétain—A Scene on Dead Man's Hill on the Meuse River—A Verdun Battlefield—A Window of Fort de Vaux Looking out over a Trench to the South—An Underground Hospital—A Roadway—French Artillery—A Battery of the Famous French 75's—King Albert and President Poincaré Decorating Officers—Returning after the Retaking of Dead Man's Hill—Verdun before the War—Verdun after the Battle and Siege—A New Use for a Church Bell—The French Retaking a Captured Sector—Burrows in which the Defenders of Verdun Were Obliged to Live—Typical Scenes in Verdun after the Germans had Vent ed Their Wrath—A Hand Grenade Attack at Verdun.

- AEROPLANE WARFARE . . . . . 71-78, 169-176

Captain George Guynemer—A Battle above the Clouds—Zeppelin *L-49*, Brought down at Bourbonne—Frame of a Zeppelin Lying across an English Road—Observation Car of a German Air Raider—Dropping Bombs from an Aéroplane—Directing Artillery Fire—with the British Royal Flying Corps in India—Photographing the Enemy's Trenches—Verifying Hits with Bombs—A Blazing German Aéroplane Plunging to Earth—Allied Aéroplane off for a Reconnaissance—An Allied Airdrome—An Aéroplane Ambulance—Italian Hydroaéroplane—Caproni Bombing Planes—A Caproni Triplane Used for Bombing—One of Guynemer's Victories—Guynemer's Forty-fifth Victory—Aéroplane View of Bombed German Trenches—An Observation Balloon—Rheims from Above—The Ruined Village of Beaumont—Dropping Safely from a Balloon—The Night Raider.



Photographs taken during the fiercest fighting in the Battle of Jutland—A Turning Movement by Three British Battle-cruisers—British Battle-cruisers Encountering the German High Seas Fleet—Sinking of the German Light Cruiser *Nürnberg*—A Neutral Ship in Flames in Mid-

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Ocean—The British Hospital Ship *Gloucester Castle* Sinking—White Mice Protecting a Submarine—An Anxious Moment on a British Submarine—The Last of a German Cruiser—A German Submarine Surrendering to the American Ship *Fanning*—A British Ship at the Dardanelles—The Destruction of the German Destroyer—A Smoke Screen at Sea—A German Shell Which Hit Nothing Except the Ocean—A New Kind of Mother and Child—The Germans Did Not Succeed in “Sinking Without a Trace”—An Italian Mine-layer—A Floating Mine.

THE “SHARK” FIRING HER LAST TORPEDO IN THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (*in colour*) . . . . . 123

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME . . . . . 145-152

General Sir Douglas Haig—Star Rockets on the Somme Front at Night—Curtains of War Zone—A German Incendiary Barrage at Night—The “Impregnable” Hindenburg Line—British Troops Assaulting—Wire Entanglements in Front of Hindenburg Line—One of the Wilts Regiments Crossing Shell-swept Ground—German Attack on a British Tank—Canadians Fighting at Courcellette—The Great British Advance in the West—Somme Front at Bouchavesnes—After the Bombardment—German Trenches Destroyed.

FIGHTING IN ITALY . . . . . 193-200

An Italian Sentinel in the Alps—A Sentry at a Minor Observation Post—Italian Soldiers Scaling a Mountain—A Wrecked Zeppelin—Ice Caves—Mountain Passageway—Trolley Transporting Wounded—Ice Fort on an Italian Mountain—Armour Protection—Italian Infantry Attacking—A Night Bombardment—St. Bernard Dogs Ready for a Trip Through the Mountains.

PLAN OF A MODERN BATTLEFIELD . . . . . 217-224

A Typical Section of Trench Line—A Modern Battle Front—An Attack—Artillery Positions and Observation Stations—An Observation Balloon Landing—A Heavy 6-inch Gun—A Listening Post—Gun of a Medium Battery—Preparations for a Nocturnal Adventure into No Man’s Land—A Diagram of an Intrenched Howitzer—A Heavy Howitzer Being Intrenched—An Intrenched Light Battery—An Intrenched Gun Concealed from Enemy Aërial Observation.

CAPTAIN BONE DOWNING A BOCHE (*in colour*) . . . . . 241

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

xxv

- IN THE PATH OF WAR . . . . . 259-266, 301-308


A Symbol of Kultur—This Was a Village—This Was a Farm—This Was a Hospital—This Was a Church—This Was a Town—This Was a Road—This is Not a Scene in Ancient Greece, but One in Modern France—Statues Saved from Arras Cathedral—One of the Miracles of the War—The Miracle of Montauban—The Fallen Bell at Neuve Chapelle—A Triumph of German Gunnery—An Amazing Oversight—The Public Square and Cathedral—King Albert's Castle.

- AN AERIAL COLLISION (*in colour*) . . . . . 283

## LIST OF MAPS

	PAGE
The Western Battlefields in 1916. . . . .	4
The Verdun Salient . . . . .	16
The Flood, Feb. 21-26, 1916 . . . . .	34
The Battle of the Wings, March to Mid-June, 1916 . . . . .	65
Verdun in Extremis, June 15—Sept. 1, 1916 . . . . .	65
British Front, July 1—Nov. 30, 1916 . . . . .	116
British Front, June 30—July 3, 1916 . . . . .	134
British Front, July 14—August 18, 1916 . . . . .	160
British Front, August 18—October 1, 1916 . . . . .	162
Verdun Delivered . . . . .	191
The Russian Offensive in June, 1916. . . . .	233
The Advance on Lemberg, June—September, 1916. . . . .	244
Limit of German Advance. . . . .	257
Rumania in the Lion's Jaws . . . . .	269

## **HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR**



## CHAPTER ONE THE NEW PERIOD

### I THE TWO CONTESTS


The third period of the World War, that which is included within the twelve months of 1916, presents a clearer and less complicated picture than the two preceding periods. In it the expectations of a sudden decision, following a tremendous success continue to weaken—have in fact well nigh vanished by the end of the campaign. Even the Germans, who in their attack upon Verdun at least dreamed of a new Sedan, have laid it aside by the coming of winter and are seeking to reinforce military weapons by a peace offensive, while the experience of the Allies—on the defensive at Verdun, on the offensive at the Somme—has dissipated the notions common in all the earlier months of the struggle.

In this period which we are now to examine, the real interest and importance of two contests dwarf all else. Verdun and the Somme are conflicts which in turn held the stage of the world as no two military dramas had fixed the concentrated attention of a world audience since the last phases of the Napoleonic cycle. Unlike the great campaigns of the previous year in the east, they were fought on ground that had, in a measure, been familiar at all times to millions in Allied and neutral nations alike, and in the months of the World War had been studied and re-studied until Arras and Rheims, Amiens and Verdun, were definite circumstances in the minds of the people of all classes in all countries.

The result was unmistakable. While the German armies advanced through Poland and Serbia, while Mitteleuropa was constructed by campaigns along the Vistula, the Dniester and the Danube, the world audience still fixed its attention upon the trenches of Flanders and Champagne. The meaning of the eastern movements escaped it, but

# HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

## THE WESTERN BATTLEFIELDS IN 1916.



when Germany renewed her assault upon France, when she sought a decision at Verdun, and still later when the Allies in their turn took the offensive along the Somme, the world understood at once the issues of the contests and hung breathlessly on the details of the operations.

And these circumstances gave to the struggles which centred about Verdun and the Somme a hold upon popular imagination which, if not in excess of their real value, was at least disproportionate to their comparative importance, measured beside the later events on the eastern front. The defeat of the Germans at Verdun was one of the great achievements of the war, it was the preservation of that decision of the Marne, which for four years saved western civilization from the immediate threat of German domination. The Somme was the first expression

of the true military power of an organized Britain, but the Somme and Verdun blinded the Allied nations to what was happening in the east and this blindness led to still another bitter awakening, when Russia collapsed and Rumania fell.

The campaign of 1916 is interesting as one more attempt of the two contending forces to break the western deadlock and abolish the war of positions preparatory to crushing the enemy in a new campaign of movement. When it opened, Germany, victorious in the east, her Mitteleuropa all but completed, sought a decision in the west, which should guarantee her position in the east. By midsummer, with the German success at Verdun still postponed, the Allies took the offensive and by concentric attacks at the Somme, before Gorizia, in Galicia, and finally in Transylvania and in Macedonia, endeavoured to overwhelm the Central Powers by equal pressure on all fronts.

But if subsequently German failure at Verdun was complete, incidental Allied successes—at Gorizia, in Galicia, in Macedonia—were rendered of no value, when Russia betrayed Rumania and German, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops occupied Bucharest and Constanza, and completed the clearing of the roadway from Berlin to Constantinople. Hopes of a decision in the campaign of 1917 were thus plainly destroyed, as the defection of Russia became assured, while the German, despite his successes in the east, weighed against these brilliant achievements the terrible death lists of Verdun and the Somme and contemplated an inevitable retreat in the west, made necessary by the British advance over the Albert ridge.

Thus, after a campaign in which first German and then Allied hopes reached a high level, both coalitions were compelled to confess failure in the pursuit of an immediate decision and concede the growing likelihood that complete military decision would be attained, if at all, in years, rather than in months. The logical consequence of this was the German peace offensive of the closing weeks of 1916, which, in a measure, transformed the character of the struggle and introduced a new element, never again to be totally absent, and destined in the following year to increase in importance with each additional month of warfare.

## II. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916

The campaign of 1916 is thus a turning point in the history of the war. In it both coalitions by arms alone, seek a decisive triumph. Thereafter each contending party, while carrying on the military campaign with varying energy, throws more and more attention to diplomacy, to intrigue, and propaganda, and to the effort to capitalize the war weariness in the opposing nations and to break the morale of the enemy by peace proposals, necessarily vague, since on neither side is there yet any real willingness to compromise on the vital questions, but designed to fasten upon the enemy the responsibility for the prolongation of a war, become almost intolerable to both sides.

In the period now under examination, Russia makes her last fight. The victories of Brusiloff in Volhynia and along the Dniester are, in fact, the expiring flicker of that Romanoff régime which, from Peter the Great to the latest Alexander, had carried Russian armies and Slav frontiers onward into Central Europe and Turkish Asia. While the world still marvelled at Russian recovery and the victories before Lemberg seemed again to threaten the very existence of the Hapsburg throne, the court and the Czar were passing under the fatal spell of German influence and the Russian people were moving imperceptibly but rapidly toward the Revolution which was to change all.

To the close of the campaign of 1916 the war is fought along lines which had been laid down in the Nineteenth Century. Whatever variations were introduced, the general scheme was that which had been foreseen by the statesmen, if not by the soldiers, of previous decades. The war, despite the moral issues involved in German actions and German methods, despite the ever-growing evidence that democracy and autocracy were struggling in opposite camps, was a war such as had in some fashion been sketched in all the military writings of the years which followed the creation of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

When one passes from 1916 to 1917 there is almost a sense of crossing a frontier as clearly defined as that which separates the period of the French Revolution from that of the decades before 1789. For the

war that was fought between August, 1914, and December, 1916, Europe had been prepared, and despite the defection of Russia in the second half of the latter year, the struggle was, on the whole, just such a conflict as Europe had feared and foretold for nearly a generation before it came. But with the end of the campaign of 1916 both contestants have to confess a measure of defeat. Neither's strategy has brought a decision, neither group of powers, looking to the immediate future, can convincingly lay claim to a prospective decision.

The consequence of this failure in both camps is the beginning of domestic protest and disorder on either side of the firing lines. Implicit confidence, unquestioning patriotism, ungrudging sacrifice, these begin to disappear. Each government finds itself daily on trial before a public which is both suspicious and unfriendly, and each leader is compelled to defend himself, not merely against charges of incompetence in conducting military operations and diplomatic enterprises, but against the more dangerous allegation that he is actually prolonging the war by a refusal to recognize facts as they are and to accept conditions which he cannot modify.

In a certain measure it is correct to say that the campaign of 1916 marks the end of the period in which unity at home expresses the will to win of each of the peoples at war. The symptoms out of which the Revolution developed in the Slav Empire are discoverable to a degree in all nations, and war weariness grows apace in Britain as in France, in Germany as in Austria, until all governments find themselves upon the defensive before their own peoples and all statesmen are condemned to make pacific gestures across the firing lines and utter proposals of peace which, however impracticable, give a semblance of readiness to end a struggle becoming intolerable for the millions.

And it was the failure of the campaign of 1916, the failure of the Allied campaign, quite as much as the failure of the German, which led to the profound modifications of spirit and purpose in the nations at war in the following year. By January 1, 1917, the rulers and leaders of both coalitions could expect only cynical distrust when they forecast a complete decision in the new year on grounds far less impressive than

the foundations out of which they had based sweeping prophecies in the preceding periods.

### III. OLD AND THE NEW

In the campaign of 1916 those German rulers who promised their subjects to destroy France briefly and completely, not only failed, but paid a price for the failure beyond all previous military calculation. Not only did the attack upon Verdun fail, but the Allied offensive at the Somme slowly but surely wore its way through the strongest German defences, and Allied artillery exacted a toll which brought mourning to all Germany. But, conversely, the Allies, whose offensive was rashly heralded with promises of a break-through and a liberation of France and Belgium, gained little more than six miles of shell-torn soil, on a restricted front, while the collapse of Rumania was a final curtain to all the hopes, dreams, and calculations of the Allies in the Balkans.

The Mitteleuropa which Germany had created in 1915 endured the tests of 1916 and on the Rumanian side was expanded to insure not one but three roads from the Central Powers to their Turkish ally. The delusion that France could be forced to make a separate peace by one more campaign in the west cost the Germans more men than Napoleon sacrificed to reach Moscow. But the Allied belief that the German lines in the west could be broken, was shaken in the long struggle from Albert to the outskirts of Bapaume, and though the subsequent German retreat from the Noyon salient, in March, 1917, established the right of the Allies to claim the Somme as a victory, faith in the Allied ability to break the German lines was once more demolished by the failures of France on the Aisne and Britain in Flanders in the following year.

In a sense, one may say that the Old Europe—the Europe of the period between the Franco-Prussian War and the Second Balkan War, the Europe of Bismarck, of Beaconsfield, the Europe of the Congress of Berlin and all the other convocations down to the Conference of London of 1912, the Europe founded upon the experience and history of the latter half of the Nineteenth Century—fought itself to the point of tem-

porary exhaustion in the first three campaigns of the war, its bankruptcy was a fact, already dimly perceived, when 1916 ended, and bound to be unmistakable before the new year had progressed far.

Issues, conditions, prospects, all submit to violent modifications before 1917 is far advanced. But for the survival of that horror and hatred of the German methods, disclosed in Belgium and France; but for the reassertion of these methods in the new submarine war, declared in January, 1917; above all, but for the intervention of the United States, no man can be sure that the war would not have worn itself out by midsummer and Europe have made another peace like that of Westphalia conceding to Germany profits such as France derived from the earlier settlements.

Always, therefore, in viewing the events of 1916, one must keep in mind the fact that an old world of ideas and of ambitions, of diplomacy and of statesmanship, is crumbling under an ordeal by fire, and giving way for the unknown, which is coming. Had the Allies won at the Somme, or the Germans at Verdun; had 1916 seen a decision of the war, or even, had it seen an old-fashioned settlement, after the German peace proposal, the ancient landmarks would probably have survived; the Europe which emerged from the storm would have been recognizable, in all respects, as the Europe of 1914, and of all times since the unification of Germany and Italy in the previous century.

Unmistakably 1916, owing to the events of this momentous year, represents a final effort of the old order and the old system to save itself, first, by successful military operations; second, by settlement around the green table in advance of the destruction of the existing European hierarchy, incident alike to popular discontent due to its continued failure to save mankind from the greatest of all known afflictions and to the outburst of that Bolshevik storm which was temporarily at least to transform conceptions and conditions in all the Allied countries. Straight through this year the reins of government remain fairly securely in the hands of statesmen well known when the World War opened, public opinion and popular emotion follow well-beaten pathways, but a few months later the Russian Revolution is the signal for a change

which fills the world with confusion and bewilders the contemporary observer as it may puzzle the later historian.

In 1916, as in the two preceding years, the military events claim almost exclusive attention. Verdun, the Somme, the Russian offensive in Galicia, the Italian success at Gorizia, the swift and infinitely sad tragedy of Rumania, these succeed each other with amazing rapidity and give to the military history of these twelve months a variety and a volume of operations and of battles which can hardly be paralleled even in the first brilliant years of the Wars of the French Revolution, while the Battle of Jutland, incomplete as it was, establishes a new standard of measurement in the conflict of modern navies.

#### IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAMPAIGN

Viewed in retrospect, the campaigns and battles of this year were barren of affirmative result. They were destructive of the foundations of all governmental systems at home, rather than of the armies or will-power of the enemy nations. Verdun may easily survive as the most brilliant single episode in human history, regard being had for the magnitude of the struggle and the miracle of French resistance, yet the Verdun epic ended almost where it began, leaving both contestants almost equally exhausted and the victorious French, again, as at the Marne, unable to turn an undisputed triumph into an offensive which should liberate France much less win the war.

In 1914 the statesmen failed to prevent war. Diplomacy and statesmanship were both bankrupt as machinery to preserve international peace. In 1916 the failure of the soldier to win the war, the incapacity of the generals in their department, was as clearly indicated as had been the earlier ineptitude of the rulers and leaders in their own field, and the consequences were unmistakable before another twelve months had passed. While the masses still preserved a confidence in the ability of their rulers and representatives, or a faith in the skill and efficiency of their generals, the war followed familiar highways, but in 1916 popular distrust in both grew to the point where the failure of the regular instruments of national and international action could be employed as an

argument for the substitution of the orator of the soap-box for the chief minister of the Czar, or the commander of a platoon for the ever-victorious Brusiloff.

All this was hidden from the world of 1916. We lived from day to day upon the reports of the fighting on the Heights of the Meuse or of the thrust upward toward the crest of the Albert ridge. Allied depression in the opening days of Verdun, heightened by the British disaster at Kut-el-Amara, intensified by the earlier narratives of the Battle of Jutland, changed to a full cry of optimism in July and August, when, with Verdun saved, German defeat in France and Austrian disaster in Galicia and on the Isonzo seemed assured.

No one who lived through 1916 in an allied nation can forget the rapidly changing emotions, now of confidence, now of despair, until the final disaster—the destruction of betrayed Rumania—abolished all hopes of swift success and ushered in the German peace proposal, which first bewildered and then angered the Allied world, but even though rejected, profoundly altered all subsequent discussion and opinion. Henceforth, until the return of the German offensive in the west in March, 1918, brought the Allied nations again to the edge of ruin, despite the rejection of the German proposal, the world talked of peace, even when the necessity for more war and greater sacrifice was still perceived on all sides.

And with the close of the campaign of 1916, at least for a time, we cross the frontier between the clarity of Nineteenth Century ideas and conceptions and the confused—and, to the contemporary world, incomprehensible—doctrines and formulæ which the Russian Revolution evolved but the radical elements in many other nations in some degree echoed. Even that statement of democratic war aims and peace terms which satisfied the convictions and conscience of the Allied nations of 1916 was destined in a few months to assume a colour of reaction which would move the Russian Bolsheviks to couple the Kaiser and the President of the United States in the same indictment and American and German governmental systems in one contemptuous death sentence.

Finally, with the campaign of 1916, we come to the end of the period

in which the military events claim first attention or attract most interest. Henceforth, for many months, the soldiers fight and the statesmen talk with equal interest for the world audience, and the audience itself, with ever-growing frequency, takes up the word itself. Up to the very end of the year the battle lines of the Allies survive apparently unshaken, the nations united against Germany seem still bound to each other by enduring bonds and agreed on a common programme—but hardly had the new year come when the whole Allied situation was profoundly modified, first by the external consequences of the Russian Revolution and then by the repercussion of Russian revolutionary doctrines in all other Allied countries. Between August 1, 1914, and January 1, 1917, events move logically and with little departure from the anticipated course, but between January 1, 1917, and New Year, 1918, there is a gulf hardly to be measured.

In every sense, therefore, the Third Phase of the World War is one of commanding interest and, viewed in the contemporary light, one likely to have enduring meaning as marking the frontier between an old world and a new, between the Europe of the Marne and Verdun and the world of the Russian Revolution and of America's entrance into the conflict.

## CHAPTER TWO

### VERDUN—THE GERMAN ATTACK

#### I THE GRAND STRATEGY

The opening of the new year saw the Germans in a military position not greatly different from that which they had occupied in the first days of the war and in certain respects, more satisfactory. In August, 1914, they had misjudged the Russians, both with respect to the rapidity of Russian mobilization and to Russian ability to destroy the Austrian armies. But now, thanks to the victories of the preceding campaign, there could be no immediate prospect of a Russian offensive, if, indeed, Russia were able again to make any attack. In 1914 Germany had, somewhat rashly, counted upon six weeks of immunity from eastern complications and she had calculated that in this time she could dispose of France. Now, for at least six months, she could hope for a free hand in the west.

As for the British, while the slender numbers which Field-Marshal French was able to concentrate in France for the first struggle had expanded to an army of at least half a million and was rapidly becoming a menace to the German western flank, in Flanders and Artois it was still lacking in guns and training to bring off a successful offensive, and the British failure at Loos was a reassuring circumstance for German High Command. Any British attack before midsummer would be bound to end badly, given the contemporary state of the British army, which was still in the early stages of reconstruction as a volunteer force, in large part officered by, and composed of, men newly withdrawn from civil life and necessarily lacking military training.

Once more, as in the days of the Marne campaign, the Germans had to deal with France, the one enemy inferior in numbers but equal in all else that made a nation strong in war. As in 1914, the German

problem was to dispose of France before Russia could become dangerous, but now the problem was to a degree complicated by the fact that Great Britain, as well as Russia, was bound, in a time which could be calculated, to become a real menace and that, once the first British armies were ready, a well-nigh inexhaustible reservoir of men and munitions would supply them for future campaigns.

Instead of six weeks, the Germans could reckon on well nigh six months in which to dispose of France, but failure to accomplish this would have even more serious consequences than the Marne defeat, for henceforth France was bound to be supported by British numbers, guns, and munitions, and any considerable German superiority in any field of military resources was unlikely ever to return save in the event of a Russian surrender not yet to be counted upon. But if France could be put out, then the British would be unable to be a menace to the Germans on the Continent for the duration of the war.

Germany had created her Mitteleuropa; she had undermined the military power of Russia; she had, in fact—although this was not yet plainly visible—dealt a death blow to the Russian Empire and insured the Revolution and collapse which were to follow. She had opened the road to the East and any peace, following that French defeat which was now to be sought, would confirm her mastery, not alone in the Balkans, not merely in Constantinople, but in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, on the road to India and at the gates of Egypt.

Under one more colossal blow the Germans might expect that France would collapse, or, even if she did not collapse, lose heart and abandon a struggle in which she had to stand alone, for neither of her greater allies could help her, and the cost to invaded France was bound to be tremendous. A great success, even though it were not a complete triumph—a success which should win more territory and at least one of the great fortresses of France—might lead the French to consent to a separate peace, provided that the terms were not made too onerous and that the German military achievement had been sufficiently shining.

All German comment, before it went to the discussion of the strategy of the next campaign, rested upon the declaration that this campaign


was to be a colossal and ultimate attempt to crush France, to break the spirit of the French people, a blow "aimed at the heart of France." To spend half a million casualties in such an undertaking, were it successful, would be a sound investment. That it could fail to succeed never entered the heads of German leaders or the German people, once more intoxicated by the wine of victory in the east and in the Balkans.

Having the initiative, as Germany unmistakably possessed it; having the advantage of men and of guns, since Russia was temporarily out and Britain still unready; it was obviously necessary to strike, to strike hard and successfully before either could enter. And this, to a degree, was the old problem of the Marne campaign of 1914, which had failed—but by only a narrow margin.

## II. WHY VERDUN?

The selection of Verdun as the objective of this great German attack—which was aimed primarily at the heart of France, not at any single military target—was made as a result of many conditions, which were little understood at the time and were long in gaining popular attention. In the first place, despite the strength of the old entrenched camp of Verdun; despite the great defences which had been constructed after 1871 and had made Verdun, alike in the military and in the popular mind, one of the greatest fortresses in the whole world; the actual achievement of German and Austrian artillery in August and September, 1914, had demonstrated that, for the moment, the gun had mastered the fort and the great strongholds, yesterday reckoned impregnable, had become well nigh indefensible.


The French had realized this before the Marne, and Sarrail had moved the mobile defenders of the fortress of Verdun well out beyond the fixed forts and into trenches. But the Marne campaign and the later German operations had combined to make the Verdun position not merely a salient, but a salient with many peculiar defects, viewed from the defender's angle. The successful thrust of the Metz garrison up the valley of the little Rupt de Mad, from Metz in September, 1914, had enabled the Germans to seize St. Mihiel and thus to cut the



Commercy-Verdun railway, one of the two lines serving the fortress. In their retreat from the Marne the Germans had halted about Montfaucon in positions from which their heavy artillery could interrupt the use of the Paris-Châlons-Verdun railroad, the other and more important line of communication.

Actually, Verdun was isolated from the rest of France, so far as railway communication was concerned. The little narrow-gauge line, which wanders up from the valley of the Ornain, near Bar-le-Duc, was quite inadequate for the task of munitioning a great army, if Verdun should be made the objective of a major German attack, and the French Parliament had turned a deaf ear to all the appeals of the army for the construction of a strategic railway to meet the necessities of the situation. Verdun was thus dependent almost entirely upon road communication for its supplies, as it remained dependent until the decisive phase of the attack was over.

In addition, the position itself had obvious defects which held out to the enemy the hope of achieving a great victory. While the trenches



held by the French east of the Meuse were along hills admirably adapted to defence, the force holding them stood with its back to the stream, which in late winter and early spring invariably overflows its banks, and the position of an army with its rearward communications menaced by a river in flood, once its lines were threatened, would be extremely hazardous.

To reinforce an army in this position, with the bridges over the river under artillery fire, to munition it sufficiently, would be a difficult task, and were the troops on the east bank ever defeated, their retreat might degenerate into a rout and into a real disaster. It was to avoid such a possibility that the French had withdrawn from the north bank of the Aisne near Soissons the previous winter, and it was the accidental destruction of a bridge at Leipzig, during Napoleon's retreat, after the battle, which made that defeat so costly to the great Emperor.

Verdun, itself, was without value. Vauban's old citadel was indefensible, although providing a good shellproof cover for certain departments of the defence. To capture Verdun, except as a detail in the defeat and rout of the French armies beyond the Meuse, would be of little permanent meaning, however great the moral effect of the success upon the publics, both German and Allied. But if, following a gigantic thrust, the Germans were able to insert a wedge between the French armies of the right, in Lorraine, and those of the centre, in Champagne, the war of movement might be resumed, the trench deadlock abolished, and the Germans might again take the road for Paris.

A successful wedge thus driven in at Verdun would conceivably compel the French to quit all their positions from Toul to Rheims, enable the Germans to cut the Paris-Nancy railway, and might compel the abandonment of all of northern and eastern Lorraine and the line of fortresses and bases from Châlons right down to Belfort. Actual possession of Verdun meant nothing, all depended upon the circumstances attending its capture, all was conditioned upon the success or failure of the Germans in crushing the French troops beyond the Meuse, for if these troops were able to make an orderly retreat behind the

Meuse, they would still maintain the whole French front intact; there would be no break through, only a local gain.

### III. VERDUN TOPOGRAPHY

Verdun, then, was a weak point in the French line, the weakest probably in the whole stretch from the Somme to Switzerland, and this inevitable weakness had been increased by the neglect of the French to prepare and maintain their defences beyond the Meuse. This circumstance, known to the Germans in advance, almost led to disaster and made the task of defending Verdun infinitely difficult, and perhaps in the long run impossible, for Verdun was actually saved at the Somme, although not until the French defence had been maintained to a point where the fall of the city would have had only moral value.

Having decided to attack the Verdun sector for reasons which are beyond criticism, the German General Staff had to consider the point at which the attack could best be made. It had also to decide the character of the attack; that is, whether it should be, like the French effort in Champagne the previous autumn, a thrust on a wide front, which would have meant an attack upon both sides of the river, or a drive on a narrow front, which involved an assault upon the eastern bank. It might have elected to attack upon both banks at once, but this would have called for a concentration of men and guns now beyond German resource.

To understand the German plans, it is necessary to grasp the salient details of the Verdun country. The town itself lies in a wide valley through which flows the Meuse. Seen from any of the surrounding hills, it rather suggests a lump of sugar in a saucer, and the lump stands for the mass of the town, rising about the slopes of the citadel and crowned by the twin spires of the cathedral, the single conspicuous landmark in the town, while the rim of the saucer represents the surrounding hills occupied by the now useless forts. On the west bank of the river these hills, which draw back from the river, are divided by a deep, open furrow, through which comes the Paris-Verdun railway.

In the old days, Verdun, with its rocky citadel guarding the bridge

across the Meuse, was the key to the main road from Metz to the capital, that is from Germany to France. Taking Verdun, which surrendered without resistance, the Prussians had penetrated through the Argonne into the outskirts of the Plain of Châlons only to be defeated in the Cannonade of Valmy, in the wars of the French Revolution. In 1870, Verdun had held out manfully and German invasion had been deflected southward although the town ultimately fell to German artillery.

But since the Germans had forced the northern gates to France and come south through Belgium, Verdun was no longer an outwork of the capital. About Noyon the Germans were, in fact, little more than fifty miles from Paris, while Verdun was one hundred and forty. It is necessary, therefore, to dismiss all idea that Verdun was a gateway to anything. It was a position back of the French front, a useful base; its dismantled forts served to furnish cover for reinforcements and depots for munitions, but the town itself was no more important than a score of others similarly placed behind the firing line. The Germans did not attack the fortress of Verdun, which had become a figure of speech; they attempted to break the French line before Verdun, the trench line, as the French had endeavoured to break the German line in Champagne in the previous September. And like the French, they came near succeeding.

The real military value of the Verdun position was derived from the range of hills rising sharply from the east bank of the Meuse and marked on all maps as the Heights of the Meuse (*côtes de Meuse*). This range of hills, some six hundred feet above the river, separated the Meuse from the peculiar Plain of the Woëvre. They were, in fact, a sort of hog's back between two depressions. Both on the Meuse and on the Woëvre side these hills—which, in reality, constitute a plateau upward of six miles wide on the average—break down sharply. Looking out upon the Woëvre, from the crest about Fort de Vaux, in the early morning light, one could imagine oneself standing upon a cliff overlooking the sea, so sharp is the fall to the marshy plain, at that hour, hidden in mist.

While this plateau appears fairly regular upon the map, it is cut and seamed by an endless number of ravines, which descend rapidly, either

to the Meuse or the Woëvre Plain, ravines worn in the clayey soil by little brooks. There is thus an infinite number of hills, not much above the general level, but separated from each other. Each of these hills was the prize of a combat and upon the more important stood the old forts of Verdun. Most of the slopes, too, were covered by little woodlands, all of which were marked with names upon the military maps and all of which, before they disappeared under the avalanche of shells, were the scenes of desperate fighting.

When the German blow fell, the French were holding the crest of the Heights of the Meuse straight across from the Meuse to the Woëvre Plain, some eight or nine miles north of Verdun and about four miles north of the outer circle of old forts. To advance upon Verdun the Germans could only move along the top of this range, that is along the crest of the plateau, because the Woëvre Plain is absolutely impassable for all transport and even for foot soldiers during the winter and spring owing to its marshy character. Thus the German advance was in reality a push south on a front of from six to seven miles, varying in width as the Heights of the Meuse varied, between the Meuse and the Woëvre. The fighting was for the separate hills, which rose a little above the general elevation, and the woods and ravines were obstacles which gave a local character to the entire campaign.

Had the Germans been able to push south as quickly as they had expected to do, they would have cleared the French off all the plateau as far south as the city, driven them into the Meuse valley east of that river and below the hills, and the enforced French retreat across the river, under direct observation and fire, would have been extremely difficult. Here was the one possibility of disaster, which disappeared after the first week. But the main German operation was in this period always southward along the plateau, never westward up out of the Woëvre, and the chief operative front was never much over seven miles wide.

West of the Meuse and north of Verdun there is a considerable ridge running east and west, that is at right angles to the river and the Heights of the Meuse; this ridge marked the line of the old forts on the left

bank, but north of it are several detached hills, of commanding elevation, notably Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme. These hills were held by the French when the battle opened, and after the French line on the east bank had temporarily collapsed the Germans were still held up on the east bank by the flank fire directed across the river at the Germans on the Heights of the Meuse. In the second phase of the battle the Germans were obliged to halt their operations on the east bank, while they pushed the French off these elevations, but having done this, they resumed their advance on the Heights of the Meuse and the fighting on the west bank did not again rise to any magnitude.

#### IV. THE GERMAN PLAN

For this Verdun offensive the Germans had begun preparations at least a year before they made the attack. Metz, their chief base, was conveniently near to the point selected for attack; perhaps an additional reason why the Verdun front was selected. New roads and light railways were constructed in a circle about the Verdun salient as far west as Montfaucon, where the Crown Prince had his headquarters, and for many months the accumulation of munitions and material went forward.

For this attack the Germans planned to employ the methods used in the east by themselves and in the west by the French and British, but with certain improvements. The concentration of artillery upon a narrow front, now become familiar in all offensives, was retained. It was indeed expanded and not less than 1,500 guns of large calibre, including German 42-centimetre and Austrian 380's, were solidly emplaced. But, as an additional detail, it was planned to make the major portion of the concentration movable, so that the guns could follow the men.

The French had failed in Champagne because they had been unable to get their guns forward to use upon the German third line after the first and second had been destroyed. The Germans planned to make their infantry little more than a subsidiary arm. The artillery was to destroy the French positions. The infantry, after careful reconnaissance, was to advance and occupy the destroyed positions. Then the guns were

to be moved forward and the second line reduced. Thus, the Germans calculated that in four days, with slight loss, they could reach Verdun itself, covering a distance of little more than eight miles. They calculated that the French losses would far exceed their own, that demoralization such as had occurred at Morhange in the opening days of the war would again occur when the French infantrymen found themselves overwhelmed by enemy fire and unsupported by their own guns.

In addition the Germans counted upon the element of surprise. And in a very large measure they counted justly. Certainly the French were aware of the growing concentration near Verdun; unmistakably their official documents disclose suspicion of a coming thrust in this sector, but no less unmistakable is the fact that the blow far surpassed any expectation; found them without an adequate counter-preparation; temporarily paralyzed their High Command, which, in the opening days, contemplated a retreat across the Meuse and the surrender of Verdun; and brought them within a narrow distance of utter defeat, for Verdun was saved by a margin so narrow as to seem, even now, indefinable.

To make the attack, following the guns, the Germans drew down to the east bank of the Meuse three crack corps, which were put through special training and were fed with a generosity unequalled during the war. These three corps, in addition to two which were regularly attached to the Crown Prince's arm on this sector, supplied the resources for the early phases of the attack; later, when the battle became a siege and the casualties swelled to the hundreds of thousands, many other units were drawn in, but at the outset rather less than three French divisions had to deal with five German army corps. The French troops, too, were territorials, while the Germans were the best that the Kaiser's army possessed and, in certain stages, fought under his eye, as they fought continuously under the observation of the Crown Prince, their nominal commander-in-chief. The real leader, of course, was not the Kaiser's heir, but Count von Haeseler the aged conqueror of Antwerp who planned the whole campaign and went into retirement when it failed, followed presently by Falkenhayn, the Chief of the Great General


# WITH THE FRENCH AT VERDUN



*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

## A REVIEW BY GENERAL PÉTAIN

General Pétain, the defender of Verdun, is here seen decorating the flag of one of the heroic French regiments under his command



*From "L'Illustration"*

HENRI PHILIPPE PÉTAIN, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF FRANCE

"More than all I saw and heard at the front and in Paris, the look of this man convinced me that Verdun would not fall, that France herself would not either weary or weaken." —*Frank H. Simonds*

*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

A SCENE ON DEAD MAN'S HILL ON THE MEUSE RIVER

This hill tragically justified its name in what Mr. Simonds describes as "scientific butchery not equalled before in all the history of war." These French soldiers are triumphantly traversing recently captured German trenches.






*From "L'Illustration"*

#### A VERDUN BATTLEFIELD

In continuous procession the waves of attacking troops passed the Petite Carrière



*From "L'Illustration"*


#### A WINDOW OF FORT DE VAUX, LOOKING OUT OVER A TRENCH TO THE SOUTH

"Looking out upon the Woëvre, from the crest about Fort de Vaux, in the early morning light, one could imagine oneself standing upon a cliff overlooking the sea, so sharp is the fall to the marshy plain, at that hour hidden in the mist."—*Frank H. Simonds*

*Free & Open from "Pictorial Press"*

AN UNDERGROUND HOSPITAL AT VERDUN

Constant and terrific bombardment made it impossible to establish above ground even the most temporary emergency stations. This is a ward in one of the subterranean chambers of a fort used as a hospital. The little dog in the foreground refused to be separated from his wounded master.



*French Official from "Pictorial Press"*

A ROADWAY IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF VERDUN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

—“300 officers, 30,000 men, and 3,900 cars were occupied in the automobile service, which was the real transport system. This system saved Verdun; the guns and divisions of the Meuse never ran short of munitions or food, while the regular relief of the troops at the front took place without delay or hindrance.”

—*Frank H. Simonds*



*Printed by Paul Thompson*

### GERMAN ARTILLERY SUPERIORITY VANISHED WITH THESE GUNS SUCH AS THIS ONE APPLIED

With the aid of this gun and others of the same calibre the French launched their triumphant counter-offensive which regained Verdun





A BATTERY OF THE FAMOUS FRENCH 75's AT VERDUN

This battery is engaged in barrage fire at Douaumont. "On February twenty-sixth the French counter-attacked on the Douaumont Plateau, all but retook the fort, and brought the German flood to a standstill."—*Frank H. Simonds*

© Western Newspaper Union

Staff, who was responsible for what proved the greatest of German defeats since the Marne.

For several weeks before the main attack the Germans had carried on minor and deceptive operations on many fronts, operations which at once warned the French of a coming blow yet gave them no clue as to the point selected for attack, but rather, since the feints were along the Champagne and Artois fronts, contributed to confuse them as to the enemy's intention.

Finally, as the ultimate incentive to his troops, the Crown Prince, in the order of the day, on February 21, thus addressed his soldiers: "I, William, see the German Fatherland compelled to pass to the attack." And this attack, all the troops who were to participate in it had been told, was to be the brief prelude to peace, the crowning achievement of German arms.

#### V. THE FLOOD

At 7:15 on the morning of February 21, the Battle of Verdun began. Unlike the French at Champagne and the British at Loos, the Germans did not preface their attack by a bombardment of many days. On the contrary, they sought to preserve the element of surprise to the latest possible moment and relied upon the destructive effect of the heaviest concentration of artillery yet known in war, to accomplish in a brief period of time that preparation which was essential to permit their infantry to advance. Of this concentration, mainly made about the village of Gremilly and in the Forest of Spincourt, less than two miles from the French lines, French aviators reported, when it had been unmasked, that the number of the guns defied their ability to indicate them upon the map.

At the moment when they were assailed by this artillery deluge, the French were holding a front line straight across the Heights of the Meuse, from a point between the villages of Consenvoye and Brabant on the river to the edge of the Woëvre Plain, some seven miles to the east, whence it ran out into the plain for a few miles and curved back gradually to the edge of the Meuse Heights far below Verdun. But the

German storm was mainly concentrated upon the line between the river and the plain, although there was heavy firing all the way from Montfaucon to St. Mihiel.

Under this avalanche the French first line collapsed and disappeared. Before many hours trenches had practically ceased to exist, yet through this day the French held on in some fashion over most of the front, and the Germans at this stage, still adhering to their original idea of sparing the infantry and making complete artillery preparation in advance of infantry attack, attempted relatively little.

On the following day, however, the real attack began. Thenceforth for four days the struggle is only a confused and confusing attempt of the remnants of three French divisions of territorials—shelled out of their first and second lines, lacking any third line—to keep a front to the Germans and maintain some sort of a line between the river and the edge of the plain. Hills, villages, woods were fought for with a bitterness not yet known in the western war, save for a moment about Ypres.

At this time the weather was very bad, snow and fog crippled the aviation branches of both armies, the men who fell died of cold where they lay. Scenes recalling the fighting in the Wilderness in our own Civil War were enacted in a dozen of the little woodlands and ravines, and all the agonies of the American conflict were accentuated by the rigours of winter.

Under the weight of numbers and artillery the French troops were gradually ground to powder. Save for two brigades, toward the end they were without reinforcements; their mission was to hold to the last and they fulfilled it. Their duty was to exact the greatest possible price for each yard of German advance, and they exacted it. But they were from the outset a forlorn hope; doomed, and knowing they were doomed. After the first two days the fight became a struggle in open country, there were no more trenches, only shell holes, and on both sides the losses were terrific. Verdun thus instantly gained the place it was to hold for many months as the graveyard of the contending armies.

Steadily, however, the Germans pressed forward. They did not keep to their schedule, which should have brought them to Verdun in

four days. It proved impossible for the guns to keep pace with the infantry and little by little the Germans were compelled to lay aside their original conception of an advance, in which the infantry soldier was only an escort to the gun, and throw their troops into the furnace with ever-increasing losses. But for four days the advance did go on remorselessly and irresistibly.


On February 25, therefore, the Germans reached the last line upon which the defenders of Verdun could stand, if they were to make any stand. In these days the Germans had come down along the Heights of the Meuse for more than four miles. They had set foot upon the Douaumont Plateau, looking directly down upon Verdun, four miles away, and they had taken the dismantled hulk of Fort Douaumont, which had earlier deserved the name the Kaiser now bestowed upon it: "The corner-stone of the chief defence of our principal enemy."

Verdun itself was in flames and ashes; it had been hastily evacuated by the civil inhabitants; the town was under ever-increasing fire, and the Germans looking down upon it, on February 25, from the Douaumont Plateau might well have believed that one more thrust, one more day, would tell the story. Already the price paid had far exceeded all German calculation. German preparation in munitions, as in reserves, gigantic as both had been, had not measured the expenditure either in lives or in shells, but not even on the morning of the Marne did German prospect of a supreme victory seem more brilliant than it did on the night of February 25, 1916.

Eastward from Fort Douaumont, which they held with a firm if still challenged grip, German troops were within a few hundred yards of Fort de Vaux and little more than a mile before them was Fort de Souville. If these forts fell, the end would be sure and that end might bring with it a disaster to the whole French army east of the Meuse from Verdun to St. Mihiel. Yet, near as were these last barriers, it was not until the end of the first week in June that the Germans reached the ruined casemates of Vaux, and six months were insufficient to permit them to enter Souville.

On February 26 the French counter-attacked on the Douaumont

THE FLOOD FEB. 21-26, 1916



SHOWS GROUND GAINED BY GERMANS.

Plateau, all but retook the fort and brought the German flood to a standstill. In point of fact, although the truth was hidden alike from Germany—still celebrating the preliminary victory and preparing for the fall of Verdun—and from France—at last roused to the full extent of the Verdun danger—the Battle of Verdun was over, the siege was about to begin. Thus February 26, at Verdun, like September 9 at the Marne, is a memorable day in all French history and in all world history. Like Foch's thrust at Fère-Champenoise, Balfourier's counter-attack on the Douaumont Plateau was a determinating circumstance in one of the decisive battles of human history.

## CHAPTER THREE

### VERDUN—THE FRENCH DEFENCE

#### I THE SUPREME ACHIEVEMENT

The defence of Verdun is, perhaps, the finest achievement in the two thousand years of military history of the French race. It was—like the Marne—a rally, after initial defeat; it was—like the Marne—the flash of the collective genius of the race, after preliminary mistakes and weaknesses which had jeopardized all; but—unlike the Marne—it was not a sudden return to the offensive, followed by a swift and complete victory. The German attack upon Verdun lasted from February 21 to October 23, and during six months of this time the situation of the defenders was always precarious and frequently desperate.

It was the tenacity of the defence which amazed the world; it was the revelation of that obstinate and unyielding spirit which made “They Shall not Pass” the watchword of the soldier, that first amazed and then thrilled the audience, which was the whole civilized world. It was a resistance such as might have been expected of the Anglo-Saxon race whose stubbornness in defence is as proverbial as the *furia francese* in attack, but in the French it was the demonstration of qualities unsuspected even after the Marne.

The description of the actual occurrences, the offensive and the counter-offensive, can be simply told, but no power of description can justly appraise the real achievement of Verdun, because it was the achievement of the French soldier himself, badly led at the outset, plunged into a contest against hopeless odds, without the protection which ordinary care should have given him, superbly commanded in all the later phases, but first and last victor, in the greatest battle in French history, by his own courage, his own innate military genius—above all else, by his character, his capacity for endless endurance and unmeasured sacrifice.

At the Marne there had been a small contingent of British soldiers, who fought gallantly but contributed little to the outcome; at Verdun France stood alone. Hers was the whole achievement and hers the entire sacrifice. Had she failed, Britain would have been beaten before she was ready, Germany would have triumphed while the United States was still unmindful of the real issues at stake on the remote European battlefield. For the second time in the World War, France saved all the western nations. Verdun was, then, an epilogue to the Marne, a preservation of the decision reached on the earlier battlefield, which must forever stand with Marathon, with Poitiers and Châlons, as one of the supreme battles and victories of arrest, which halted barbarism on the point of destroying western civilization.

And almost from the moment that the first German assault struck the French lines upon the Heights of the Meuse, all France felt the greatness of the peril and magnitude of the crisis. Thereafter, all through the long months of agony, when the battle had developed into a siege, when the German troops still slowly but surely pounded their way forward, it was as if the whole French nation had set its shoulder against this ultimate portal by which the Barbarian was seeking to force his way to the heart of France.

All through these long months there was a never-ending sense in Paris, in the provinces, that the life of France was at stake; and not since the days of the incursions of the Teutonic hordes, when Rome was falling, has any great people more consciously confronted the peril of destruction than did the French. To be in France in that great hour was to feel an intensity of emotion combined with a steadfastness of purpose which was unforgettable. In that time France, the nation, was fused into a single purpose and a single thought. Bleeding terribly from the tremendous wounds inflicted by a more numerous and still better-prepared enemy, the French people, at the front and behind it, echoed and re-echoed the words of the first defenders: "They shall not pass."

It is this fundamental fact that must be recognized and cannot be embodied in any description of what took place about the old Lorraine fortress. When Pétain reached the broken lines, Verdun, by every law

of war, was lost; when Douaumont fell, the road to Verdun was all but open, and the Kaiser did not go beyond probability when he forecast the speedy entrance of his troops into the French town. To him, to his army, it must have seemed thereafter as if the very law of gravitation had been arrested to save Verdun. The defence of Verdun, like the victory of the Marne, was a miracle; it was the same miracle—the miracle of France herself, once more revealed to an incredulous world.

## II. FRENCH PREPARATION

Against the storm, dimly suspected in the weeks preceding the German attack, the French had made certain preparations which were wise and far-seeing; by contrast, they had neglected certain essentials which almost brought a deserved disaster and which ultimately ended the military career of more than one French general. Indeed, as Falkenhayn fell when Verdun held out, so Joffre went ultimately into honourable but unmistakable retirement because the French nation, still grateful for his enormous service at the Marne, saw in the circumstances of Verdun evidences of failing energy and defective foresight which could no more be tolerated in him than those faults in his subordinates, which, at an earlier stage, he had punished unpityingly.

Chief among the failures of the French at Verdun had been the neglect to prepare a third line of defence behind the two lines left by Sarrail when he quitted Verdun, after his original defence in the Marne Campaign. Had this third line been constructed before the Douaumont Plateau, as it had been sketched, the worst of the suffering of the later months would have been avoided and the German attack might have been permanently halted at the edge of the old entrenched camp. Because there was no such line; because, in addition, the two lines which existed were not kept in sufficient repair; German advance, in the first flood, reached and passed Douaumont and gave German High Command reason for pushing the operation, despite the larger failure of the opening week.

Exactly the same neglect had brought ruin to the Russians at the Dunajec less than a year before. Prevision on this score had saved

the Germans at the Battle of Champagne in September, 1915, when the French had carried the first line and pierced the second. Equally inexcusable negligence was to lead to one more disaster to the Allies, when Italy was broken at Caporetto on the Upper Isonzo, in 1917.

When the German blow fell, therefore, not only were the existing French lines on the Meuse Heights in bad condition; not merely were their defenders territorials and not first-line troops (a circumstance hardly to be mentioned now, in view of the defence made by these territorials); but there was lacking a solid third line to which to retire when the first two lines were pierced.

The neglect of the railway communications is chargeable to the French politician and not to the French army. But for the preparation made by the General Staff, when the effort to obtain a new railway line failed, Verdun would have been doomed at the outset. But against such an emergency as was now to come, the Staff had completed a plan by which an army of 250,000 men, with all its supplies and material, could be moved by automobile transport to the Verdun sector. It had reconstructed the highways, it had provided the motor transport. In this preparation lay the salvation of the city.

Thus, on the eve of the German assault, the French were holding the Heights of the Meuse, facing the coming tempest with barely three divisions of territorials, occupying trenches no longer in the best state of repair, having behind them a river in flood, supported by little or no heavy artillery, and—whatever the unrest and uneasiness in the mind of the High Command—unwarned, in any adequate measure, of what was to come. They were occupying a sector which had been long quiet and was reckoned impregnable by those who looked at the impressive heights beyond the river and paid too little attention to the actual weaknesses of the position, viewed as a whole.

Despite all these circumstances, long established and no more to be disputed, there grew up—and persists—a legend that, in attacking Verdun, the Germans walked into a trap skilfully set for them by Joffre; that from the beginning to the end of the struggle they were actually the

victims of strategy which had foreseen all and provided against all emergencies. Nothing is further from the truth. The French at Verdun were surprised at least as completely as were the Russians at the Dunajec. They were surprised with insufficient defences, with no proper system of support lines behind them, their existing lines were torn to pieces in the first four days of bombardment, and for most of the first week the French fought in open country far behind the last line of prepared trenches which had belonged to them on February 20.

The French achievement was greater in view of these handicaps at the start, but so was the sacrifice, the sacrifice which began when Balfourier's "Iron Division" was compelled to counter-attack and hold on under annihilating artillery fire, while a new line of trenches was constructed and a defensive position organized. This is the tragedy of the Verdun story, known to all France even in the earliest days, but long hidden from the world.

### III. THE DECISION TO FIGHT

When the first artillery bombardment signalled to the French High Command the new German activity, it was impossible for Joffre and his associates to act immediately. Time must be allowed to find out whether the Verdun operation was a real attack or a mere feint. If it was a feint, then to hurry an army to this point might be to leave the real objective of the enemy unguarded. Thus, while preparations were made to set in motion the transport machinery, which had been prepared, no real steps were taken to relieve the troops defending the Heights of the Meuse until February 24.

By this time there was no longer any mistaking the magnitude of the German thrust. Indeed, the real question had now become whether it would be wise or even safe to defend the east bank of the Meuse at all. Joffre, himself, inclined to the belief that it would be unwise and even perilous. Under pressure from Paris he sent his chief adviser—General de Castelnau, the defender of Nancy—to Verdun to make the great decision. Upon Castelnau devolved the duty of deciding whether a new French army would be thrown across the Meuse to de-

fend the eastern hills, or the whole French line drawn back from the east bank of the river from Verdun straight down to St. Mihiel.

In the latter case Germany would justly claim a very considerable victory. Verdun might fall, the Germans would be solidly established on the line of the Meuse if they should later have to retreat; but the new French position, resting on the western hills, would doubtless hold; the German advance would be halted at the western edge of the river, and the success would be local, not decisive. Given the extent of German advance already achieved, to throw a great army across the flooded river, whose crossings were now under German observation and fire, might be to court disaster. Unmistakably the memory of Sedan and that other political interference were in Joffre's mind when he inclined to refuse the German challenge and retreat.

Paris, the politicians, the Government, on the other hand, recognized the moral value of Verdun. They perceived the degree to which the German public would be elated, the French nation depressed by the loss of a city which, in the minds of both countries, was still the cornerstone of French defence, despite the fact that contemporary war had robbed it of this distinction. There was, then, in these days, a real crisis in Paris as the probability of the fall of Verdun became more and more apparent and the views of the French Generalissimo were more and more widely known.

Once at Verdun, however, Castelnau decided for the defence. He saw both the moral and the military significance, he recognized Verdun to be the same problem which he had solved at Nancy. On his word the decision to defend was made, the French High Command accepted the battle challenge of the German. And as the first step in the defence, Castelnau summoned Pétain—the man who had saved the situation at Soissons in the preceding winter, gained reputation at the Artois fighting, and won real fame in the Battle of Champagne, which had been of his planning. The next day Pétain was on the spot; the new phase was about to open.

But on February 24, when Castelnau advised the defence, there were still no reserves available and Pétain was not yet come. For two days

more the survivors of the territorials, who had met the first rush, were asked to hold on. That they did this may be reckoned for them as well nigh the finest achievement of the whole war. But during these two days their sacrifices were tremendous. And despite all their heroism and devotion, the Germans were able to set foot upon the last defensive line of Verdun, the positions which should have been fortified by the French and were not; and when Pétain at last began to throw his advance guards across the Meuse, Douaumont had fallen, the French line was broken on the Douaumont Plateau, and, for the moment, the road to Verdun was open.

It was this situation—"delicate," to borrow from the official phrase later published—which Pétain restored by throwing the Twentieth Army Corps across the river and against the victorious Brandenburgers, who had taken Douaumont. While the Iron Corps, the most famous in the French Army, counter-attacked, held the German advance, and rewon considerable ground, new trenches were dug behind them, new gun positions were selected and prepared; the men of Lorraine and Brittany, who made up the Iron Corps, opposed their bodies as a living wall to the German artillery and infantry, until the new army arrived and the new positions had been prepared. Magnificent this was, undeniably; but it was a sacrifice made necessary by the negligence which had gone before.

#### IV. THE END OF THE BATTLE

The Battle of Verdun may be said to have ended with February 26. To be sure there was no real termination, no pause between the battle and the siege, and by many military observers the great struggles of March 9 and even of April 9 are considered portions of the opening contest. They were, however, variations of the original German plan, modifications of the first scheme, which envisaged a swift, deadly thrust to Verdun through French lines broken by artillery bombardment. By the close of February the German had been compelled to alter his plan, and his alteration was the first step in the protracted siege, which lasted until October.

On Friday, February 25, when the Brandenburgers took Fort Douaumont, the German flood reached its high tide. The fort was not taken by storm, as the Kaiser's sonorous declaration affirmed; it was taken without resistance, and by surprise. In fact, so torn and broken had the French line become, that the few men who occupied this fort, now only a dismantled hulk, believed that they were far behind an existing French line and were surprised by troops which had penetrated a gap in French defence.

By contrast, on February 26, the French counter-attack—Balfourier's thrust out to the Ravine of Death on the edge of the Douaumont Plateau—brought the whole German rush to a dead halt. In fact, the storm had worn itself out. The French territorials, whose mission it was to hold on until the reserves could come up, had just managed to perform their task. They had inflicted losses so tremendous, they had opposed a barrier so obstinate, that the German reserves in men and munitions had been exhausted before the final blow could be delivered.

In a word, the whole German conception had broken down; it had not been possible for the guns to keep pace with the men. It had not been possible, even where the guns did keep up, to destroy the surviving French troops, who had been driven from their ruined trenches. In shell holes, in ditches, in the ruins of villages, they had found shelter and exacted an incredible toll of casualties from their foes. Lacking in heavy artillery they had used their "75's" with fatal effect and sacrificed guns freely that the artillery fire might be maintained to the last possible moment.

French High Command had drawn the thing fine. Had the new forces arrived one day later, Verdun would have been indefensible; had they come a day earlier, Douaumont and all the priceless gun positions toward Louvemont would have been saved. As it was, the last defensive position had been pierced and thenceforth the French were obliged to fight facing uphill, with their backs to the flooded river, while the Germans had direct observation upon Verdun and all the communications and bridges of their foes.

Yet defensible the position the French now occupied manifestly was, as the next months were to prove. Only one of the old forts, but the most important of the outer circle, had been captured, only on a narrow front had the old limits of the entrenched camp of Verdun been passed, and the thin wedge which the Germans had driven in offered no immediate opening for a final push to Verdun. On the contrary, the French flanks on the Charny Ridge and Le Mort Homme west of the Meuse and on the Vaux Plateau south and east of Fort Douaumont offered admirable opportunity to sweep the German centre about Douaumont with a converging artillery fire and forbade any further attempt to break the French centre until the French flanks had been disposed of.

As for the French, moreover, a new army had arrived, an army composed of first-line corps splendidly organized and well commanded. The momentary disorganization which was noted in Verdun in the first days of the attack—when terrified refugees, driven from the city by the bombardment, choked the roads, and every wounded man coming from the battlefield was a messenger bearing evil tidings—had disappeared. Above and beyond all else, for the second time in the war, and in her second great crisis, France had found a man. More and more, in the succeeding months, Pétain was to grow in stature until, with but a brief delay—while his Verdun-trained subordinate, Nivelle, was to have his chance and fail—he was to succeed to the honours and the authority of Joffre. And in history as Joffre will live as the victor of the Marne, Pétain's fame is assured as the defender of Verdun.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE SIEGE OF VERDUN

#### I THE GERMAN PROBLEM

On February 24 the French High Command—represented on the spot by General de Castelnau—had to make the momentous decision whether France would accept or decline battle on the Meuse Heights. To decline meant to abandon all of the French positions east of the Meuse, probably to evacuate the ruined town of Verdun itself, and above all else to confess a defeat—and a defeat which would bulk large in the eyes of the world, given the value which time and tradition had earned for Verdun. It meant to risk a disaster in a retreat across a flooded valley, but, all things considered, the chances of great disaster in this retreat were probably small.

On the other hand, to accept battle meant to throw a force of 250,000 piecemeal across the swollen Meuse, to face huge numbers now enthused by great successes and expecting decisive victory. The first French divisions to arrive must face this oncoming flood in the open field, without any but the most summary trenches to shelter them against the most important concentration of heavy artillery yet known in war. This was the challenge which Castelnau accepted on February 24; this was the “delicate” situation which Pétain partially restored on February 26. France deliberately chose to accept battle, to engage Germany until Russian armies should be restored and British armies ready. Once more France bore the burden.

By March 1, the situation had materially changed. The great German advance, the drive down the Meuse Heights on a narrow front and behind a huge artillery fire, had come to an abrupt halt, had indeed in some slight measure recoiled. Further advance was no longer possible in the centre, while from the flanks the French fire swept the com-


munications and rear of the Germans. Until these flank positions of the French on the Vaux Plateau and west of the Meuse were reduced, the main thrust must be postponed, and to postpone this operation in the centre was to give the French time to prepare against any new attack. The element of surprise, the advantage of overwhelming numbers, of incomparably superior artillery would have disappeared, when next the push was resumed on the Douaumont Plateau.

Accordingly, in the first days of March, the German High Command had to make its own decision, hardly less momentous than that of the French, less than ten days earlier. Should it continue the Verdun operation? The possibility of a supreme victory was unquestionably gone. The chance to break the French line, to drive a wedge between the armies of the centre and the right, and resume the march on Paris, between the Oise and the Meuse, had disappeared. Verdun might, now be taken, but it could only be taken after long siege operations, and taking it would have little more than a moral value if it were captured only after weeks or even months of effort. For when it did fall, granted that Germany finally triumphed, the French were sure to have prepared endless lines behind it on the admirably defensible hills that rise to the west of the Meuse Valley.

Puzzling as the problem must have seemed, the Germans, in reality, had no choice. They did not vainly throw away thousands and hundreds of thousands of good troops in obstinacy or blindness, as the contemporary reports loudly asserted. Their failure to win their first and greatest objective was not long in becoming apparent to them, but they had so committed themselves that they now had no real alternative but to continue. An offensive of the proportions of the Verdun attack in this present-day war requires months of preparation, the concentration of guns and munitions is a matter of many, many weeks. Railroads have to be rebuilt, roads constructed, light railways provided. Before the first gun is fired in a great attack, thousands of men may have laboured for six months, for a year, in preparing the way. And in the case of the Verdun operation, German preparation began fifteen months before the battle.


*French Official from "Pictorial Press."*

KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM AND PRESIDENT POINCARÉ OF FRANCE DECORATING FRENCH OFFICERS AT VERDUN  
If any soldiers ever deserved decorations it was those who in successfully resisting the apparently overwhelming German onslaught had shown not only the brilliance and dash supposed to be typical of the French soldier, but the bulldog tenacity supposed heretofore by most Americans at least to be an Anglo-Saxon specialty




RETURNING AFTER THE RETAKING OF DEAD MAN'S HILL.

"The French held on to them (Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304) as long as they could without too great losses and surrendered them finally, when the attack became too fierce and the price exacted satisfied their commander, only to retake them a year later with little cost."—*Frank H. Simonds*




VERDUN BEFORE THE WAR



*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

#### VERDUN AFTER THE BATTLE AND SIEGE

"As for Verdun, itself, it melted into dust and ashes as Arras had, as St. Quentin was to disappear. Yet the cathedral survived and to the very end there were houses, and even quarters, where houses remained standing, in which the troops lived."—*Frank H. Simonds*





#### A NEW USE FOR A CHURCH BELL

*Photograph from Underwood & Underwood*

This is the famous bell of the Vaux church as used on the Verdun front to give the warning signal, "gas coming." It was captured by the Germans when they took Vaux, but just as they were about to ship it to Germany Vaux was retaken by the French and the historic old bell was recovered.



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THE FRENCH RETAKING A CAPTURED SECTOR AT VERDUN

"In four hours the victors had traversed the ground which it had taken the enemy eight months to cross."

--Frank H. Simonds



A PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE BURROWS IN WHICH THE DEFENDERS OF VERDUN  
WERE OBLIGED TO LIVE



*French Officers from Pomeroy's Regt.*



*Photograph from Underwood & Underwood*

**TYPICAL SCENES IN VERDUN AFTER THE DEFEATED GERMANS HAD VENTED  
THEIR IMPOTENT WRATH UPON THE CITY**

© Underwood & Underwood

A HAND GRENADE ATTACK AT VERDUN

These men volunteered to attack a particularly dangerous angle of German trench. They were running forward, shouting and throwing their grenades, when this picture was snapped.



And once the offence has begun, the attacking High Command has but one of two possibilities before it, it may stop the attack or it may pursue it, but it cannot transfer its attack to any other sector on the battle front, not in weeks, not in months. Thus the Germans, when they could not force the Verdun positions in February and early March, could have abandoned the offensive but they could not have begun a new attack either in Champagne or in Flanders, because all their preparations had been made in Lorraine, and to prepare a new attack on another front would mean postponing all attack, accepting the defensive, sacrificing the initiative for six months at least, perhaps for the whole of the campaign of 1916.

This the Germans could not do, because within six months the British army would be ready to attack, the Russians would have recovered from the effects of their defeats of the previous year. Italy would be on the move, and France, unexhausted by any long campaign about Verdun, would be ready to support the British in the offensive already preparing along the Somme, as the Germans well knew.

Thus, while modifying her expectations, Germany had to continue her Verdun offensive. Her new calculations must be far more modest than her previous reckonings. She could expect, at most, only the capture of Verdun after a defence which would enable the French to assure the connection between their centre and eastern armies. She could expect a victory only at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, now that the French were alert and would soon be prepared. But she might hope that, together with the moral advantage of a victory—a limited victory, which would not pass beyond the possession of the ruins of Verdun—she would be able to inflict such losses upon the French as to preclude their participation in the summer offensive. She might, in fact, as her own statements presently forecast, “bleed France white” while the battle lines remained with little change.

In addition, German High Command might calculate that the sacrifices of France would arouse French protest and that this protest would lead the British to make a premature offensive, against which the Germans were at all times prepared. Such a premature offensive would

end all the peril of a summer attack. The whole scheme of an Anglo-French offensive in Picardy would go off at half cock and Germany would be able to preserve her Mitteleuropa without any other serious threat during 1916, in the latter half of which she might complete her operations against Russia and aid Austria against Italy. Finally, while possession of Verdun would mean little, viewed in the light of the situation as it existed, if Germany were ever compelled to retire behind the line of the Meuse, Verdun in her hands would mean the possession of a valuable bridgehead, while, in French hands, the whole position of the Heights of the Meuse would serve as a French bridgehead, threatening that new line, making it at all times dangerous, if not actually untenable, and preserving a threat to the invaluable Briey iron district only a few miles to the east, from which Germany derived the larger part of the iron ore used in her war industries.

Germany had to go on, she was committed to the Verdun sector, and the general situation imposed upon her the necessity to make some major attack. Her objectives had changed, her hope of a swift and decisive victory had gone by the end of February, but henceforth, on the only line on which she could conduct an offensive at the moment, she sought to cripple her French opponent by the infliction of heavy casualties and to avert a joint attack of her enemies in the summer by inducing Britain to make a premature assault in the early spring. Finally—since her Balkan work was not yet completed and the Salonica army a growing menace—she might calculate by her threat in Lorraine to persuade her enemies to withhold troops from Macedonia.

Of all these objectives the Germans, at the most, realized only the negative purposes. The French blow at the Somme was, probably, less powerful than it would have been had there been no long-drawn-out killing on the Heights of the Meuse. The army at Salonica was not sufficiently reinforced to enable it to coöperate when Rumania entered the war. But for this lessening of future menaces, Germany paid a tremendous immediate price. And it may be questioned whether any victory that would have been possible at the Somme could have had a

greater moral or material consequence than the final French achievement about Verdun in October and December, when the lost forts were re-taken and in a few hours the Germans were thrown out of all their conquests, with a loss of prisoners and guns beyond even Napoleonic achievement.

As for the British, they did promptly and gladly volunteer to make the attack, which the Germans hoped for and expected. But Joffre wisely forbade this, and the British, at his direction, were compelled to limit their contribution to the French by taking over one more sector of the French front, which brought the British lines well down toward the Somme and released at least one more French army for service elsewhere on the line, either at Verdun or at some other point, from which other units had been withdrawn to reinforce Pétain.

From February to August the Verdun siege was, first of all, a struggle to inflict losses, not to achieve any local decision or gain any position which had decisive military value. It was a battle fought in Lorraine by the French and by the Germans, the former seeking to give the British time to organize the Somme offensive, the latter endeavouring to make that offensive impossible by wasting French forces and thus forcing British attack. When the Battle of the Somme began, Verdun was in deadly peril, and the peril of Verdun slightly hastened the Somme stroke, but it is hardly to be conceived now, in the face of the evidence we possess, that the Somme could have led to decisive victory had there been no Siege of Verdun or that materially greater results could have been realized at the Somme than were realized along the Meuse had the French refused battle and retreated behind Verdun.

When the French High Command perceived that the Germans were fully committed to the Verdun operation, they deliberately accepted the challenge and all that happened thereafter was in accordance with French calculation. The French High Command very frankly accepted a risk—considerable at the outset, because of the chaotic condition of French defence beyond the Meuse—in the belief that it could ruin German strategic combinations; defend Verdun, which had only moral and local value; inflict upon the Germans a terrific if not a deadly loss

in casualties, and give the British and Russians time to prepare their new offensives.

And in the main the French High Command realized all its objectives. The Germans lost far more heavily than the French, although the losses of both were probably exaggerated at the time. They finally surrendered all the positions which they had gained, together with many guns and prisoners. The world steadily fixed its eyes upon the geographical entity, which was the city and the old forts of Verdun. It measured the situation by the approach of Germany to the Vauban citadel and the French victory by the subsequent expulsion of the Germans from all the area of the entrenched camp. But neither French nor German strategy after the opening days concerned itself with these details, save only in bulletins addressed to the uncomprehending publics.

One more circumstance needs clarification. The world spoke of the Siege of Verdun, but it was merely a figure of speech, for Verdun was never invested. The road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun was open at all times and little troubled by artillery fire, despite occasional barrages. The narrow-gauge line coming up from Bar-le-Duc was also in operation but its capacity was slight. By contrast, 300 officers, 30,000 men, and 3,900 cars were occupied in the automobile service, which was the real transport system. This system saved Verdun; the guns and divisions east of the Meuse never ran short of munitions or food, while the regular relief of the troops at the front took place without delay or hindrance.

In reality the Siege of Verdun was no more a siege than the Battle of the Somme was a siege of Bapaume or Péronne. It was one more incident in trench warfare, differing little, except as the nature of the country differed, from the later battles of the Somme and of the Flanders campaign of 1917. In Champagne in 1915 the French had been able to cut their losses and terminate their offensive whenever the cost became out of proportion to the immediate or prospective profit. They could do this because the general Allied situation did not then require a major offensive at some point in the line. At Verdun the Germans could not follow this course because they were bound to

attack, and thus to prevent, or modify, the weight of attacks which were gathering at the Somme on the Russian front and at Salonica.

## II. THE NEW FIGHTING

In this Siege of Verdun, which lasted with little real interruption from March to the end of August and did not really come to a close until the December offensive of the French had cleared the whole area of the entrenched camp, a new order of fighting was promptly disclosed. In all earlier battles the concentration of artillery had abolished the first and even the second line defences, and thereafter the assailant had either advanced to victory or been halted at a third line, and the struggle had quickly fallen back to the old familiar routine of trench warfare.

At Verdun the bombardment, which had hitherto been merely the prelude to infantry attack, endured for days and even weeks. Eight thousand shells fell daily for nearly three months upon Fort de Vaux, Trenches, dugouts, communication trenches; all these were soon abolished and never could be restored. Men fought in defences supplied by chance, chiefly in shell holes joined by some mere suggestion of a trench. The forest-clad hills of the Meuse Heights were soon swept clear of every vestige of tree or plant. The whole area was pockmarked with shell-craters, until looking down from an aëroplane, one might believe oneself examining the surface of the Sahara.

Organized lines and ways of communication were blotted out and roads reduced to mere trails; to step off one of these was to fall into a shell-crater and many men were drowned in such craters. In the fog and snows of the severe weather of February and March, 1916, the suffering of the troops on either side was indescribable. In France as in Germany, Verdun became a name of evil omen and it is probable that well nigh a quarter of a million of men perished in French and German armies combined, in the first ten months of the fighting; that is, through the period in which the Verdun sector was actively engaged.

No pen can describe and no brush paint the horrors of this siege, whether during the spring, the summer, or the autumn. The misery of those who fought is beyond all realization, the desolation of the coun-

try hardly believable, even for those who have looked out upon it. As for Verdun itself, it melted into dust and ashes as Arras had, as Rheims was to disappear. Yet the cathedral survived, and to the very end there were houses, and even quarters in which houses remained standing, in which the troops lived.

All the romance of the war of movement, the old-fashioned war; all the relative comfort which long months of experience had made possible in the trench-lines elsewhere, were absent from Verdun. Men lived in mud and ruins, they fought without shelter other than the shell-crater half filled with water which was frequently partially frozen. They were shelled for hours and for days without interruption. Ground was won only when it had been pulverized and the men who held it blown to fragments, and the smallest gain was frequently purchased at a cost beyond that paid by the victor in many of the considerable struggles of our own Civil War. In this contest the rifle played a relatively minor part. Apart from the artillery, bombs, liquid fire, asphyxiating gas, machine guns and the bayonet were the chief weapons of defence. In sum, the Siege of Verdun was a scientific butchery not equalled before in all the history of war. It was a butchery by artillery, primarily, but to artillery were added all the weapons that human ingenuity could fashion. And to the horrors of war were added the tortures of a relentless climate and a hostile countryside. Forests, swamps, and marshes—even fogs, rains, and blizzards—were details in the history, the horror, of Verdun.

This long-drawn-out agony was repeated at the Somme; it was at some moments surpassed by the horrors of the British and the French floundering in the mud and muck of the Third Battle of Ypres; but for concentrated agony and misery, for human sacrifice and human endurance, Verdun was, when it occurred—and still remains—a page unchallenged in human records. Indeed Death was perhaps the kindest friend the soldiers of Verdun knew, and that they welcomed it, scores of letters of German and French soldiers alike demonstrate.

And with the Siege of Verdun we enter a new phase of war. The Battle of Champagne, the Battle of the Aisne, these were but transitions from the Nineteenth- to the Twentieth-Century method, while First

Ypres was far more closely related to Waterloo than to the Allied offensive of 1917. But even the war of trenches had well nigh disappeared when the Verdun contest closes and it has become a war of shell holes, with the bomb, the machine gun, and the bayonet as aids to that artillery which now rules all and destroys all.

### III. ON THE LEFT BANK—DEAD MAN'S HILL

By the first of March the German advance on the Heights of the Meuse had definitely halted, and while in the next few days there were spasmodic efforts to gain ground on the Douaumont Plateau, the conflict, after several interludes, shifted from the centre to the flanks, from the Douaumont Plateau to the westward, to the left bank of the river north of Verdun; to the eastward to the Vaux Plateau, south and east of Fort Douaumont.

This second phase of the Verdun contest, which lasted until the last week of May on their left flank and until the end of the first week of June on their right, is called by the French the "Battle of the Wings." For the Germans a shift in operations was made necessary by the position in which they found themselves when the brusque attack had failed to capture Verdun and the first rush had been beaten down. At this moment the French lines were shaped like a crescent, with the horns facing the German lines; and from these horns—formed by Le Mort Homme ("Dead Man's Hill") and by Fort de Vaux, on the Vaux Plateau—the French directed a converging fire upon the enemy's centre within the curve of the crescent.

Before they could push farther forward in the centre, therefore, the Germans had to deal with the French flanks—with the left wing at Dead Man's Hill and the right at Fort de Vaux. In the end they were bound to reach Verdun, if at all, through the breach they had opened in the French centre, because there they were nearest to their objective and there the ground was most favourable to their attack. But French artillery on both wings swept this breach and until it had been silenced and the horns of the crescent seized, no further advance in the centre was possible.

The two operations that make up the Battle of the Wings went on not simultaneously, but alternately, during nearly three months. First on the French left and then on the right the Germans attacked. New artillery concentrations and new infantry divisions and corps were brought up; German losses mounted rapidly, while the French, holding the unessential positions lightly and counter-attacking only when some vital trench or redoubt was temporarily lost, paid a far smaller price for their resistance. In point of fact, there was nothing more costly to the Germans in the whole conflict than the struggles on the west bank of the river during March and April, save possibly the brusque attack upon Vaux—that assault which failed on March 9.

Important as was the place which these struggles for Dead Man's Hill and the adjoining summit, Hill 304, occupied in contemporary reports, they had no direct importance; they did not represent an effort of the Germans to get Verdun by moving up the left bank of the river. The total meaning of their effort was comprehended in the necessity to push the French guns and infantry off two hills on the left bank of the river, from which French fire commanded the western side of the Douaumont Plateau, and held up German advance in the centre.

When the Germans began their attack on the left bank the French there were still holding the line occupied when the Battle of Verdun opened. This line ran westward from the Meuse along the south bank of the little Forges Brook, which enters the Meuse just opposite the village of Samogneux, lost by the French in the first days, the stream which our own Americans crossed in the first stage of their offensive between the Argonne and the Meuse more than two years later. A branch of this brook coming down at right angles to the main stream and parallel to the Meuse, separates Hill 304 from Dead Man's Hill and the various German efforts aimed at taking these two isolated hills, first by frontal attack, then by a push up the south branch of the Forges Brook, and finally by an attack from the west up the slopes of Hill 304, which commanded Dead Man's Hill.

The main French defensive position on the left bank of the river was not along the crest of the two contested hills, but a couple of miles south

of them, along the Charny Ridge, which was higher than either and extended in an unbroken line westward from the Meuse and more than four miles north of Verdun. Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304 were far outside the old area of the entrenched camp of Verdun. The French held on to them as long as they could without too great losses and surrendered them finally, when the attack became too fierce and the price exacted satisfied their commander, only to retake them a year later, with little cost, when they had regained the offensive.

This battle on the left wing lasted from the first week of March to the last week of May. When it ended the French had been driven south and off of both hills; they had lost their power to assail the Germans on the Douaumont Plateau by a flanking fire. Thus the Germans obtained the result which they had sought, but at a tremendous cost in casualties and not until after three months of intense fighting. When they had attained their objectives they contented themselves with occupying and fortifying the captured hills, and the fighting on the left bank was over.

#### IV. ON THE RIGHT—FORT DE VAUX

The fighting on the right wing attracted more attention, and will probably enjoy more lasting fame, because it had a single, clearly distinguishable objective, Fort de Vaux, and because the defence of this fort—later described in one of the memorable books of the war—constitutes an epitome of the whole Verdun epic and one of the finest and most appealing chapters in the history of warfare.

Vaux itself, stood on a broad, fairly level plateau, facing east over the edge of the Woëvre Plateau and north fronting Fort Douaumont across the deep ravine carrying the brook of Vaux. Little watercourses have here bitten so deeply into the clayey soil that Vaux is really almost surrounded by ravines and thus practically isolated from the mass of the Heights of the Meuse behind it, which bear the inner line of old forts, Tavannes and Souville, among them.

The Germans, who attacked Vaux from the north, advanced out of the valley at its feet, having taken the little village of Vaux-devant-

Damloup, just under the fort. As they advanced the contour of the hills gave them a protected sector right under the fort, the slope being too sharp to permit the guns of the Vaux position to reach them. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the Germans endeavoured to repeat their achievement at Douaumont and on March 9 announced that they had taken Vaux by a brusque attack. This was utterly untrue and compelled them to invent a successful French counter-attack the next day to explain why the French were still in Vaux. Rarely hitherto in war has a combatant been obliged to bestow an imaginary victory upon his foe merely to cover the falsity of his own claims of an earlier success.

From March 9 onward the battle for Vaux went forward with unending severity. Little by little the Germans crept up the Vaux Plateau, more and more closely their trench lines drew about the doomed fort, which was now nothing but a heap of shattered masonry and crumbling brick. By the first of June the investment was complete. Only a little garrison of some 600 men still held out; and this garrison, swollen by the survivors of other units who had taken refuge there, was beyond the resources of the fort to feed or furnish with water.


Immured in the underground passages of the ruined fort, the gallant garrison still hung on. All direct communication with the French forces outside ceased. Carrier pigeons supplied the lack for the moment, but soon the last pigeon was released. Then for a day or two messages were flashed by heliograph. But by June 3 the end was in sight, for the Germans were now pushing up and occupying the ground over the ruins of the fort and the troops of the little garrison had to defend themselves against an attack from above, as the Germans following their bombs down the narrow staircases poured into the underground passages below.

Still Vaux held out, its garrison, defending the passages and the inner stairways from gallery to gallery by bombs, enduring several gas attacks. The Germans poured the gas down into the hideous caverns, in which the atmosphere was already mephitic; even liquid fire failed to tame the spirits of the defenders. It held out until food and water were both gone. Then, and only then, Major Raynal—whose


# THE SIEGE OF VERDUN

65

## THE BATTLE OF THE WINGS, MARCH TO MID-JUNE, 1916



## VERDUN IN EXTREMIS, JUNE 15-SEPT. 1, 1916



last message from his commander had been the announcement of his decoration for supreme bravery—yielded his sword to a conqueror, who, for once, honoured himself by honouring the brave man who had defended his post to the final moment of possibility.

The last resistance in the ashes of Vaux ended on June 7 and with this date the Battle of the Wings also ends. For more than a hundred days the Germans had been occupied in preparing the way for a renewal of their advance by the centre. These hundred days had been gained for the Russian preparations, which were already revealing themselves in a new offensive in Volhynia; they had been gained for the British, now approaching the point at which they might take the offensive with a reasonable chance of success.

Now in June the final problem was posed. Verdun had done its real work, its defence had achieved the primary purpose of the French High Command. Its fall now would only mean a moral defeat, the military purpose of the defence had been realized. But could the moral as well as the material victory be achieved? Could Verdun itself be held until that moment, now to be foreseen, when the Russian pressure in the east and the Anglo-French attack in the west would compel the Germans to abandon the struggle on the Meuse and transfer their guns and men to the Somme and the Styr? The Germans had planned to take Verdun in four days, and only now as the fourth month was ending, were they within sight of victory; only now was Verdun at last *in extremis*; could it hold for two months more?

#### V. THE ATTACK IN THE CENTRE

While the battle had raged on the flanks, the lines in the centre had changed but little. There had been a slight but immaterial German advance, while the French, on their side, had—by a brilliant counter-attack designed to relieve the pressure upon Vaux—stormed the ruins of Fort Douaumont and held them for one long May day, only to retire in the face of new German concentrations of artillery and men and this counter-offensive was to be the last ray of light for the defenders for many days.

When the final German thrust for Verdun began, the positions of the two contending forces were something like this: No longer facing south, but west, the Germans were endeavouring to advance from the Douaumont Plateau downhill toward the Meuse Valley and Verdun, four miles before them and in plain view. They and the French occupied halves of a gigantic letter "**H**," one of the sides representing the Douaumont Plateau, the other the parallel ridge which carried Fort Tavannes, and between these two sides ran the German route to Verdun. The cross stroke represents the narrow ridge connecting the two longer ridges and, itself carrying Fort de Souville. On this connecting ridge the French and German lines faced each other with only a few feet separating them and the whole German problem was by frontal attacks to force the French off this ridge, seizing first the Thiaumont redoubt and the village of Fleury in their immediate front and then Fort de Souville. If they could take Souville they would then isolate and capture Tavannes and advance upon Verdun along the three valleys which were followed respectively by (a) the light railway coming east from the village of Vaux; (b) the main Paris-Verdun-Metz railway, which between Vaux and Tavannes passes from the Meuse Valley to the Woëvre by a tunnel rather more than a mile long, and (c) the Metz-Verdun highway which borrows the least considerable of these depressions to cross the Heights of the Meuse.

As they thus advanced, the Germans would drive the French downhill, and, once Souville and Tavannes had fallen, the French would have only St. Michel and Belleville, forts which stand on the first slopes east of the Meuse and which, in the nature of things, could only be held lightly and for a brief time, since the retreat of their garrisons would be practically impossible and their destruction by German batteries on the higher ground to the east was bound to be only a matter of time. Forts, moreover, had long lost their old importance and even Tavannes and Souville were important only because of gun positions about them and the cover their underground galleries gave for reserves and for supplies of munitions and food.

June 8 to August 8 saw the final phase of the Verdun offensive

of the Germans. In this time the German line was pushed forward a little more than a mile, on the right it thrust the French off the Douaumont Plateau altogether and back upon the subsidiary and lower elevation of Froide Terre. Here the German advance was marked by the capture of Thiaumont Farm and redoubt. In the centre the German flood reached and passed the village of Fleury, attained the Chapelle St. Fine beyond, and halted exactly at the ditch of Fort de Souville, the extreme highwater mark. On their left, the Germans advanced from Fort de Vaux rather more than a mile, thus covering half the distance separating Vaux from Tavannes.

On August 8 the German line between the Meuse and the Vaux Plateau curved inward toward Verdun and then bent back to the Vaux Plateau; it was, in fact, a gigantic wedge driven toward Verdun, penetrating most deeply southwest of Douaumont. The Germans were now on the downward slope, less than four miles from the old Vauban citadel. They had flung back both wings of the French army defending Verdun, they had opened a breach in the centre. Souville, nothing but a shapeless mass of blackened ashes, was the single fragile barrier between them and an advance which would carry them to the Meuse.

But this advance was not to come. The Anglo-French offensive in Picardy was now five weeks old and it was no longer possible for the Germans to find reserves and munitions for two great operations. They had, in fact, lost the initiative. Had they been able to reach Fleury in March, there would have been no siege of Verdun, since an immediate French retreat beyond the river would have been inevitable. Had they arrived in May or June, there still would have been time to make the last leap. But in August the opportunity came too late. The Verdun game had been played out; Verdun had served the Allies' purpose; it had performed its full duty. In battle and in siege it had held for nearly six months. The military end had been attained in June, the moral objective was now realized in August; Verdun had not merely held out long enough to serve the purposes of Allied strategy, it had also supplied the moral victory, which was almost beyond calculation, given

the condition which Pétain had found when he came to Verdun on February 25. To the glory of Thermopylæ, Verdun had added the achievement of Platæa. "They shall not pass," the Poilu had said in February, and in August the Germans had not passed—the challenge had become a prophecy and the prophecy was already fulfilled.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### IRELAND AND KUT-EL-AMARA

#### I BRITISH PERPLEXITIES

While the guns of Verdun were awakening echoes all over the planet and little by little the world was realizing that France was engaged in a desperate duel to the death to hold a new German flood until Britain could at last arrive with her new armies, three events of unequal importance, but in the nature of things achieving equal attention, served to reveal British public life and British public sentiment at the lowest ebb since that hour when the menace of Napoleon had been removed by the victory of Waterloo and the exile to St. Helena.

These three events—the Irish Rebellion, the Surrender of Kut, and the Battle of Jutland—were utterly dissimilar. The Irish Rebellion hardly rose to the level of the draft riots of New York City in the Civil War period. At Kut, Townshend surrendered an army but little larger than Burgoyne surrendered to Gates at Saratoga, and of the entire force not over 2,000 were British. Finally, Jutland was in all its ultimate consequences a British victory, as complete a victory as Gettysburg had been on land for the North in the Civil War, since it left unshaken that superiority out of which victory was bound to flow, if it were not abolished; and at Jutland it was not even shaken.

Yet the immediate consequences of these three episodes were unmistakable. Each, in a sense, revealed a failure; together they disclosed an ineptitude in governmental quarters which shook the nation to its foundations and finally led, with brief delays, to the overthrow of the Asquith Ministry. For, of Ireland, men believed that a supine Cabinet had closed its eyes to the coming of an outbreak already foreshadowed by all competent observers; of Kut it was believed that a new Gallipoli tragedy had been made possible by the same fatuous inex-

# AËROPLANE WARFARE



*Photograph by Paul Thompson*  
CAPTAIN GEORGE GUYNEMER  
"Dead on the field of honour"



*Photograph by Peter A. Sully*  
A BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS


The eagle swoop of this pursuing battleplane on its prey, whose scurrying flight can be felt in every line, vividly illustrates the terrors of aerial warfare



*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

ZEPPELIN L-49, BROUGHT DOWN AT BOURBONNE


The air pilots tried to burn their machine but were stopped by a French farmer



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

FRAME OF A ZEPPELIN LYING ACROSS AN ENGLISH ROAD

This Zeppelin, the fourth lost in raids upon England during one month, was brought down in the outskirts of London



OBSERVATION CAR OF A GERMAN AIR RAIDER

This small car, with its one observer, is suspended from the Zeppelin which floats high above, often out of sight above the clouds



DROPPING BOMBS FROM AN AEROPLANE




*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

DIRECTING ARTILLERY FIRE  
This service is attended by extreme danger



*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*


WITH THE BRITISH ROYAL FLYING CORPS IN INDIA  
Receiving a wireless message from an aeroplane



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*


#### PHOTOGRAPHING THE ENEMY'S TRENCHES

This picture shows one type of aeroplane camera which was used in France




*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

#### VERIFYING HITS WITH BOMBS



*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*  
A BLAZING GERMAN AEROPLANE PLUNGING TO EARTH



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*  
ALLIED AEROPLANE OFF FOR A RECONNAISSANCE



#### AN ALLIED AIRDROME

Bird's-eye view of an aviation headquarters close behind the lines, somewhere in France




#### AN AÉROPLANE AMBULANCE

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*


The aéroplane ambulance has saved many desperate casualties where a few minutes' time means life or death



Photograph by Underwood & Underwood  
ITALIAN HYDROAEROPLANE STARTING FOR FLIGHT



Courtesy of "Flying"  
ONE OF THE 600 HORSEPOWER CAPRONI BOMBING PLANES



A CAPRONI TRIPLANE USED FOR BOMBING

Courtesy of "Flying"

perience and folly which had sent so many men to gallant but futile death at the Dardanelles; while in the case of Jutland it was perceived that an engagement—reflecting the highest credit upon British seamanship and ending indecisively only because of the lateness of the hour when the main battle was joined and the poorness of the visibility—had been so presented by the Admiralty that the nation and its allies were at the outset suddenly confronted with an apparent defeat, while the Germans were able to cover a terrible disappointment by false claims finding an apparent confirmation in the first official statements of their enemy.

From the morrow of the defeat of the British at Loos to the opening of the Battle of the Somme, the British nation was passing through one of the least lovely and most depressing periods of democracy. In our own Civil War we had begun the most terrible of all internal struggles with a leader at our hand, one of the great men of all time, who slowly but surely impressed the millions of the nation with his competence; who led a people at first unconscious of his greatness but at the last clearly aware that—however generals blundered, ministers faltered, politicians and editors alike lost hope—a leader, one of themselves, aware of their essential patriotism and loyalty, conscious of their capacity for sacrifice and for steadfastness, directed the administration. The South was not beaten by Grant and Sherman nor conquered by the superior industrial resources of the dominant half of the nation; it was beaten because Abraham Lincoln saw clearly and saw whole the fundamental fact that the country could not be divided, and that the millions of the North and the West would, in the end, stand firmly against disunion and national disintegration. His faith in the nation, his works based on that faith, saved his country.

In its hour of deadly peril Britain had no Lincoln; the very character of parliamentary institutions and the tendencies of recent ministries led directly away from the leadership which democracy demands in war and eschews at all other times. The result was a chaos and a confusion which revealed themselves in contradictions alike of policy and of public statement. The industrial struggles which preceded the war did not end

with its outbreak. War is like disease, it inexorably attacks the weakest portion of the political as well as the physical frame. Ireland was an old infirmity and the onset of the terrible plague of the war instantly assailed the weakened organ. British labour was engaged in a struggle of almost unprecedented bitterness when Germany set out for Paris, and labour remained conscious of the older grievance in the most critical hour of national peril, nor can one fix upon labour a reproach which was deserved equally by its opponent in the industrial struggle of the preceding decade.

## II. THE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENTS

To understand the progress of events it is necessary from time to time to arrive at some appreciation of the conditions of the peoples at war, and the condition of the British people at the outset of 1916 is deserving of utmost attention. Magnificent as had been and was the effort of France, it was plain from the outset that France could not, alone, defeat Germany or even with the aid of Russia reach a decisive victory. In the spring of 1916 the war waited upon Britain as, two years later, with Russia gone, it was to wait upon the United States.

And in Britain there was still only a vague perception of the magnitude of the conflict and the reality of the British peril. In a very real sense the German attack upon Verdun at last brought home to London the fact that the war might be lost. It is impossible even now to present accurately the extent of popular misapprehension which existed in Britain as to the main facts of the war. The statesmen had first misled their people in the years before the coming of the struggle by the oft-repeated assertion that all war was unthinkable, and war with Germany totally outside the reckoning.

Surprised, themselves, by the arrival of the war; surprised in circumstances which deprived them temporarily of their nerve and almost led them into the fatal blunder of abandoning France; the statesmen who still controlled British policy never recovered from the original surprise. Having permitted the people to believe that war was impossible, they fell into the far more serious error of long concealing from the people,

alike by their public statements and through their control of the press, the true gravity of the situation. While Germany was erecting a Mitteleuropa from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf and sweeping victoriously from the Carpathians to the Pinsk Marshes, British leaders and British journals continued to propagate the legend that Germany was already beaten and approaching that disintegration which was to result from internal revolution and external disaster.

As a consequence the British people had to find out for themselves, and in the depths of agony and suffering, what the World War was. The Colonies, far more alive to the situation than the Mother Country, sent their sons to Flanders and to Gallipoli; and there they perished—as a consequence of mistakes, which were themselves beyond defence and calculated to destroy the confidence of the most loyal. And in the spring of 1916 the Canadians and the Australians saw with a clearness still lacking in Britain, and spoke with a bitterness which not until after Kut, was to appear in London.

It was not that Britain was unwilling to make the sacrifice necessary to win the war. On the contrary, the response of the British nation to the call for volunteers is the finest page in all the history of democracies. It was not that the army was unwilling to bear the burden of the terrible casualties which were imposed upon it in some measure by the mistakes of statesmen and soldiers alike. All that was best in Britain was in khaki or in the pathetic graves which stretch from Anzac Cove to the ever-glorious and ever-saddening marshes about Ypres.

In the spring of 1916 Britain was a nation of men and women—themselves ready to bear anything, to do anything—but a nation which craved leadership, demanded action, was ready to face the grimdest of realities, but was still ruled by men afraid to tell the people the truth; afraid to order conscription, which could only affect a few hundred thousands, after the millions had volunteered; afraid to deal in the awful truths which confronted them and confronted the world, because they lacked confidence in the masses, who were themselves worthy of all confidence.

France with an open frontier and a thousand years of history saw the

facts unmistakably on August 1, 1914. No illusion then or thereafter hid from the millions of French men and women the solid fact that the nation was engaged in a life-and-death struggle and that one of the only two possible outcomes of the conflict would be the destruction of France as a nation and as one of the great people of the world. France saw things as they were, and the completeness of this understanding of the facts explains, in no small degree, the character of French resistance at the Marne in 1914, at Verdun in the long and terrible months of 1916.

### III. THE GREAT AWAKENING

It was only after the Irish rising, the surrender of Kut, and the first terrible belief that a naval battle of vital importance had been lost off Jutland, that the truth came home to the masses of the British Isles. It was only then that it was appreciated how disastrous had been the mistakes, flowing from a lack of central or intelligent direction alike of war policies and of war preparations. The British nation had looked forward to the campaign of 1916 as bound to see the decisive defeat of Germany and the advance of victorious Allied armies to the Rhine, but in February it suddenly beheld German armies rushing forward upon Verdun—beheld France compelled to meet the storm alone for many months, because British armies were still unready.

Not less appalling was the disaster of Kut to that portion of the British public which thought in terms of empire and knew instantly what would be the consequences for British prestige in the East when every bazaar from Bagdad to Bokhara rang with the stories of the Turkish triumph at Gallipoli and the captures of British forces—of an entire British army—at Kut. Egypt, India, the remotest and the most considerable of the non-self-governing colonies, were bound to be impressed by the progress of events; the whole of Asia, with all its immeasurable problems and mysteries, was bound to be stirred—with consequences impossible to measure—if, as at last seemed to be the case, British prestige was become a byword in the market place.

Finally it was with a fury essentially British that the news of the Dublin tragi-comedy—the absurd, ghastly Irish Revolution—was

received from one end of Britain to the other. Not alone in Mesopotamia and at the Dardanelles, in the Near East and on the frontiers of the Far East; not merely on the battlefields of Artois and Flanders was British safety threatened by defeats and disasters; but within the British Isles themselves there had been a rising. A hand was stretched out to the German by those who represented themselves the leaders of the Young Ireland and spoke in the voice which was the voice of the oldest Ireland—that Ireland which, when France was the foe, gave its sons and its heart to France and now offered, or seemed to offer, itself to Germany.

In France, in the spring of 1916, one had the impression of a people dealing, with courage, competence, and complete comprehension, with the most terrible fact in the history of the race. One felt that the people—the generals, the soldiers, and the civilians—had taken a firm grip upon the realities of their world. In France men talked about the strength of Germany at the moment when the readers of the British press, itself controlled by the British censor, were bound to conclude that Germany was starving to death, bankrupt, her people almost at the point of rising in rebellion to expel their Kaiser and adopt that British form of democracy which was revealing itself at the same hour in such unlovely disarray. British defeats were still disguised as British victories, or British heroism—undoubted and beyond praise—emphasized to disguise the fact that the heroism had but resulted in a hopeless slaughter, where men had been thrown against guns, unsupported by artillery (which itself lacked the right kind of ammunition).

The consequences were to be revealed in subsequent events. The fact stands forth, compelling attention. In the first two years of the war the British people lost confidence in their statesmen just as, in the first two years of our own Civil War, we of the North learned to have faith in Abraham Lincoln and in that faith found our ultimate national salvation. Clemenceau in France once swept away a ministry with the lapidary characterization of its head, “He has spoken, he speaks, he will speak.” And while beneath the surface the British nation did organize itself and the manhood of that great people transformed itself, the statesmen continued to talk; and each successive speech disclosed

these statesmen as still unwilling—or unable—to bridge the great chasm between the world as they had described it in their speeches preceding the great conflict and as it now existed at the moment when the Germans were throwing their divisions of élite against the devoted but outnumbered and stricken French soldiers on the slopes of Dead Man's Hill and the Vaux Plateau. In England, then, there was the sense of little men, of eternal talk, of words which disguised the truth; the words of men who, when Germany was actually on the march, could see no foe in sight, although the foe was visible not alone from the watch towers but from the streets themselves. But the supreme tragedy lay in the fact that in the hour of grimmest crisis, the people saw their leaders thus, and the perception left them at last awake, but appalled by the revelation.

No people of any race or time did more splendid things than did British men and women in the opening months of the World War. No army ever died as the army of Sir John French—the regular army of Britain—died at First Ypres. The British fleet had taken Germany by the throat when it moved to its battle station on August 3, and that grip, never shaken in the following four years, remained a priceless contribution to the cause of the nations allied against Germany. It was, with the French army, the foundation on which victory was built.

On the material side the British contribution was not to be measured in money, because without it the war had been lost from the outset. Americans, looking back upon our own Civil War, could recall much that was identical with conditions in the bitter days of our own agony and our own disillusionment. Democracy in times of stress reveals the fact that, for the liberty it affords, there is paid a price in inefficiency which must be measured in the best and noblest of a race. Yet the difference was capital; we in America found a man in 1861 as we had found a man in 1776, but in an hour of equal gravity England did not find a man. Conscious of her mighty potentialities, conscious of the plenitude of the spirit of sacrifice, England longed for a Cromwell and found an Asquith.

The period of depression passed, when at last the guns at the Somme

sounded the relief of Verdun; it did not completely return when the terrible slaughter of the Somme resulted not in the expulsion of the German from France but in the gain of some sterile miles of shell-torn Picardy soil. But it was a natural consequence of the mood of the spring that, in the winter, Britain threw herself unconditionally into the hands of Lloyd George; it was a consequence of the convictions stirred by the first two years of the conflict that the Kaiser's peace proposal of 1916 found at least a momentary hearing in Britain—that the terrible disappointments of the campaign of 1917 produced in Britain, as in all the nations allied against Germany, a temporary wavering before the terrible road that had still to be traversed, if victory—decisive victory—was to be attained; even more, roused a passing suspicion that victory of a decisive character could not be won, but that a defeat of incalculable extent might be suffered.

Only the historian of the future who shall deal with events wholly completed, and with results at last established, will be competent to analyze and discuss the true meaning of the domestic events in Britain, in France—or, for that matter, in Germany—during the great struggle. Yet even in a fugitive narrative of events, still recent, it is necessary to set down the facts as contemporaneously revealed. Britain entered upon the World War at a moment when the whole British people was immersed in an historic conflict, certain to modify if not to revolutionize the whole character of British institutions.

In the social fabric there were grave weaknesses and serious evils. To remedy these, British statesmanship was labouring with little thought as to events beyond the narrow seas which were held to be the sure bulwarks to Britain. Between classes within the nation there was a bitter division of feeling which was revealing itself in political struggles of unprecedented acrimony. All of these struggles could not be abandoned in a moment, nor could those engaged in them at once perceive that all for which they contended was lost if Germany should win the war.

Every Frenchman could perceive that German victory meant French ruin; he saw the enemy through the open frontier; and within six weeks of the outbreak of the war Paris heard the guns of a German

army. Yet even in invaded France the extreme champions of social revolution could not permanently forget their cherished dreams of Utopian regeneration despite the fact that German shells were falling upon Rheims Cathedral and French women and children were the victims of brutal and beastly German oppression. It is not strange, therefore, that British labour still clung to the strike as a weapon against a traditional enemy, although the strike itself deprived their fellow countrymen of means of self-defence in the fields of Flanders, nor that capital invited the strike by adherence to what it still held to be its inalienable rights.

Only in Germany was there unity, a subordination of all domestic differences to the common faith in the opportunity for foreign aggression. Britons could not surrender their insular habits, British and French leaders and masses could not forget wholly their Utopian or their political schemes of the ante-bellum period. The result was the revelation of the Allied world in disarray from April, 1916, to March, 1918.

#### IV. THE IRISH REBELLION

The Irish Rebellion of Easter Monday, 1916, is at once a tragic and a ridiculous detail in the history of the World War—tragic in its consequences and circumstances, ridiculous in its size and comparative insignificance. Actually, it has no other relation to the war than the fact that it disclosed a condition which did infinite harm to the British cause in the eyes of the neutral world during a period of two years preceding the entrance of America into the conflict, while on the material side it claimed and retained the energies of a number of British divisions at all times necessary on the western front.

The causes of the Rebellion are to be sought not in any single episode of recent times but in the whole bewildering complex of Anglo-Irish relations from the Conquest onward. In three centuries British armies and British navies had circled the globe and laid the foundations of mighty colonies. Conquest had been followed by conciliation; in South Africa at the very outset of the present struggle a new example of

British success was revealed when Botha, who had led the Boers against the British armies less than a decade before, led the Boers against Britain's enemies in German Southwest Africa.

But what has been possible for Englishmen elsewhere on the planet has been beyond their resources at their own door. From Oliver Cromwell to David Lloyd George, sovereigns and statesmen alike have wrestled with the Irish problem and wrestled in vain. England having wronged Ireland in past centuries, noble-minded and generous Englishmen had sought in recent decades to repair the injuries, and Ireland had enjoyed in the years immediately preceding the war a return of prosperity—thanks to beneficent and far-reaching reforms. Nowhere in the British Isles had the land legislation been so just or so generous, and Ireland, at the opening of the Twentieth Century, seemed at last on the point of arresting the stream of emigration which for more than a century had drained the island of the best of its youth.

Unhappily, just and generous legislation did not and could not reach the heart of the Irish people. Through all the years of subjection to a foreign rule Ireland had retained a spirit of her own, a spirit untamed and unconquerable. Between Englishman and Irishman there opened a gulf as wide as that separating the Frenchman of Alsace from the conquering and dominant German. Between the two races there was a barrier of mutual misapprehension, of mutual incapacity to understand the other, hardly to be paralleled in the case of any other races in history. At bottom, the Irishman preserved, with respect of the Englishman, a distrust as profound and as complete as the mind of an intelligent and brilliant race is capable of preserving. And in the presence of that Irish mistrust—suspicion—English effort at reconciliation broke down—not merely in despair but frequently in passionate reprisal. For more than a century Ireland had been faithful to her ancient wrongs, she still remained faithful to them in 1916.

At the moment when the World War broke out, Ireland was on the verge of Civil War. The Asquith Ministry was preparing to carry out the provisions of a new Home Rule system, against which Ulster was in arms and the North of Ireland—led by Sir Edward Carson—was plan-

ning open rebellion, while British officers, whose duty it would be to suppress the insurrection, were resigning their commissions rather than carry out the mandate of the British Government against the North.

With the declaration of war, John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalists—who had laboured over a long lifetime to succeed where his old chief, Parnell, had failed, and win for Ireland Home Rule through parliamentary and peaceful methods—made a magnificent gesture. He pledged Ireland, Roman Catholic, Nationalist Ireland unconditionally to the support of the war, which he eloquently described as a war for human liberty. And for the moment Ireland seemed ready to follow Redmond. There was a prompt response of volunteers, the British uniform was tolerated in regions where it had never been before other than a symbol of a thing detested. But the golden moment passed. Instead of applying the Home Rule Act the Asquith Ministry suspended it; Ireland's reward for Redmond's pledge was the postponement of all her hopes and of her just expectations.

The consequences were inevitable. Redmond remained faithful to his pledge until death, hastened by disappointment, came to him; his brother died nobly at the front; but Young Ireland, the new generation, turning its back upon Redmond and that policy of orderly and loyal approach to self-government through parliamentary channels, threw itself into the arms of Sinn Fein, that new movement originally limited to the endeavour to produce an intellectual and spiritual renascence, but now become political and animated by the desire to achieve a complete independence by any possible means.

In Ireland, therefore, treason became rampant. Hands were extended to Germany; German aid was sought as, in remoter times, French aid had been sought. Ireland—Sinn Fein Ireland—armed itself, as Ulster had armed itself in the days preceding the war; and the Government, which had watched the Carson rebellion gathering, now sat still while a new and even more dangerous storm gathered. In all history there could be no more incongruous alliance than that between Irishmen and Germans, yet in the spring of 1916 the extremists of the

Sinn Fein looked to the Kaiser as a champion and saw in Germany the possible liberator.

The charge that the mass of the Irish people shared the Sinn Fein madness before Easter Monday, or even in the days immediately following, was not warranted. It was not until after the rising, with its grim sequence of executions and deportations, that Ireland—roused once more by a new accession to the list of its martyrs—definitively turned its back upon all compromise and conciliation and became a passive but a passionate foe of Britain. Yet in the weeks and months which preceded the outbreak the British lost Ireland. They lost it by a policy as weak as that of Buchanan in the closing days of his administration, when he closed his eyes to the rebellion which was gathering. They lost it by a refusal to apply that Home Rule Act already on the books, which alone could have fortified Redmond and his supporters, who were themselves rapidly losing their hold upon their constituents and upon the confidence of the Irish people.

The story of the actual Rebellion is briefly, all too briefly, told. On April 20, Sir Roger Casement—once a British consular official, who had earned an honourable reputation in foreign service, but was now become a German sympathizer and a German agent in the effort to rouse Ireland against Britain—was landed by a German submarine on the Irish coast. The next day he was arrested by local officials and sent to England to meet a traitor's death. But despite the fate of Casement, the Sinn Feiners of Dublin adhered to their programme, and on Easter Monday seized control of the public buildings and of many quarters of the city, proclaimed the Irish Republic, and began a fight to occupy the remaining quarters of the city and the castle.

The result was inevitable. A few brief days of a warfare of sniping, and the handful of rebels, mostly boys, were crushed on the arrival of British troops and war ships. By May 1, one week after the outbreak, Dublin was in British hands, but smoking ruins and shattered buildings gave to the Irish capital the appearance of Arras or even of Verdun. In the brief period of possession by the rebels, and as a consequence of bombardments, the finest quarters of the city had been

destroyed and its brief glory as the capital of the Irish republic had been fatal.

While Dublin was in arms the rest of Ireland, save in a few isolated districts, remained calm. There was no general insurrection and the local uprising was suppressed too quickly to allow the fire to spread even had there been any possibility of an extension to the south and the west. In the struggle 17 officers and 504 British soldiers had been killed, 800 civilians had been injured, and 180 insurgents and innocent bystanders slain. On the military side the affair was no more costly than a raid between trenches in Flanders, but its consequences were out of all proportion to the extent of the encounter, for in this week and the succeeding days, when fifteen of the leaders of the pathetic and insane affair were shot, the mass of Irish people deliberately gave their sympathy to the rebels, in whose operations they had declined to participate and upon which they had looked with disapproval.

Thenceforth, for the next two years and a half, Ireland was a garrisoned country. The tiny stream of volunteers dried up; the British Government could, in 1918, under the lash of Labour and following the great defeats of March and April, resolve upon conscription for Ireland and order it; but, having ordered it, Lloyd George and his associates did not dare to apply it. As time passed and the struggle with the Germans became more terrific and the prospect of German victory more unmistakable, British resentment at Irish refusal to share in the conflict increased. When the United States entered the war, sent her sons to the European battlefield, and began to bear the blood cost of the war, American sympathy with Ireland—always lively and keen in the first moments of the Rebellion and its tragic aftermath of executions—diminished, disappeared, and gave place to stern reminders that America could not forgive further Irish agitations which weakened British armies in the presence of the common enemy. This, however, was but an accentuation of the tragedy; hopeless and helpless, Ireland now became friendless, since both America and France, ancient friends and sympathizers, alike looked with amazement and then with indignation upon a sullen and self-centred Ireland, who placed her own wrongs

above the dangers to all civilization and, because she hated England, refused to fight Germany.

While the events are still recent it would be useless to endeavour to fix the responsibility for the Irish affair. Indeed, to explain it one must go backward over three centuries of history. What instantly attracted and long held public attention in all free nations was the tragedy of the episode. A people seeking freedom with a passion undiminished by years of disappointment now declined to strike a blow against the greatest enemy of all human liberty. A race which for centuries had deserved the reputation of the most belligerent, which had supplied three nations with its best fighters and some of its most distinguished generals, now declined to share in the greatest of all wars; the most charming and the most brilliant of English-speaking tribes henceforth resolutely turned a sullen and suspicious face toward all overtures and appeals and by this course deprived itself of its natural allies and strengthened the hands of its traditional enemies.

Only in Berlin did the events of Dublin awaken rejoicing. In Irish affairs Germany found an opportunity to denounce alleged British hypocrisy and confute Allied claims to the rôle of champions of small nations and defenders of the rights of self-determination of the weaker races. Thus, in every sense, the Irish Rebellion, insignificant as it was, on the material side was a moral disaster of the first magnitude—a disaster immediately pressing upon the British, eventually weighing upon the Irish themselves. Seeking liberty, the Irish people had made themselves the tools of German tyranny and separated themselves from the sustaining sympathy of all other liberty-loving peoples of the earth.

#### V. KUT-EL-AMARA

While the news of the Irish Rebellion was still holding the attention of the whole British Empire there came, on April 29, the brief announcement that the army of General Townshend—long invested in the Mesopotamian town of Kut-el-Amara and equally long forgotten by the British public—had laid down its arms. Once more it was the

moral rather than the military effect which commanded instant attention. A British army had surrendered to a Turkish force; Kut had now become an epilogue of Gallipoli; and as the British public and the British Parliament began to unravel the threads of the Mesopotamian adventure, a new scandal and a new folly were revealed.

The original expedition to Mesopotamia had been a wise and logical step, for the mouth of the Tigris and the Euphrates—the delta of the stream through which both of the great rivers reach the Persian Gulf—is as much an outpost of India as is Palestine an out work of Egypt. More than that, northeast of Basra are the immense oil fields which were of vital importance to the British navy. Finally, recognizing the German ambition to stretch her domination from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf and recalling the advance of the Bagdad Railway, it was essential that neither time nor opportunity be lost to forestall Germany at the mouth of the rivers of Mesopotamia.

Basra was occupied on November 23, 1914, by a small force sent from India. The oil wells were promptly secured, and until such time as a real expedition could be organized and British military resources made adequate to bear the additional strain, this was all that was needful to do. But once more the policy of adventure—which had lain behind the dash to Antwerp, the gamble at Gallipoli—reasserted itself. A nation which in its recent history had made the memorable campaign to Khartum, a campaign in which every element of chance was eliminated and nothing was done until everything was prepared—a nation which had the conqueror of the Sudan in charge of its whole military establishment—now permitted politicians to prevail, while soldiers remained silent or spoke their doubts hesitatingly. The result was a steady expansion of the Mesopotamian horizon with no commensurate expansion of the resources of the army engaged.

As Constantinople beckoned the dreamers, Bagdad held out an irresistible temptation to those who could see clearly the mighty results which success in Mesopotamia might bring, but blindly or obstinately refused to recognize how impossible of attainment was the success desired; indeed, the very failure at the Golden Horn added a new incen-

tive to undertake another gamble in the hope that victory at Bagdad might balance defeat at Constantinople. As a consequence, the insignificant force in Mesopotamia was steadily pushed northward. By October it was far on the road to Bagdad, marching into a hostile country, with only the river as a line of transport for supplies, with only a scant division available with which to conquer a region to which the Turks were able to draw unlimited numbers.

Still the advance went forward until, on November 21, Townshend encountered the Turks on ground of their own choosing at Ctesiphon, barely twenty miles from Bagdad itself. Attacking, the British made a gallant fight for it, but numbers overbore them; of their 15,000 they lost not less than a third in the battle, and after the battle there was nothing for it but to retreat. This retreat carried them back to Kut-el-Amara by December 3, and two days later they were besieged in their lines about this town.


From December to April there is written a new story like that of Gordon at Khartum. There is the same frantic effort, made by the tardily awakened officials, to save the beleaguered army. New reinforcements are hastily sent from India, even from Europe. By January a relieving force has arrived within sixteen miles of Kut; it will advance over half the remaining distance in the next two months. But the effort is in vain; the Turks are too numerous, too well-posted, too ably commanded. The weather is unfavourable and the river rises at the critical moment. So finally, on April 29, Townshend lays down his arms, the Bagdad gamble, like the dash for Constantinople, ends in a disastrous reverse.

The Kut surrender was followed within a relatively brief time by the brilliant and victorious advance of Maude to Bagdad and beyond; British prestige was restored and enhanced when Jerusalem and Bagdad alike were occupied. In the larger sense Kut was but an episode; it came, however, at a moment which gave grim value to its lessons; it represented a useless waste of brave men and valuable material; it had no justification at the time and found no defenders subsequently. A parliamentary investigation presently revealed conditions unhappily,

recalling the worst chapters in the history of our invasion of Cuba with an unprepared and inadequately supplied army.

And in comprehending the mood of Britain in May, 1916, it is necessary to recall the various landmarks of a year: Festubert, with its consequent shell scandal; Loos, with its bloody shambles; Gallipoli, with its story of impossible exertion and inevitable failure; and, last of all, Ireland and Kut coming at the moment when Verdun was revealing the true state of Allied fortunes and the real magnitude of the German peril. The policy of the British Government had been summed up by the Prime Minister as a policy of "Wait and see." The British public had waited, they were seeing, and in the revelations of April and May was written the political doom of Mr. Asquith and his immediate associates, who still in the main ruled in the councils of state, despite the substitution of a coalition for a party Cabinet.

# SEA FIGHTING



ADMIRAL BEATTY'S BATTLE-CRUISER SQUADRON

was here engaging the entire German High Seas Fleet. Some of the ships are seen firing at the enemy, beyond them to the right and not visible in the photograph. The great columns of water are caused by German shells falling amid the British ships. Sir David Beatty said of this phase of the battle: "At 3:30 p. m. I increased speed to 25 knots, and formed line of battle, the Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E. S. E., slightly converging on the enemy. . . . At 3:48 p. m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously."



*From "Illustrated London News," courtesy British Bureau of Information*

THESE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN FROM THE DECK OF A BRITISH WARSHIP DURING THE FIERCEST FIGHTING IN THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

*From "Illustrated London News," courtesy British Bureau of Information*

A TURNING MOVEMENT BY THREE BRITISH BATTLE-CRUISERS AND THEIR SCREEEN OF DESTROYERS

This drawing was made from data supplied by Petty Officer W. Griffin, Coxswain of H. M. S. *Shark*, a British destroyer which met an heroic end during the battle. Coxswain Griffin was rescued and brought to Hull.






*From "Illustrated London News," London, Eng. - Bureau - Information*

#### **BRITISH BATTLE-CRUISERS ENCOUNTERING THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET OFF JUTLAND**

For the moment the British ships were holding their fire. The misty weather and low visibility across the smooth sea were unfavorable for long-range shooting. To the left are the leading ships of the German High Seas Fleet

### THE SINKING OF THE GERMAN LIGHT CRUISER "NÜRNBERG" OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

This drawing, which appeared in a German illustrated paper, is supposed to represent the incident at the moment when the *Nürnberg*, summoned to surrender by the English flagship, replied, "German warships never surrender"






*Photograph from London "Daily Mirror"*

A NEUTRAL SHIP IN FLAMES IN MID-OCEAN

A German submarine commander showed the customary respect for the property and lives of unoffending neutrals by setting this neutral ship afire



*Photograph from London "Daily Mirror"*

THE BRITISH SHIP "GLOUCESTER CASTLE" SINKING AFTER BEING TORPEDOED BY A GERMAN SUBMARINE


As in a number of similar cases, this vessel, laden with helpless wounded, was sunk without warning



© Western Newspaper Union

#### WHITE MICE PROTECTING A SUBMARINE


White mice are not noted for their bravery, but they help save the lives of the brave men who man the British submarines. They are the first to smell the fumes of the dreaded "petrol" and give warning by their squeals



Photograph from Central News Photo Service

#### AN ANXIOUS MOMENT ON A BRITISH SUBMARINE

The commander is watching through the periscope for the approach of a momentarily expected enemy ship



© London "Daily Mail"

#### THE LAST OF A GERMAN CRUISER

The final plunge, stern first, of a German light cruiser sunk by a British salvo in the Battle of Jutland. In the background may be seen British destroyers steaming at full speed after the fleeing German fleet. Some of the British ships exceeded their supposed maximum speed in this battle

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

A GERMAN SUBMARINE SURRENDERING TO THE AMERICAN SHIP "FANNING"

The submarine was sometimes caught napping, as was this one. These men were eager to save their lives by surrendering to a chivalrous foe.



## CHAPTER SIX

### THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

#### I

#### "THE DAY" AT LAST

On May 31 there took place in the North Sea and opposite the Danish mainland the first encounter between the British and German battle fleets and the greatest conflict in all marine history. "The Day" which the Kaiser and the German naval officers had toasted and dreamed of, the moment to which the British navy had looked forward for almost two years, became a reality in the Battle of Jutland.

The circumstances of the encounter are simply told. On the preceding day Sir John Jellicoe had put to sea with the British battle fleet and had made a sweep through the North Sea in a broad circle, his armada divided into two fleets; that of the battle cruisers, with certain supporting units, under Sir David Beatty, had turned south and made a round of the broad gulf which is bounded on the east by Denmark and on the south by the flat German coast lying behind Heligoland. Jellicoe had remained to the north and was, in mid-afternoon of May 31, not far from the Norwegian coast at its southernmost point.

The next day Admiral Von Scheer with the German battle fleet had left his base and started northward. He, too, had divided his fleet and sent before him a battle-cruiser squadron under Admiral Von Hipper. As far as Jellicoe was concerned the mission of his fleet was obvious, it was one of the familiar excursions of the British battle fleet, intended to give the fleet a regular airing and to repeat the familiar invitation to the Germans to come out and fight. It was the visible demonstration of naval supremacy, expressed in the proud progress of the greatest fleet in human history through seas which had once borne the name of the German Ocean. As to Scheer's mission, it was—and remains—unknown. It may have been one more of the relatively few and fugitive

ventures of the German fleet, seeking to get its high seas exercise, without any wish or expectation of battle; it may have been a major detail in some larger scheme to break the British blockade and permit fast cruisers to slip through the breach and repeat the exploits of the *Emden* in making war upon merchant ships.

But whatever the mission of Scheer, it is certain that he, like Jellicoe, was engaged in an operation which did not have in its immediate vision a Trafalgar. Scheer had not left his base to challenge British sea supremacy and Jellicoe had not set sail with the purpose or expectation of meeting Scheer. Every circumstance in the engagement indicates that it was a chance encounter on both sides.

The actual meeting took place shortly before three o'clock in the afternoon, when Beatty, his sweep through the North Sea completed, had already swung round and was headed north to rejoin Jellicoe's flag. At this moment one of his light cruisers, *Galatea*, sighted the smoke of Hipper's squadron and a little later a seaplane, sent up from *Engadine*—once the *Campania* of transatlantic memories—reported the proximity of Hipper with five battle cruisers.

What followed was a threefold operation: First, Hipper swinging round immediately on the discovery of Beatty, whose force was overwhelming, sought to draw Beatty after him and back upon the main German battle fleet, which, as he well knew, was coming up behind him. Beatty, on his part, whatever he may have suspected, was ignorant of the fact that Scheer was at hand and was naturally bound to seek to destroy the squadron now within his grasp. We have then the flight of Hipper and the pursuit of Beatty, which constitutes the first phase, lasting from about 3:30 to 5 P. M.

But at five o'clock Beatty suddenly finds himself in the presence of Scheer's battle fleet. He is now hopelessly outnumbered and has no choice but to get away. His purpose becomes what had been the earlier purpose of Hipper. Now it is the British admiral who is seeking to draw the whole German battle fleet—Scheer and Hipper, too—after him and back upon Jellicoe, who has long ago been warned by wireless of the fact that Beatty was engaged, and has been driving

toward the scene with full speed. Hitherto, however, Jellicoe has lost rather than gained distance, because Beatty, in going south after Hipper, has pushed ahead at full speed and thus travelled much faster than Jellicoe's battleships could move, although these were now exceeding their trial-trip records.

The second phase lasts from five o'clock until just before seven, when Scheer and Hipper, in pursuit of Beatty, suddenly run into the British battle fleet, at last come up, and promptly turn and make a desperate effort to escape from an unequal conflict. This flight is the third phase, and in it the battle fleets of the two rivals are at last engaged, but only momentarily.

## II. THE FIGHT

On the scientific side the circumstances of this Battle of Jutland must remain of absorbing interest for all technical and naval men; on the tactical side it has already given rise to controversies without end and without hope of solution. On the practical side both nations claimed a victory and neither could, in the immediate limits of the engagement, support its claim save by a complete reliance upon its own official statements and a complete denial of the similar statements of the enemy.

Yet certain things are at once clear. First of all, we have to deal, not with a Salamis or a Trafalgar, but with a locally indecisive engagement—three indecisive engagements, more accurately—in each of which one of the contesting parties was actually in flight from the other; outnumbered and aiming at escape—not at the immediate destruction of the enemy. Hipper ran away from Beatty; Beatty ran away from Scheer when the German commander had joined his lieutenant bringing up the battle fleet; Scheer fled from Jellicoe when the British commander had arrived on the scene.

In each case the fugitive escaped not alone destruction but fatal injury. The German battle fleet was not destroyed, however it may have been crippled. Neither Beatty nor Jellicoe suffered losses which in the smallest degree crippled their battle and cruiser fleets. The losses of the British were heavy, but frankly conceded. How heavy the

German losses were remains to be established after the close of the war, but even on the face of the German admissions, first and last, they were sufficiently considerable to constitute at least as great a proportionate loss, given the relative strength of the two navies.

In the end the German fleet was able to escape by reason of the lateness of the hour when the main battle was joined and the extreme shortness of the vision—the famous “low visibility” of the official reports. The morning of May 31 had been clear, but the afternoon had brought with it mists and pockets of fog. In the third and last phase of the battle Jellicoe had interposed between the Germans and their bases with his overwhelmingly superior armada, and, had he been able to reap the profits of his superior numbers and advantageous position, it is hardly open to question that the result would have been something approximating another Trafalgar.

But low visibility and night robbed Jellicoe of his prize. The German fleet escaped, disappeared in the mists and the shadows of the night, and were not to be found when morning came. Save for a Zeppelin, which sailed over the British fleet and attracted a brief fusillade, no German ship on sea or in the air was to be found on June 1 and in due course of time Jellicoe sailed away to his base in Scotland, put his injured ships under repairs, and was, in a few days, quite ready to resume his customary watch of the North Sea, his strategy and his methods totally unaffected by the recent battle and his fleet retaining that immense and indisputable superiority which it had possessed from the very outset.

And here, in a narrow compass, is the story of the Battle of Jutland, a story complete when the statement of the losses of the two contestants is added. The British losses were immediately announced, and no question has ever been raised, save in obviously ridiculous German claims, as to the accuracy of the British report. As to the German statement, on the contrary, in its first form it was absolutely false, as a German official confession later admitted, asserting that the falsification was for “strategic reasons.” As amended it was still far below the estimates of the British officers, who participated in the contest, but understate-

## THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

107

ment as it may have been, it disclosed nothing to warrant the German assertion that there had been a German victory, or any material inroad on comparative British and German numbers.

The losses as stated by the two official statements were as follows:—

### BRITISH LOSSES

	TONS		OFFICERS AND MEN
<i>Queen Mary</i>	27,000	Battle Cruiser	1,000
<i>Indefatigable</i>	18,750	" "	790
<i>Invincible</i>	17,250	" "	780
<i>Defence</i>	14,600	Armoured "	850
<i>Black Prince</i>	13,550	" "	750
<i>Warrior</i>	13,550	" "	750
<i>Tipperary</i>	1,430	Destroyer	160
<i>Ardent</i>	935	"	100
<i>Fortune</i>	935	"	100
<i>Shark</i>	935	"	100
<i>Sparrowhawk</i>	935	"	100
<i>Nestor</i>	1,000	"	100
<i>Nomad</i>	1,000	"	100
<i>Turbulent</i>	1,430	"	.....
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	113,300		5,680

### GERMAN LOSSES

	TONS		OFFICERS AND MEN
<i>Lützow</i>	28,000	Battle Cruiser	1,150
<i>Pommern</i>	13,040	Battleship	736
<i>Wiesbaden</i>	3,450	Light Cruiser	...
<i>Frauenlob</i>	2,657	" "	281
<i>Elbing</i>	3,450	" "	...
<i>Rostock</i>	4,820	" "	373
Five Destroyers	5,303		.....
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	60,720		2,540

The total casualties officially acknowledged by the British were 6,106; by the Germans, 2,414.

It remains to be said that the official estimate by Sir John Jellicoe of German losses was two dreadnoughts, one *Deutschland*, one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, six torpedo-boat destroyers, and one submarine; in all 119,200 tons, or 6,000 tons more than the British loss, with a correspondingly larger loss in personnel.

Laying aside all technical discussions, it may be remarked that the loss of the three British battle cruisers, including *Queen Mary*, was due to a structural defect promptly recognized and as swiftly remedied. Neither the torpedo boats nor the submarines justified expectations as weapons of offence directed at the capital ships. It was the common testimony of the British officers engaged that the German gunnery was exceedingly good in the opening stages and equally bad as the engagement progressed.

Such criticisms of the tactical aspects of the engagement as have come, largely from American naval authorities, are comprehended in the somewhat conjectural assertion that since Jellicoe at the close of the engagement lay between the Germans and their bases and the hours of darkness in the northern latitudes were so short, the ultimate escape of Scheer is incomprehensible. Aside from this there is a common agreement that the battle developed nothing new or of real importance; that it was fought in accordance with the conventional ideas of the past and left naval tactics about where it found them, save as it greatly depreciated the valuation hitherto placed upon the submarine as a weapon against the larger ships, for it was a matter of official knowledge that the Germans had their submarines out and they accomplished nothing of importance, despite several favourable opportunities.

### III. THE RESULT

When the British battle fleet left the scene of the conflict and returned to its base it came home conscious and confident that it had won a great victory. Arrived at home it found the nation in the throes of something not far from a panic arising from the belief that a great naval battle, *the* great naval battle, had been lost. More than this, in neutral countries there was heard the whisper of Ægospotami, of a Modern Athens at last the victim of a new Lysander. Far and wide all over the world went forth the impression that Britain had lost the greatest naval battle in human history.

The cause of this amazing report was to be found in the stupidity of the British Admiralty. The first news of the battle that the world

had presented to it, without explanation or adequate comment by the British Admiralty, was the mournful catalogue of the British ships lost. Thus announced the conflict had the appearance of a disaster, and this appearance was intensified when the Kaiser, seizing the opportunity thus offered, congratulated Scheer and his subordinates upon a victory which had at last broken British sea power. Had Nelson survived Trafalgar, he could not have deserved more sweeping praise than was now showered upon the German admiral.

And to some extent this belief in a German victory long survived, as a consequence of the blunder of the Admiralty. Yet what were the facts? The measure of the victory, if victory there had been for the Germans, was necessarily to be sought in the progress of subsequent events. There the answer was simple. On the morrow of the battle the German ships sought their refuge and presently, through neutral channels, there began to come reports of the true extent of the injuries to German ships. A cordon of silence and of mystery was drawn about these ships, but week followed week and months came and went without any new revelation of German sea-power; the "victorious" fleet continued to hide behind its land defence for more than two years, while the fleet the Kaiser described as "defeated" resumed its regular sweeps through the North Sea. On June 1 and thenceforth the situation was exactly what it had been on May 30; nothing was in the smallest degree changed.

Here was the final answer to the claim that Jutland had been a German victory. Only one result could have warranted the Kaiser claiming victory, and that was the infliction of sufficient injury upon the British fleet to destroy the existing superiority of the foe. Unless this could be done any effort was a failure, and the Battle of Jutland was a patent failure because afterward, as before, British sea supremacy remained unquestioned, revealed in ever-increasing efficiency as weeks and months went on.

After Jutland there was a gradual disappearance of the demands by one school of naval thinkers that, to use Winston Churchill's vigorous phrase, the fleet should "dig the rats out." More and more clearly

it was perceived that Britain had won the war on the seas when the battle fleet moved to its station on August 3. Then it had taken Germany by the throat; thereafter—slowly, surely, more completely than Britain had throttled French commerce in the days of Napoleon—she tightened the noose about Germany. It was not the destruction of the German fleet, but the mastery of it, proven by its very stagnation, and the paralysis of it, which constituted the true naval victory of the war.

Seen in its later perspective, Jutland was an incident; it changed nothing, it modified nothing. It was an accidental encounter, brought on by Beatty, who naturally desired to force an engagement, particularly while he had the advantage of numbers; followed up by Scheer when he, in turn, possessed the advantage; broken off by the German when he met the main British battle fleet. We may now accept without qualification the conviction of the British commander that, but for low visibility and darkness, Jutland might have been a Trafalgar. But even had there been a Trafalgar it would not have changed the situation, for all the consequences of Trafalgar would continue to be seen in the later time, while Jutland would soon be forgotten.

The discovery at the close of the war that Germany had sunk one ship or three ships more than her enemy—that the loss to British tonnage was twice as great as to Germany, as the German official figures would indicate—would be of as little consequence as the assertion, equally familiar, that in the Battle of the Marne the French losses exceeded the German. The proof that France had won the Marne was found not in official reports of either contestant, not in the lyric celebrations by the Kaiser's press agents of the German strategic retreat or equally eloquent Allied descriptions of French and British advance. The solid fact was that the Germans had set out to destroy the military power of France and that after the battle was over, the military power of France endured and continued to endure.

We may leave it to the future to disclose the accuracy or exaggeration of the claims of Jellicoe and his subordinates as to the injury done to the German battle fleet at Jutland. But no such postponement is required to demonstrate that the Kaiser's fantastic declarations immedi-

ately following the battle were without basis in fact. If Jutland was only a drawn battle which left both navies as they were before, it was, even then, in a clearly perceptible measure a German defeat, because the purpose of any attack, of any battle joined by the Germans, must have been to reduce if not to abolish the disparity between the two fleets.

Scheer failed and was celebrated; Jellicoe succeeded and was criticized—did, in fact, in a relatively brief period, give way to Beatty; but if the legend of a German victory continued to survive for a long period and with the less thoughtful, there presently came a clearer and saner view as weeks and months passed and it was perceived that what Germany claimed to have been a victory, breaking the grip which Britain had maintained upon sea supremacy since Trafalgar, had left Jellicoe's fleet in unchallenged control of the exits of the North Sea and had not in a single particular lessened the severity of the blockade, which was more and more closely sealing every sea entrance to the Fatherland.

To compare a great battle with a small one, when the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor* met in our own Civil War, a victory by the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads would probably have meant the destruction of our blockade and, conceivably, the loss of the war for the North. But when the *Merrimac* put back to Norfolk, crippled, there to remain until she was blown up, the danger was abolished. In a sense, the fight between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* was a drawn battle, far different from the outcome of the struggle between the *Kearsarge* and the *Alabama*, for example. Neither ship was sunk, both sustained crippling injuries, but the only real significance of the contest for the future, so far as the Civil War was concerned, lay in the fact that the most considerable challenge to the supremacy of the North on water had ended without in the smallest degree impairing that supremacy.

So it was in the case of Jutland, the Germans had had their "Day"; and when that day had ended in fog and mist, their fleet had made good its escape, having inflicted heavy losses and having received rude blows. Ships and men had fought well, as British seamen had come to expect German ships and men to fight, but if Jellicoe had failed to de-

stroy Scheer, as Sturdee had annihilated Spee at the Falklands, Scheer had accomplished nothing save his own escape. Jellicoe occupied the field of battle, which was in the larger sense the whole North Sea; he dominated it and his successor continued to dominate it without challenge, until that day more than two years after Jutland when the German fleet again left its base, and sailed for the British coast, there to strike its flag and intern, thus completing the greatest capitulation in naval history.

A little man may strike a big man a sudden blow which gets home and hurts, but if the little man runs away after the blow is delivered, locks himself up in his own home and stays there, he may congratulate himself upon his success in landing his blow but he can hardly claim the mastery of the field from which he has just fled. Nor can he claim a victory, since the big man remains his master. In the case of Jellicoe and Scheer the analogy holds good, it was Jellicoe's fleet which kept the high seas in all the weeks and months of the next two years, and in this fact lies the proof that Jutland was a British victory and a German defeat, a vindication of Britain's claim to sea-supremacy and a failure of that German challenge made by the Kaiser long years before, when he had said: "Our future lies on the sea."

The real challenge to sea power, the real attack upon British marine supremacy, was to come when the submarine warfare was resumed in its more virulent form ten months after Jutland. But this was not a challenge to the battle fleet; it was an attack upon British seaborne commerce, which, had it prevailed, would have rendered the mastery of Jellicoe's battle fleet useless in the larger sense. Britain would have starved, her Allies succumbed to the lack of material and ultimately yielded because British and American reinforcements could not arrive—in 1917 British naval supremacy was challenged—momentarily threatened—but not by the battle fleet.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME—CONDITIONS OF THE CONTEST

#### I A SUPREME TRAGEDY

In the first four years of the war on the western front, the great Battle of the Somme—the First Battle of the Somme, as it may now be described, since there was a Second, and even a Third, in the campaign of 1918—constitutes the supreme tragedy. It was alike the graveyard of more men and more hopes than any field of fighting, from Switzerland to the sea, up to the end of July, 1918. The flower of a generation of young British manhood was shrivelled under the fiery blasts of that fearful summer; all that was physically and morally best in British manpower, the first full measure of the magnificent answer of the volunteers to the call to arms, made its great and awful sacrifice between July and November in the hills and valleys between Amiens and Bapaume.

For the British, powerfully aided by the French, the Somme was a victory and a victory in which their effort was by far the greater and their sacrifice several times as heavy as that of their allies, who were paying and had paid their generous share at Verdun and in the first two bloody campaigns which had preceded the Verdun struggle. But although the victory later resulted in the first considerable German retirement on the west front, that of the spring of 1917, and more immediately saved Verdun, all the ground and much of the glory were swept away in five terrible days of March, 1918, when those positions which had cost the British five months of desperate and costly effort were recaptured by the Germans swiftly and cheaply and the battle-line pushed to the environs of Amiens and across the Ancre and the Avre, while the scene of a considerable British victory became the field of the most complete British disaster in more than five centuries of cam-

paigning in France and elsewhere on the Continent of Europe. Four months later the ground was retaken by British armies and the victory expanded beyond the Hindenburg line. Thus the sting of defeat was swiftly removed by the glory of one more triumph at the Somme, but even after the final and complete success of 1918, the sacrifice of 1916 remains a grim and hideous memory.

The supreme tragedy of the First Somme is found not in the later events but in the immediate circumstances of the battle. Not all the splendour of the sacrifice, not all the glory of the spirit revealed by the hundreds of thousands of young men from all corners of the British Isles and from all parts of the British Empire, served to disguise the fact that Britain was paying the full and terrible price for her long years of political and international blindness. The best of the race died or were shattered in what was, after all, a training school and the most costly of all training schools, for the population of a country which had neglected to give to its sons proper preparation in days of peace for the test that was to come with the inevitable war.

Between Mons and the Somme Britain had created a mighty army. Five million Britons had responded to the call of the country with a speed and readiness which establish an enduring record of national devotion. Eight divisions of the old Expeditionary Army had been expanded to eighty; in place of the few field pieces and almost non-existent heavy guns there had been created a supply of heavy artillery far surpassing the German resources on the opposing front, while the old scandals of the preceding year—when Sir John French had vainly clamoured for high explosives—had given way to a time when ammunition of the right sort and without limit was available.


Out of every class of her population, drawing from field and factory, from the far colonies and the most congested of her London districts, Britain had fashioned a citizen army as we, in the United States, had fashioned two armies in the days of the Civil War. But like our armies it was an army in which officers and men were lacking in all of those essentials to victory which are the product of years of preparation and training on the intellectual side. The First Battle of the Somme, so

far as it was a battle between the Briton and the German, was a battle between a still unorganized population—driven forward by dauntless courage and an unconquerable spirit of sacrifice—and a machine, commanded and directed by men who for a generation had been studying the method of war and absorbing the lessons of a system bequeathed to them by their predecessors who for a century and a half had been engaged in that industry of war which Napoleon described as the “Chief of Prussian occupations.”

In the shock between these two contending forces it was the British who paid the first and most terrible price. Between the shambles of July 1—when more than 50,000 Britons fell (not a few to their own guns) over half the front before the unreached first lines of the German defence—and the November achievement of Beaumont-Hamel, when the British army and its commanders gave first unmistakable evidence of having learned a portion of the great lesson, there stretches a period of tragic sacrifice and incredible waste of the finest in a nation’s human resources, which should serve to all who come hereafter as the ultimate demonstration of the cost of unpreparedness and the eternal refutation of all the theories, once so powerfully held alike in Britain and America, that a peaceful nation, strong in its potential resources for war and confident of the determination of its citizens to defend their liberties, can safely await attack before beginning its preparations for defence.

## II. THE PURPOSE

The main purpose of Anglo-French strategy at the Somme was unmistakable from the outset. The blow had long been maturing; it had been the most important circumstance in the main plan of the campaign of the year, which called for a general pressure upon the Central Empires from all sides. But its immediate objective was to relieve Verdun and compel the Germans to abandon an attack which was approaching the last ditch of the defenders. Because of the Verdun situation it was undertaken a number of weeks earlier than had originally been planned, but despite the German effort to hasten British action before preparations were even reasonably complete, Haig continued to get ready for,



BLACK SHOWS GROUND GAINED.

and Joffre to postpone the date of the attack, believing alike that Verdun would hold and that to strike before the preparation had been adequate would be to invite defeat if not disaster.

Had there been no Verdun blow the Somme stroke might have had far greater immediate effect, for many French troops consumed in the Lorraine furnace would have been available in Picardy. So far Verdun served to accomplish what Von Falkenhayn had hoped to see it accomplish, but this was a restricted fraction of its grandiose major objective. On the other hand, as the presence of large French forces at the Somme proved, Verdun had not bled France white, nor deprived Joffre of sufficient reserves to undertake a great offensive after a tremendous defensive operation.

For the rest, the Somme was a contest in attrition. It was a wasting

of the reserves of both sides. As such the Allies accepted it, confident that, after the Verdun sacrifice, and in the face of Russian attack and Austrian weakness—with later demands for German aid made as a result of Rumanian intervention and Balkan operations—Germany could not indefinitely continue to match division with division against her western foes.

That the Allies hoped to achieve an immediate rupture of the German line, a break through on a wide front followed by a German retirement out of France; that they even expected such a result before the attack of July 1, is likely; but after that date, and at a time when the Allied world was still discussing the approach of a German disaster, it is clear that the Allied High Command had already put away all such hopes and consented to continue a war of positions, with all its burden of casualties, in the belief that attrition might accomplish what forced attack had failed to do, namely, compel the Germans to shorten their lines in France or run the risk Lee had run, with such fatal results, when, in the spring of 1865, he had sought to hold too extended a front with his shrunken army.

As an effort to penetrate the German lines, to break through, the Somme offensive was an immediate failure, despite the success of the French, which, had it been more immediately followed up, might have had far-reaching consequences. Henceforth we see the slow, grim, monotonous advance, preceded by artillery preparation and limited to the attainment of relatively restricted objectives. In a word, the First Battle of the Somme was one more episode in the war of positions, of sieges, carried out upon a front of more than thirty miles, but carried forward at a pace so slow as to abolish all chance of penetrating the vast network of German defences organized in depth and capable of extension, behind, as rapidly as the enemy could break its front works.

In this siege-battle, which lasted for nearly five months, more than three million men fought and the killed, wounded, and captured numbered at least one million. When it was over the British had pushed forward some six or seven miles on a front of a dozen; the French had made a similar gain on a somewhat wider front. The Germans had lost


the high ground which was the foundation of their defence system, and their whole salient in France between the Scarpe and the Aisne was endangered, but their dike had held sufficiently long and well to satisfy German purposes. While still assured of their western defences the Germans had crushed Rumania, beaten down the Russian offensive, and retained and even extended their eastern conquests.

And this was the larger purpose of German strategy. With the failure at Verdun, to snatch a decision in the west and eliminate France before the British were ready, they lost the initiative in France and Belgium, lost it for a period of months, lost it until Ludendorff on March 21, 1918, won his amazing success and returned to the old Somme battlefield a victor. Thus, while the First Somme was a local success for the Allies—a success for their strategy, since it saved Verdun and regained the initiative; a battlefield success, since it resulted in the temporary gain of considerable valuable ground in Picardy—it was not a defeat of material consequence to the Germans. Even as a contest in attrition its results were not important, because the later collapse of Russia enabled Germany to bring her eastern forces to the west and regain numerical superiority.

In all senses, save one, therefore, the First Somme represents a bitter and a brutal disappointment to the Allies. The courage, the devotion, of the young British troops in this terrible ordeal will remain as enduring a page in Anglo-Saxon history as Verdun supplies in the annals of the French race. Nations describe their glory differently: for the French Verdun was an "epic"; for the British, a battle which cost them twice as dearly was a "Show"; but for both peoples the story of the campaign of 1916 is forever memorable. Apart from the human qualities there revealed, however, the Somme represented the substantial failure of the first great Allied offensive—the first effort of Britain, at last organized for war upon the continental scale.

Had Russia held out, the First Somme might have proved a decisive contribution to German defeat in the following year. While Russia remained, its consequences were disclosed in the Hindenburg retreat from the Somme to the Scheldt. But, Russia gone; the campaign of 1917

A BRITISH SHIP AT THE DARDANELLES AS SEEN FROM A BALLOON  
The British use specially equipped ships such as this from which balloons may make ascensions for observing the enemy's positions. The ascensions are made from the deck between the bridge and bow.





© Western Newspaper Union  
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN DESTROYER "S-126" BY THE ENGLISH SUBMARINE "E-9"

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

### A SMOKE SCREEN AT SEA


British destroyers have thrown out this smoke screen to protect some troop ships which they are convoying. This was the first picture illustrating this protective operation to be passed by the British censor.



*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

A GERMAN SHELL WHICH HIT NOTHING EXCEPT THE OCEAN

This bursting German shell, fired from many miles inland, landed harmlessly between this British torpedo-boat and the transport she was convoying.







Courtesy of British Bureau of Information. — "The Heroic 'Shark'." — "The Heroic 'Shark'." — Drawing by Maurice Randall from material supplied by the "Shark" Coxswain.

#### THE "SHARK" FIRING HER LAST TORPEDO IN THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

The story of how this British destroyer's commander, Loftus Jones, with one of his legs shot away, took charge personally of the last gun left in commission and kept firing until his ship went under, the waves is one of the epics of the Battle of Jutland.





Photograph by Central News Photo Service


A NEW KIND OF MOTHER AND CHILD


This is *Le Kangourou*, a French submarine mother ship. She carries her submarine charge between her pontoon sides. This particular submarine mother ship was torpedoed and sunk in the Bay of Funchal, Madeira Islands.

*Photograph from London "Daily Mirror"*

**IN THIS CASE THE GERMANS DID NOT SUCCEED IN "SINKING WITHOUT A TRACE"**

British destroyers are hurrying to the rescue of the surviving victims of this submarine atrocity






*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

#### **AN ITALIAN MINE-LAYER DROPPING MINES WHILE UNDER FULL HEADWAY**

The Italian Navy is noted for its efficiency in everything to do with torpedoes, submarines, and mines. The mines are ranged along the sides of the vessel ready to be dropped overboard at carefully charted points.



### A FLOATING MINE

The internal mechanism of this dreaded modern instrument of destruction

© Western Newspaper Union

a failure, as an immediate consequence; the return of the Germans to Bapaume and Péronne; their arrival in Albert and Montdidier, held by the Allies from 1914 onward, changed the whole perspective of the world as to the struggle of 1916 and added new sadness to the story of the sacrifice of the untold thousands of British soldiers who had died in all the shell-torn and wasted regions between the Somme and the Ancre on either side of the Albert-Bapaume road, along which they had marched to victory and to death and near which they later slept for many months within the lines of a foe who had retaken the positions for which they had paid so high a price in the summer of 1916.

### III. THE NOYON SALIENT

In its local aspect the Anglo-French offensive which precipitated the First Battle of the Somme was an effort to reduce the famous Noyon salient and to reduce it by an attack—not at its apex, south of Noyon, where the German line was but fifty miles from Paris, but by an attack upon one side of this salient, not far from the point where it rejoined the straight line of the general German front between Arras and the still more famous Ypres salient to the north in Belgium.

This Noyon salient was the creation of the fighting of the weeks immediately following the German retreat from the Marne. Von Kluck and Von Bülow had retreated from the Marne to the heights north of the Aisne between Soissons and Berry-au-Bac and the high ground north of Rheims, on which stood the old, dismantled forts anciently constructed to defend the cathedral city. While the German High Command was still attempting to return to the offensive east of the Oise and toward the Marne, Joffre had opened his turning movement west of the Oise, the Germans had been compelled to conform to French strategy, and the line had mounted steadily from the Oise below to the sea at Nieuport, eastward of Rheims, Arras, and Ypres, and westward of Lille, Cambrai, and St. Quentin.

The front from the Oise to the sea was thus created by the hazards of the fighting, and when the campaign was over the Germans held a broad salient pushed out toward Paris, with its nose at Noyon. The

base of this salient was the line between Arras and Berry-au-Bac, an air line distance of some eighty miles, while the extreme depth was some forty miles between St. Quentin and Noyon. Such a salient presented no difficulties to the defender. It was too broad to be exposed to the immediate dangers of the Ypres salient, and between Noyon and Berry-au-Bac, on its south side, it rested upon the St. Gobain Forest and the Chemin des Dames Plateau, positions which were reckoned almost impregnable and did, as the event proved, suffice to arrest a tremendous French offensive in 1917 with disastrous consequences alike to the French commander, Nivelle, and, temporarily, to the morale of the French nation, shaken by the tremendous costs of the Aisne attack.

Within the salient were many railroad lines, both trunk and lateral, enabling the German to transport his troops rapidly from one point to another as emergency demanded, while Douai, Cambrai, and St. Quentin served as bases for concentration alike of men and material. The French railroad systems in this corner of the country were admirably adapted to German purposes, while those on the Allied side of the front were far less satisfactory; in consequence, the German enjoyed, throughout the conflict, the advantage that superiority in communications provided. This was, too, a priceless advantage for an army fighting on the defensive and outnumbered by its foe.

The strategy of the Allies, whose armies were commanded by Haig and Foch, was comprehended in a drive eastward astride the Somme, designed to break in the western side of the salient, move across the flank and rear of the considerable concentrations in the nose of the salient nearest Paris, and compel an immediate or an eventual evacuation of this nose to avoid envelopment as the Allied advance approached and reached the railroads serving the Germans in these sectors. Could the Allies, as a result of their first push, break the German line on the front attacked and, by a rapid and unimpeded advance, reach the line of Cambrai-St. Quentin, they might achieve a Sedan by enveloping the Germans to the south of them. Had their success been as great or as immediate as that of Hindenburg on the same front nearly two years later, this result would have followed.

But while they thought of such a grandiose immediate success, Allied commanders did not reckon upon it; their calculation was, rather, that by their first attack they would break through to Bapaume and Péronne and secure the crossings of the Upper Somme and, from the ground thus gained, continue their advance by the slower process of siege warfare until they reached the point where a wide swinging German retreat would be necessary. In this they anticipated the strategy of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, two years later, with the single but all-comprehending difference that what they hoped for the Germans achieved. Even more exactly they anticipated the strategy of Foch in August, 1918, when using the British army as his weapon he compelled the Germans to retire from Albert to the environs of Cambrai in one brief month.

Failing all these things, Foch and Haig purposed to take such advantage as they could of any less considerable immediate success and begin a long campaign of siege and attrition, designed to wear out German man-power and slowly acquire eastward gains which, by the close of the campaign, would make the German position south of St. Quentin and west of the Oise, on the front nearest Paris, precarious and even perilous. This last they accomplished.

The simplest description of the long Battle of the Somme is that it was, after the first attack upon a wide front, a slow, costly wearing through of the western side of the Noyon salient, which in the end partially closed the entrance to the Noyon pocket, between Arras and the Oise, and so compelled the Germans deliberately but unavoidably to retire to the afterward-famous Hindenburg line, in the spring of 1917. There never was a chance, after the first moments of the battle, that the German line would be broken on a wide front or that there would be a swift advance to St. Quentin and Cambrai, the ultimate objectives, or even to Bapaume and Péronne, the local goals.

The choice of the Picardy front for the offensive was doubtless determined by the obvious profit promised from any considerable advance and perhaps by the fact that on this front the British and French lines now met and both armies could participate, while making use of their

own systems of communication. Finally, as the event proved, success, even if only after slow and desperate struggling, would compel the enemy to retire from the point nearest to Paris and thus give better insurance against some later German return to the offensive and a new dash for the French capital. The value of this phase of the Allied purpose was revealed two years later when the German success in Picardy carried the enemy back to and beyond their old line and again placed Paris in danger.

But these larger considerations were promptly lost sight of when the First Battle of the Somme opened and minor villages and inconsiderable strips of forest became the prizes of contests which rivalled Waterloo or Gettysburg in numbers engaged and losses incurred, while advances of a mile represented the fruits of weeks of preparation. In the aggregate the Allies advanced at the rate of little more than a mile a month, and each mile gained represented hardly less than 200,000 casualties. All preceding standards of artillery fighting were distanced; all earlier records in casualties, in the whole history of modern warfare, were exceeded. Beside the First Somme the Champagne offensive was inconsiderable and Loos but a demonstration in force. The first week of the fighting cost the British more in killed, wounded, and captured than the total number they had engaged at Mons or at the Marne.

#### IV. THE BATTLE-GROUND

The country over which was fought the First Battle of the Somme has no counterpart in the United States, but is quite like certain English districts. It is a chalk country cut by two considerable streams and many smaller brooks, running in deep valleys. The two larger streams, the Ancre and the Somme, the latter alone deserves the name of river, flow through relatively wide stretches of bottom lands easily transformed into almost impassable marshes.

Actually the Germans north of the Somme and on the whole operative front held the western slopes of a series of ridges which behind them rose slowly to the divide between the waters flowing into the Somme and those which wind northward into the Scarpe and Scheldt.

In its first stages the British advance was northward and eastward up and over these slopes and the culminating point between the Ancre and the Somme—known as “the Ridge”—was the key of the battle in its early phase.

As you travel eastward out of Amiens along the great national highway to Cambrai, which is itself a survival of Roman road planning, you pass slowly and imperceptibly from a country of the plain, first to a region of long, rolling hills and finally to the fairly deep-cut valley of the Ancre, which crosses the national highway at Albert and finds its way to the Somme a few miles east of Amiens. In our own West or South we should call this river a creek and it is at all times an inconsiderable stream.


East of Albert the national highway climbs rapidly into a tangle of hills and finally passes the crest of the ridge above Pozières, a notable centre of fighting in the battle, and begins to descend toward Bapaume on the other side of the divide. This national highway was the main route of communication and the chief objective of the fighting. Along it the British sought to advance to Bapaume and toward Cambrai, and the battlefield of the British phase of the Somme lies on either side of the road for some twelve miles on the north side and rather less than eight to the south. The extreme points of the July fighting are Gommecourt to the north beyond the Ancre and Maricourt to the south, just north of the Somme valley, where the French and the British lines met.

From Gommecourt to Maricourt the German line ran in a series of curves on the forward slopes of the various hills about a number of villages henceforth memorable as the scene of desperate fighting. These villages were, from north to south, Gommecourt, Serre, Beaumont-Hamel, St. Pierre Divion—where the lines crossed the Ancre—Thiepval, Ovilliers—just south of which it crossed the national highway—Fricourt, and Mametz. Maricourt was just inside the Allied line. Between Gommecourt and Fricourt the general direction of the line was north and south, but from Fricourt it ran directly east to Maricourt, whence it again turned south.

On this front there had been no fighting since October, 1914, and in

## HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BRITISH FRONT, JUNE 30-JULY 3, 1916



that long period German industry had transformed the German lines into fortresses of unexampled strength. On the map the network of trenches seems inextricable and the experiences of the Champagne fighting had led the enemy to construct in the chalk deep dugouts on a scale unknown before. Electric lights, running water, and all the furnishings stolen from occupied French towns, contributed to the comfort of the garrisons of these strongholds.

Every advantage of elevation and contour was with the German. To the natural advantages he had added defences of the most formidable character; the villages were transformed into fortresses of great resisting power; the woods were wired and fortified, and along the line a number of more elaborate works or redoubts added to the defensibility of the positions. Finally, behind this first line, the strongest single

stretch of line on the western front, the German had constructed a complete second line along the crest of the ridge above Pozières, and had begun to prepare still a third line beyond the ridge and on the last stretch of rising ground in front of Bapaume, which was eight miles northeast of the point where the national highway crossed the firing line.

North of the Ancre the country is more open and rolling than to the south, and this gave the enemy wider outlooks and made Serre and Gommecourt obstacles which proved beyond the resources of the British to take by direct assault. South of the river the hills are more abrupt, although none is 600 feet above the river bottom. Seen at close range, however, these latter hills appear to be far more considerable than the map would indicate and constitute military obstacles of very great value.

South of the Somme and on the French front the German defences were far less elaborate, as the German, quite incorrectly, had not calculated upon any serious French attack, while he had long before the battle learned where the British were to strike. But behind his defence system southwest of Péronne he had the deep and almost impassable valley of the Somme, coming north from Nesle, before it makes its great bend west below Péronne, and this served to hold up permanently all French advance eastward after the first surprising rush of July 1. Even in its first phase, too, the French operation was relatively minor; it was designed to cover the flank of the British operation, which was to be the decisive thrust.

After the first onslaught the British front was narrowed to the region south and east of the Ancre on either side of the national highway, but in the main east of it, between Ovilliers and Maricourt, as Sir Douglas Haig sought by thrusting first northward and then eastward to widen the breach made in the German first line east of the road and turn the Germans out of their impregnable positions from Thiepval to Gommecourt. Actually, therefore, in its earlier and more deadly period, the Somme fighting took place between the Albert-Bapaume stretch of the national highway and the Albert-Péronne road, which passes through Maricourt.

North of the Ancre, although the British made progress in November and took Beaumont-Hamel, the Germans held Gommecourt and Serre to the end, while south of the Somme the French, after their first success, made small progress for several months and eventually took over a portion of the front north of the Somme to cover the extended flank of Haig as he continued his forward movement toward Bapaume, designed to turn the Germans out of their positions on either bank of the Ancre. This movement ultimately succeeded in attaining this object, although the retirement did not come until the onset of the campaign of 1917 and was then without more than temporary profit.

In this area in which the battle was fought there were no towns of importance which were the prize of battle, no railroad lines or junctions of strategic importance; from first to last the struggle was for villages, woodlands, and elevations, all of no more than local value. One line taken, the Germans were always able to retire to a new and formidable secondary system of defence.

The meaning of the struggle is hard to explain by the map and the day-to-day fluctuations are obscure and intricate, because the battle itself was a competition in attrition on a narrow front rather than a pursuit of remoter and more considerable objectives to be attained by success on the front as it existed at any given moment. It was a bruising, brutal combat; it had little of the old-fashioned and ever-fascinating circumstances of a war of movement. It was a war of machines; men only fought when the artillery had achieved approximate annihilation in the enemy's lines. It ended in November barely six miles in advance of the old British front line of July 1; while it lasted its fame filled the world, but when it had passed it left no record to rival that of Ypres or Verdun.

Generations hence men will doubtless go to Verdun and to Ypres, attracted by the memories of the tragic splendour of the contests which raged about those ruined cities, but at the Somme not only was a smiling region turned to desert, to a desert which will endure for many decades, but the last semblance of romance and of charm was eliminated from war and it became nothing but murder on a scale hitherto unparalleled in civilized or barbarian warfare.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THE SOMME—JULY 1

#### I THE NEW ARMY

In the phrase of the British army—which, faithful to the tradition of the race, conceals its emotions, like its achievements, in words which by their very inappropriateness arrest attention—the Battle of the Somme was “the first full-dress show” of the New British Army. It was such a test as our own civilian armies of the Civil War period had in 1862, in the Peninsula and at Antietam, but unfortunately for the British they did not, as did our armies, North and South, face opponents equally new to the conditions and trials of modern war.

The Old British Army, the men of Mons and of Ypres, had for the most part disappeared from the line and a majority slept their final sleep in the old “Wipers salient” which they had held by such incredible gallantry and at such terrible costs alike to themselves and to the picked troops of the Kaiser. The German gas attack of April, 1915, the barren sacrifices of Neuve Chapelle and of Loos, had completed the work of destruction, and the army which faced the Germans on the Somme was, in larger part, an army composed of men—and, for that matter, of officers of the lower ranks—who two years before had been without the smallest knowledge of military affairs and without even the latent suspicion that they might ever wear khaki or undertake the task of a soldier.

No such army as the British, which opened the Battle of the Somme, had appeared on the Continent for a century; even the levies of the Third French Republic, in its despairing effort to save the country in 1871, had included a considerable fraction of citizens who had served with the colours. But from top to bottom the British army, apart from a few officers of the highest rank, was a new thing. Its commander-

in-chief had begun the war as a corps commander and where he now directed the operations of a million men, he had then exercised control of rather less than forty thousand.

Sir Henry Rawlinson, who commanded the army actually engaged, had landed in Belgium in October, 1914, at the head of the immortal Seventh Division, which entered the Ypres Campaign 12,000 strong and left it three weeks later 2,500 strong.

Major General Allenby, who, to the north, commanded one corps which had something of an independent rôle, had been a cavalry colonel when the war broke, and, in the defence of Messines and "Whitesheet" ridges, had taken the first step in a career which was to grow with the Somme struggle, to achieve new laurels in the victorious offensive against Vimy Ridge and the Arras front in 1917, and finally to culminate—at least for the first four years of the struggle—in the capture of Jerusalem and the subsequent destruction of the Turkish army in Palestine in the spring and autumn of 1918.

Another rising officer, under whose immediate command some of the most considerable successes of the opening phase were achieved, was Major General Horne, commander of the Fifteenth Corps on July 1, but later commander of the First British Army and the defender of Bethune in the terrible days of April, 1918. Later in the conflict, the Somme forces were reorganized and General Rawlinson, with the Fourth Army, was aided by a Fifth British Army under Major General Sir Hubert Gough, whose services at the Somme seemed for a moment to mark him as one of the coming men, but the promise was not fulfilled and he disappeared from France on the morrow of his terrible defeat in the Battle of Picardy, on March 21, 1918.

The old story of the Civil War is thus being repeated in this new British army; new names are appearing, old faces are vanishing, a new organization is being formed in the terrible testing fire of a great battle. By no means all the reputations made at the Somme were retained in later campaigns, but after a fashion, the men who rise to prominence in this conflict are the men who, in the next two years, are to direct British campaigns. And to the number of these must be

added Major General Sir William Robertson, Chief of Staff and, with Kitchener, the chief maker and moulder of the New Army.

Since the days of Oliver Cromwell no similar British army had taken the field. It represented the hope, the patriotism, the physical and moral pick of more than forty millions of people of the British Isles; and Canada and Australia, as well as New Zealand, were represented alike in effort and in achievement in the terrible days that were to follow. After nearly two years the British race had responded to the challenge of the German upon the battlefield. It had taken two years to bring together this army, two years of bitter disappointment and endless humiliation, but, on July 1, Britain was at last to answer "present" in the roll call of peoples fighting Germany.

## II. HOPES AND FEARS

But what was to be expected of this army? German military authorities affected, and even seemed, to hold it in utter contempt. If on the physical and the moral side it was as fine an army as ever marched to death with cheers on the lips of its countless thousands, it was still, on the professional and the scientific sides, an experiment—and an untried experiment. Experience under fire the various units had known, in the trench training of recent months, but experience of only the most limited sort.

The army which opened the Somme fighting was more than twice as large, three times as great, in fact, as the force Sir John French had commanded at Mons or at the Marne. Artillery, heavy artillery, there was at last in profusion, and ammunition beyond the dreams of the keenest of gunners, but the men who worked the guns were but recently come from civil life. All the machinery of war, which Germany alone possessed in adequate amount when the war came, was at last provided for the British, thanks alike to the miracles of their own workshops and the complementary contributions of America, but could this machinery, could that army—which was itself a new machine, in the hands of inexperienced masters—face the German machine, with its ante-bellum perfection and its two years of war experience?

This was the great problem which faced the British soldier, statesman, and public on the eve of the Somme; and to it no man could return an answer. All that could be done to create and equip an army in less than two years had been done. Alike the response of the British people and the achievement of British industry in the making of this army will remain a landmark for future generations of the race. Yet, for the commanders of the army, great in numbers and in material resources but weak in all that the trained soldier reckons essential, the anxiety must have equalled that of the few experienced fighters who sent the Minute Men and militia of our Revolutionary period against the regiments of "Redcoats," whose flags bore the record of victories all over the world and whose officers had seen fighting in every clime and against the best that Continental warfare could afford.

It is certain that neither the army nor the British public felt any doubt. After long months in the trenches—outnumbered, outgunned, and outmunitioned—the relatively few veterans who were the stiffening of the New Army felt that the bad time was over—that, at last, they had the advantage of numbers, of artillery; that their guns, instead of being rigidly rationed, were able to fire as they chose, while it was the German, now, who gave evidence of growing difficulties alike in manpower and in munitions.

Yet, looking backward to that time of high hopes and only hidden fears, it is necessary to recognize that, of the hopes, many now seem vain. All that courage and devotion could accomplish this New British Army achieved. It died on July 1 as few armies have ever died. In the succeeding weeks, slowly, at a bitter cost, it learned the lessons of war, which can only be learned on the battlefield; it learned the use and mastery of its instruments. But it did not rival, and, in the two years that have followed it has not rivalled, the technical attainment of the German army and of the German High Command.

The real costs of the Somme were long concealed from the public; the visible and considerable progress on large-scale maps aroused the general conviction—first, in the British public and then, at last, in the army—that it had become a machine superior to the German and, a

year later, it entered the campaign of 1917, convinced that it was, to use the "Tommy's" phrase, "top dog." But after bloody failures on the Yser, the defeats of Picardy and of Flanders in 1918 demonstrated again the eternal truth that armies cannot be improvised, even by the richest and most patriotic of peoples—that neither devotion nor the possession of magnificent mechanical resources can avail to enable a nation to overtake an enemy prepared over long years, its staff trained not alone by years of patient and persistent effort, but inheriting a tradition built upon the victorious experience of more than a century.

In a sense the Somme was as tragic an episode as Balaclava and the sacrifice of Haig's magnificent army comparable with that of the Light Brigade. It was not an utter failure; in a sense it was not a failure at all; nor was it unnecessary. On the contrary, the need was imperative, but it was a waste, tragic beyond power of words to describe.

### III. THE SAME OLD PROBLEM

On the technical side the Battle of the Somme was one more effort to solve the same old problem of transforming a war of positions into a war of movement. There had been many previous experiments, all of them failures on the western front, although the Germans had succeeded brilliantly in Galicia in their Dunajec struggle of the preceding year.

Neuve Chapelle, Second Ypres, Champagne, and the still more recent Verdun offensive, yet proceeding furiously, were all efforts to solve the same riddle. Champagne, the most ambitious Allied effort, had failed because the German organization in depth had enabled the Germans to hang on until their reserves arrived, defending second- and even third-line systems, still beyond the reach of effective artillery fire, for France had not yet overtaken Germany in the provision of heavy guns.

Verdun, the great German experiment, after coming far nearer to success, had failed to make an immediate break through chiefly because the attack had been upon too narrow a front and the French—on the flanks of what was, up to that time, the greatest immediate advance of

trench warfare—had been able to hold up the victorious German centre after it had reached the Douaumont Plateau and swept away all the lines of French fixed defence before it and, in addition, seized most of the remaining gun positions on the east bank of the Meuse.

Neuve Chapelle and Loos had failed because of bad staff work after initial success. In all four the element of surprise had played a considerable part, and the experience of the Somme was presently to demonstrate that, without surprise, victory was impossible. But in the Somme campaign the British deliberately laid aside the element of surprise, influenced alike by the Verdun episode, in which surprise had not brought success, and by the enormous task of preparing for the preliminary artillery bombardment, which was relied upon to sweep away the intricate mass of German defences.

We have nearly two years more to cover before at last the Germans solve this problem of penetration and bring to the western front methods which had been devised in the east, by the application of the lessons of Byng's surprise in the Second Battle of Cambrai, methods which resulted in prompt and deep penetration and seemed for the moment to revolutionize the whole war. Yet even these methods failed to restore the old-fashioned war of movement save between positions. At the Somme the emphasis was laid upon artillery preparation, as it had been by the Germans at Verdun and by the French in Champagne.

Unfortunately for the British their artillery was by no means up to its task in the opening phase of the battle. It did not achieve a destruction of the Germans first line comparable with that which had been achieved by French guns, mainly of smaller calibre, in Champagne a year earlier, and by German heavy artillery in the last days of February of the current year. And without the element of surprise and lacking in adequate artillery preparation, the British infantry, launched against the German positions—lined with machine guns brought up from deep dugouts—when the British guns “lifted” for the infantry advance, went not merely to defeat but to annihilation.

In the later phases the British artillery slowly but surely mastered its problem. Before the struggle terminated the balance between the

gun and the fort had been changed and the Germans were driven to abandon their elaborate system of fixed defences for a far different method which rested upon the principle of organization in depth and lightly, rather than upon that principle expressed in their Somme defences which rivalled the fortresses of old-fashioned warfare. After the first fatal attempt to sweep the Germans out of their lines by long-continued artillery preparation, rising to an avalanche of steel and fire in the final hours, the British on their side changed their method to one of slow pounding, concentrating their efforts upon local objectives and gradually reaching the point where they inflicted upon the enemy appalling losses, isolated his front lines from his rear, hampered his communications, and thus contributed to the demoralization of his troops.

In the later phase the dugout became a tomb; the infantry in assault reached the enemy trench before the Germans could emerge from underground, if, indeed, the entrance to the dugout had not been blocked and the occupants buried alive, the whole elaborate system of fixed defences was breached and broken, and the Germans were defending their new line from shallow trenches, from shell holes, and from isolated nests of machine guns, exactly as the French had successfully defended Verdun, after their first lines had given way in the storm of February 26.

On July 1, however, the opening attack was one conforming to the older standards, on a front of twenty miles so far as the British were concerned and rather less than half as much by their French allies on the right flank. It did not differ from the Champagne or the Verdun offensive save that the artillery preparation was more intense, the number of guns employed greater, the duration of the bombardment longer; but, unhappily, the effectiveness of the fire infinitely less than on either of the former occasions.

As a result the British were on this occasion to fail as the French subsequently failed at the Aisne in May of the next year, and as the British again failed in Flanders a few months later in the same year. One more effort to break the deadlock, which had existed on the west

front since the end of the Marne-Ypres campaign, was foredoomed to failure.

#### IV. JULY I

The army of General Rawlinson consisted of five army corps containing a varying number of divisions, while associated with it was a sixth corps under Allenby. All told, the British strength was something like twenty divisions containing around 250,000 bayonets. To the south of Maricourt the French coöperating army was under the command of General Fayolle, henceforth one of the coming men of the French army, while to the south of this was still another army under Micheler, which played a considerable part in the latter phases of the struggle. Two years later and in the same Picardy fields Fayolle was to intervene at the crucial moment, when the Fifth British Army had been destroyed and save Amiens, bar the road to Paris, and close the gap between the British and the French, thus parrying the latest and deadliest German offensive.

Both French armies were under the supreme direction of General Foch, next to Joffre the most famous of French commanders and destined in later time to assume the command of all the Allied armies at a moment of great peril. In all the trying period of the Yser and Ypres struggle Foch had been associated with Sir John French and again in the campaign of 1915 these British and French generals had closely co-operated, as Haig and Foch did again in the new contest. Fayolle's army, which shared in the July fighting, contained three corps, two of which—the famous Twentieth (the Iron Corps, which had recently saved Verdun and at an earlier time preserved Nancy) and the Colonial Corps—were reckoned as the best of the French shock troops. All told, the British and French forces exceeded 400,000 and were able to put more than 300,000 infantry into the opening assault.

The German force facing the Anglo-French line included portions of two armies, one commanded by Otto von Below, hitherto known for achievements in eastern fighting, and the other by Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria. But as the struggle proceeded the various German

# THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH ARMIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT

At the desperate moment in the Battle of Ypres when the decimated British front line was being held against apparently hopeless odds by cooks, hostlers, drivers, and any one who could carry a gun, General Haig, immaculately dressed and accompanied by a small escort of his staff officers, rode along his lines exposed to the full fury of the enemy fire. He was as calm and cool as if on dress parade at home in England. The moral effect upon his hard-pressed troops was magical. It seemed to galvanize them into invincibility.



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

STAR ROCKETS ON THE SOMME FRONT AT NIGHT

THE CURTAINS OF THE WAR ZONE

Miles upon miles of curtained roads like this one stretched throughout the war zone. Note the apertures cut in the drops to admit shafts of light




*Private... Cet... No... Photo Secr*

A GERMAN INCENDIARY BARRAGE AT NIGHT

The German incendiary projectiles added still another horror to war and have been responsible for the wanton destruction of much property in Northern France. The barbed-wire entanglements in front of the French trenches are seen in the foreground of this picture.





Photographed by French Pictorial Service

THE "IMPREGNABLE" HINDENBURG LINE

These fortifications, in the invincibility of which the Germans had placed their confidence, yielded to the first onset of the French at the Somme



BRITISH TROOPS ASSAULTING  
This assault was made January 7, 1916, at Boiselle

*Courtesy Major A. Radcliffe Dugmore.*



WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS IN FRONT OF HINDENBURG LINE




ONE OF THE WILTS REGIMENTS CROSSING SHELL-SWEPT GROUND

*Courtesy Major A. Radcliffe Dugmore*



*Drawn by F. Martania for "The Sphere," London, copyrighted by The New York Herald Co.*  
**GERMAN ATTACK ON A BRITISH TANK**



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*  
**CANADIANS FIGHTING AT COURCELLETTE ON THE SOMME**



THE GREAT BRITISH ADVANCE IN THE WEST  
A raiding party getting clear of a sap and racing toward the Boche trenches


*British Official*



SOMME FRONT AT BOUCHAVESNES

*Photograph by Press Illustrating Co.*

A dangerous passage between two trench sections. These men are targets for sharpshooters



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

#### AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT

This is what the great guns do to France's beautiful countryside



*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

#### GERMAN TRENCHES DESTROYED BY ALLIED ARTILLERY

What the British troops found in the crumbling remains of the enemy's trenches after a terrific bombardment

forces engaged were placed under the supreme command of Rupprecht, and the contest was actually between Haig and Foch on the Allied side and the Crown Prince of Bavaria on the German side. It is well to point out, too, that as the battle progressed new divisions were constantly sent into the furnace from all parts of the front by both sides. Thus in the course of the struggle the Germans employed not less than 133 divisions, although there were probably never more than fifteen or twenty on the line at a given moment, and the Allies used forces only a little less considerable.

At daylight on July 1, after the fiercest final artillery bombardment of the war, the British troops left their trenches on the twenty-mile front from before Gommecourt to Maricourt and advanced against the German lines in successive waves. The great hour for which the New Army and the nation alike had been waiting had come at last. With a heroism beyond praise the assailing waves went forward against defences of known strength whose condition after the long bombardment remained a matter of conjecture.

If the British expected to find the German works destroyed and the German army shaken by the bombardment, they were promptly undeceived. From Gommecourt, through Serre and Thiepval, on either side of the Ancre, and as far south as Fricourt, where the line turned eastward, the advance culminated in swift disaster. On this whole front the German works were still undestroyed; the German machine guns were brought out of the dugouts and opened before the infantry could arrive; in certain instances the infantry passed the first German line only to be taken in the rear by the fire of German troops who had remained concealed underground until the first wave had passed. German barrages prohibited the advance of supporting waves. In all military history there had never been a more prompt or bloody check than that which the British suffered from Gommecourt almost to Fricourt. Even where local gains had been made, the successful troops could not be supported and remained to die or dribbled back in pitiful fragments.

From Fricourt to Maricourt, and for a short distance north of

Fricourt and south of the national highways on the contrary, there had been a measure of success. South and east of Fricourt the German first line had been broken on a front of perhaps four miles and the villages of Mametz and Montauban taken. Owing to the turn in the German line about Fricourt, the fall of Montauban and of Mametz together with the gain north of the town necessitated the retirement of the Germans out of Fricourt and as far westward as La Boisselle just south of the Albert-Bapaume stretch of the Amiens-Cambrai national highway. Thus, on July 2, when the German readjustment had taken place, the British were in possession of some seven miles of the old German front line. They had taken 3,500 prisoners and a certain number of machine guns and material.

As for the French army to the south of Maricourt astride the Somme, meeting with far less resistance and operating in conjunction with an artillery trained by long months of war, it had swept forward, attaining all of its objectives with insignificant losses, capturing half a dozen villages and 6,000 prisoners. The Germans had not expected an attack from the French, exhausted as they believed the French army to be as a result of Verdun; for Fayolle's rush they had not made the same preparations which had been so fatal to the British on most of the front; but with all due allowances for these circumstances it is no less clear that greater French success at infinitely smaller cost than to the British was due in part to the fact that a veteran army fought under the Tricolour.

The cost to the British of the first day of the Somme has been variously appraised but by no credible estimate has it been placed at below 50,000 killed, wounded, and captured. It was probably materially greater, and many brigades and divisions were well-nigh destroyed. The dead lay in rows before the unbroken German lines as grain under the scythe of the reaper. The experience of Burnside at Fredericksburg had been repeated in the case of all the British troops north of the Albert-Bapaume road, and the positions which were attacked continued to cover their garrisons for long weeks thereafter. Nor were they ever successfully assailed by frontal attack.

Contrasted with all previous general offensives on the western front the first day of the Somme was a ghastly failure, despite the gain of a mile or two on a seven-mile front before the British and a somewhat deeper penetration by the French. In only one respect had the Allies established immediate and unquestioned superiority: they had seized control of the air and they were to retain it throughout the long months of battle. This success in the end proved of priceless value and was one of the decisive factors in the later advances. But on July I it was of less immediate importance, because the German defence had held over so large a fraction of the front.

#### V. HAIG MAKES GRANT'S DECISION

On July 2 Haig was called upon to make the decision which is expressed in Grant's memorable words: "I intend to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer." His effort to pierce the German lines and compel a general retirement had been an absolute failure. His attempt to break through even to the relatively near centre of Bapaume had come to nothing; the sum of all his profits was disclosed in the seven-mile break east of the national highway and west of Maricourt.

There was, moreover, no possibility of renewing the general attack; the failure had been too complete, the cost too terrible, to permit the commander-in-chief to think of asking more sacrifices from the shattered divisions and corps which had left their best on the slopes before Thiepval and Gommecourt. Like Grant's army after Cold Harbor, Haig's troops could do no more. On the whole, the prospect on the second day was infinitely less promising than on the day following Neuve Chapelle or Loos; the gain, by comparison, insignificant.

It was, however, impossible to abandon the action altogether, since Verdun remained in peril and the necessity of compelling the Germans under pressure in Picardy to abandon their effort in Lorraine was patent. The major thrust had failed and could not be repeated, there was left only the possibility of making use of the meagre gains which had been acquired along the Somme to compel the Germans, by ever-increasing pounding, to relax their efforts along the Meuse. And this was the

decision of Haig. In the days that followed he slowly and methodically mopped up the fragments of the broken German line before him and blasted his way forward to the second line, behind the broken front. He had failed to break the German line from Gommecourt to the Bapaume road, but, having taken that portion of the first defence system east and south of the road and profiting by the curve in the line, he undertook to advance northward behind the unbroken sectors, seeking to reach the crest of the Pozières Ridge from the south instead of from the west, blasting his way from wood to wood and from ruined village to ruined village, reckoning that, as the army moved northward, it would more and more envelop the German line from Gommecourt to the Bapaume road and slowly compel the Germans to retire from the positions before which his frontal attack had been broken.

And with this decision, made on July 2 and disclosed in all the subsequent fighting, the character of the Battle of the Somme changes. Attacks upon a considerable front there were on later occasions, notably on July 14, but never on such an extent of front as had been assailed on July 1, and never with the smallest hope of achieving any break through or anything but purely local advantage. Haig's method henceforth was a process of erosion, and as the British flood slowly ate its way northward behind the still-unbroken sectors of the German front, these positions had to be evacuated and the gap in the German defence system gradually widened until it reached and passed the west bank of the Ancre.

Throughout this period the French armies served as the flank guard. From time to time, as the British moved northward, Foch attacked eastward and widened the area in which the British might operate. The French attacks were invariably more brilliant and more successful than those of the British, but they were subordinate to the British operation. In all ways the British was the main effort and the British paid the greater part of the expense in life and in material. Slowly, painfully slowly, this British wave ate its way northward; we had day after day the story of the struggle over some insignificant wood or farmhouse; five months of fighting were concentrated in little more than

fifty square miles of territory, and casualties greater than those of our own Civil War were inflicted in an area smaller than that of the old City of New York.

Out of the first failure Haig constructed a battlefield success by iron resolution and by the reliance upon those qualities which have always stood British armies in good stead, whether attacking or holding on. But on the evening of July 1 he faced a failure which might well have staggered a less resolute spirit. The British public hailed that first day as a victory, little knowing the cost or the truth; the German High Command reckoned it a victory, as it was, but built upon it the assurance that the Verdun campaign would continue and the army of the Crown Prince suffer no weakening by the transfer of guns and troops to Picardy; but in this it was mistaken. The first moment of the Somme was, for the British, by far the worst.

To use a simple figure, the first break in the German dike had been inconsiderable—was promptly closed from behind—but in the months that followed the water ate slowly through the retaining walls, and swirled behind one shelter after another of still unbroken dikes, eventually penetrated through all of the old systems of dikes, and, as the campaign closed because of the coming of bad weather, was beginning to surpass the powers of the defenders to construct new dikes behind each falling wall. This, after all, was the real Somme success, a success of erosion and of attrition, wearing away both the walls and the numbers, never achieving a decisive success, never developing into anything which could rival the Marne or even Verdun in popular appeal or spectacular circumstance. But always the British flood wore its way onward and upward until the Germans were out of the whole of their original lines of defence from the Ancre to the Somme and the British looked downward from the summit of the Ridge upon their enemies in the lower ground beyond. Verdun, in the meantime, lapsed into a quiet sector, to become active again only when Mangin took the offensive in October and again in December.

The Somme is not less a symbol than Verdun or the Marne, but as it is the expression of a different race, it has a quality all its own. It

left its seal upon the British people, it expressed the British people, and yet it is—on the military side, as a spectacle and as a campaign—quite indescribable, because it was, from the first days onward, a confused and tangled battle for insignificant objects. It contrasted with the Marne, or even with Verdun, as a battle in the open and in line contrasts with a house-to-house advance through a resisting city. The world could see the Verdun fight unroll before its eyes and could understand, if not the local circumstances, the larger issue. “They shall not pass” summed it up and at the same time translated it for millions. The Somme was untranslatable, once it fell to the level of a siege, with no city or fort as the objective but merely a system of successive trench lines stretching backward, for all that the world knew, to the Meuse or even to the Rhine.

All this was an inevitable consequence of the defeat of July 1 and the subsequent decision of Haig to follow the example and apply the words of Grant. Literally and persistently through the summer and autumn he fought his fight on a line which, save on the largest-scale map, must seem the same unchanged and unchanging front from July to November.

## CHAPTER NINE

### THE SOMME—JULY TO NOVEMBER

#### I

#### TO THE CREST OF THE RIDGE

The Battle of the Somme, following the July 1 attack, naturally and logically divides itself into four phases, as Sir Douglas Haig himself indicated in his terse and soldierly narrative of the conflict contained in an official report which is by all odds the best account of the struggle so far written. These four phases are, in turn, associated with the successive German lines which were broken in the respective periods.


On July 1 the British broke the first line on a front of some six miles east of Fricourt and for rather more than a mile west of it. From July 1 to July 13 Haig was occupied in clearing the way to the second German line, which lay along the forward crest of the henceforth famous Ridge and was indicated on the map by a road running roughly east and west from the Albert-Bapaume national highway at Pozières, through Bazentin-le-Petit and Bazentin-le-Grand to Longueval and thence of Ginchy, touching the notorious Delville or "Devil's Wood" between the last-named towns.

Before he could attack this second line Haig was compelled to fight for nearly two weeks in the restricted area between the original German front line and the new positions. His operations were little more than considerable clearing movements. A number of bits of woodland familiar in the official reports of the time—Bailiff Wood, Mametz Wood, Bernafay Wood, and Trones Wood—outer bastions of the German second line, had to be reduced. Fricourt was taken on July 2, but Contalmaison held out for many days and not until it was taken could the second line be attacked.

On July 14 Haig swung forward on a front from the Bapaume highway near La Boisselle straight eastward to Delville Wood and on this

eight-mile front, on the average about two miles north of the front attacked in the July 1 operation, delivered the second considerable blow. This time he was successful on an even more limited front, breaking the German second line only on a three-mile front between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval. This offensive marked the beginning of the second stage in the Battle of the Somme.

**BRITISH FRONT, JULY 14-AUGUST 18, 1916**



More than a month, from July 14 to August 18, was now occupied in clearing the way for an attack upon the third German line and those portions of the second line which had not been carried in the July 14 offensive and the succeeding operations. In this period the field of operations extended westward across the Bapaume road toward the Ancre. The northward push was gradually weakening the German


positions between the Ancre and the highway, threatening their rear, and compelling a withdrawal which extended the width of the breach in the first line.

In this second phase Ovillers-la-Boiselle, Pozières, and a material fraction of the Delville Wood were taken and the British at last reached the crest of the famous ridge, near the Pozières Windmill, and began to catch glimpses of the lower lands beyond. But holding the Thiepval salient, the Mouquet Farm, and the village of Martinspuich, as well as Flers on the Bapaume-Maricourt road, the Germans were still in possession of most of the high ground. Seven weeks after the first attack the British advance had not exceeded five miles at any point and the operative front had narrowed to less than seven miles, the distance from Thiepval to Flers.

The French on their part of the front had been far more successful. In the first days of July they had driven a wedge through three German lines south of the Somme and reached the river, within a mile of Péronne; a score of villages and 12,000 prisoners had been their bag in the first phase. In the second, moreover, they had extended their successes north of the river and carried their front forward within striking distance of Combles, the single considerable town within the fighting area. But the mission of the French was relatively minor; they held the flank of the real operative force and their successes, still more considerable than the British for several months, were not turned to larger account, as later commentators have believed that they might have been.

Between August 18 and September 10 Sir Douglas Haig, with French help, undertook to widen his field of operations by pushing east, and in successive attacks succeeded in approaching close to the Bapaume-Péronne highway. Powerfully assisted by the French, he extended his lines until they ran from the edge of Combles southward to the Somme at Cléry, and the German position in Péronne began to be uncomfortable in the extreme. This was the situation at the close of the second phase in the early days of September, and by this time the German had lost his second line from Thiepval all the way round to Estrees south of the river and on the Roman road which runs from Amiens

BRITISH FRONT, AUGUST 18-OCTOBER 1, 1916



eastward to St. Quentin. This was the road along which Hindenburg's victorious army was to make its tremendous advance less than two years later and the French army in the summer of 1916 occupied the ground on which was also to be fought the Third Battle of the Somme in August, 1918.

## II. THE END OF THE BATTLE.

The third phase of the Somme covers the period from the first days of September to the first day of October. In this time the British at last master the final line of permanent German entrenchments, as these entrenchments existed when the battle began; they take Thiepval and Martinpuich, as well as Courcelette, and begin to get rapidly forward toward Bapaume on the northern slopes of the ridge, while the

Germans are now condemned to fight in the low ground of the head-waters of the Ancre Brook.

Farther to the east the British at last dispose of Delville Wood, take Flers, and approach within less than three miles of Bapaume along the Maricourt road, while still farther to the east the French and British together take Combles, and the French cross the Péronne-Bapaume highway on a front from Rancourt to Bouchavesnes and approach Mont St. Quentin, the key to Péronne itself. In this time there is a manifest weakening of the German resistance. All the old permanent defence systems have been breached and broken on the front from the Ancre east of Hamel to the Somme just north of Péronne and southward of Cléry; on the river the French have made rapid progress all the way down to Chaulnes, where Micheler's French army is beginning to become active on Fayolle's flank.

On October 1 Haig could hope, and did hope, that he was now at the point where his long battle might begin to yield great profits. His process of erosion had worn through the major obstacles which had been before him at the beginning. The Germans were now fighting in hastily constructed trenches, barricaded villages, and in many cases in shell holes and mine craters. They were in the low ground and, since their air service was hopelessly inferior, this was a terrible handicap. There remained, in an ordinary season, at least four more weeks in which to press home the victory.

But again, as happened once more in the following autumn and had happened on many previous occasions, the weather favoured the German. A period of rain and storm winds, of low visibility and heavy communications, intervened. The cumbrous machine, which had at last begun to pound its way forward irresistibly, if slowly, was conquered by mud at the moment when its triumph over the German seemed inevitable. The time when the exploitation of the real successes already achieved might have been possible, passed; the end of the campaign came and the German line was still unbroken; it had been bent, a wedge had been driven in between the Oise and the Scarpe, the original German defences had been pounded to dust, but a line still held.

One final flash of shining achievement there was to lighten the gloom naturally accompanying the great disappointment. On November 14 came a brilliant offensive at the bend of the Ancre and on the west bank of the little stream, about Beaumont-Hamel and near Serre, the scene of the bloodiest repulses of July 1. In a few hours Beaumont-Hamel was taken, the Germans turned out of a valuable joint in their line and a position of great importance in the defence of their front on both sides of the river. Five thousand prisoners and not a few guns, the largest bag of any day in British fighting on the western front up to that moment, were taken.

But Beaumont-Hamel was more than a brilliant incident, it was an evidence of the fashion in which the New Army had learned its trade. It was a thoroughly scientific performance; not so perfect as Plumer's victory at Messines Ridge in the following June, not so immediately fruitful of prisoners and guns captured as Rawlinson's push a little to the south beyond Albert in August, 1918, but it was a workmanlike military operation. There was not again the terrible death list, the sacrifice of countless lives against unbroken wire and unshaken defences. From the end of the First Battle of Ypres to the beginning of the Battle of Arras, Beaumont-Hamel is the most interesting military performance—on the technical side—of the British army, marked by good staff work, sound artillery coöordination with infantry, a proof positive that the British army had learned the offensive lessons of modern war.

### III. THE TANKS

Before passing to a summary of the actual situation at the end of the Battle of the Somme, one detail demands notice. In the operations of September 15 there first appeared upon the field that henceforth familiar engine known to the British as "Tank" and to the French as "chariot of assault." With the "Poison Gas" of Second Ypres, the tank shares the dubious honour of being one of two great innovations in all of the first four years of the struggle.

The submarine and the aëroplane—and the Zeppelin, as well—were in existence before August 1, 1914. It is true that, both in the case of

the aëroplane and of the submarine, particularly in the case of the former, the developments, after the war began, so completely transformed and expanded their usefulness that they might be regarded almost as discoveries of the conflict itself. But poison gas and the tank were born after the conflict began and were two natural developments of the form of warfare which, in the larger sense, had been a surprise to all combatants when it arrived and remained.

The tank was an odd combination of the familiar chariot of ancient warfare and the modern battleship; in theory it was as old as the warfare of that period where mythology and history meet; in mechanism it was as modern as the latest agricultural machine of the American Middle West. It was a movable fort; it was capable of breaking through the barbed-wire entanglements, of smashing houses, of breaking walls. It could move, waddling like an obese and clumsy hippopotamus, over the strongest lines of defence and opening gaps in the most solid entrenchments through which infantry could pour.

On its first appearance it contributed to the capture of certain ruined villages which had defied all previous artillery preparation. It produced consternation in the ranks of the enemy, but almost as striking was the sensation of amusement created within British lines. Even in the heat of battle thousands of men fighting for their lives and under deadly fire were seized with uncontrollable laughter as they saw these strange and animal-like engines moving forward over the battle-front, carrying death and destruction before them and about them, but combining a high degree of mechanical efficiency in destruction with a clumsiness of movement which was beyond description.

Like the poison gas at Ypres, the tank at Courcelette and afterward did not win the battle in the larger sense. The element of surprise was promptly exhausted, the Germans learned to mass field guns in the front lines and in other ways to meet the tank attack, while the prompt arrival of bad weather, with mud and inundation, limited the immediate usefulness of the tank, although it played an interesting and useful rôle in the remaining weeks of the battle.

Yet, limited as was its success at the moment and in the next few

months, the tank, once it had come, remained, like the various forms of poison gas, a permanent detail in the new order of warfare. A little more than a year later a massed fleet of tanks enabled the British to achieve, at Cambrai, the first real break-through on a considerable front of the whole western struggle. Unhappily the victory far surpassed the expectation and there were lacking reserves to exploit the success, but the success itself opened the eyes of the British and the French to the possible future use of the tanks, while it turned the German mind toward experiments in restoring the element of surprise in the war by intense artillery preparation over a short period.

The Germans tried their adaptation of the lessons of the tank with great success in the first half of the summer of 1918; the British and French—sticking to the tank but changing its form and improving its mechanism—were able to win their first great western victory of this later year and change the whole current of events in Rawlinson's offensive south of the Somme and less than ten miles from the point at which the tank made its initial appearance in the great Foch counter thrust of August, 1918.

Thus, in a future not greatly distant, the tank revolutionized the Allied method of attack; it supplied the place of the long artillery preparation, once regarded as essential to remove the enemy's wire and fixed defences, but fatal to all possibility of surprise. It contributed mainly to two victories, those of the Second Marne and the Third Somme in the critical hours of the campaign of 1918 and it may be regarded, hereafter, as having been as important an innovation in land warfare as were the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, in our own Civil War, in naval warfare.

But if the tank could be traced on the military side as far back as the Scythian chariot and the Trojan horse; if it was the natural and logical extension of an idea expressed by the Ancient World in its relatively restricted armoury, the actual origin of the tank was both humble and destitute of martial circumstance, for the original tanks, which ground and crunched their way over the last few rods of the Albert Ridge, were but very slightly modified forms of the Holt Tractor, manu-

factured in Peoria, Illinois, propelled on the caterpillar principle, and intended for agricultural purposes and for the crossing of rough ground and the familiar obstacles of the farmer. Of old it had been the fashion to quote the adage as to beating the swords into ploughshares, but in the topsyturvydom of the new era, the farm tractor was transformed into a land battleship.

#### IV. THE ACHIEVEMENT

Like the First Battle of Ypres, the First Battle of the Somme did not end abruptly; it simply died out, as both armies little by little surrendered to the elements and sat down in the mud and filth of the bleak Picardy uplands to face another winter. But by December it was plain that the end of the battle had come and there was a prompt effort on both sides to measure its meaning and to translate it into such terms as should satisfy a public looking with frank dismay at the "butcher's bill" and perceiving, on the map, only minor changes as compared with the situation of July 1.

In the period of five months of more or less steady fighting the Allies had advanced at points rather more than seven miles; they had retaken perhaps two hundred square miles of French territory and captured more than 80,000 German prisoners. They had inflicted a loss of at least half a million upon the Germans, but the British alone had suffered even more heavily while the total Anglo-French loss could hardly have been less than three quarters of a million. The enemy's defences had been battered into ruins and his theory of elaborate and grandiose fixed defences had been upset, unfortunately only with the result that the German was to appear in the next year with an elastic system which was to prove equally difficult and equally successful in defying effective penetration.


On the larger side Verdun had been saved; pressure had been taken off the French; the British and the French had seized the initiative on the western front and made possible a bid for a decision in the following year. In the east Brusiloff had been enabled to make the last brilliant and despairing Russian offensive which was to bring Austria once more

to the point of ruin. But great as was the burden which Haig had imposed upon German man-power, the Germans were still able to aid their Austrian allies against the Russians and, a little later, to provide the generals and the troops which were to insure the rapid ruin of Rumania.

Had Russia been able to continue in the war the Somme might, conceivably, have proven—as in the winter of 1916-17 it was thought to be—the beginning of the end. But Russia fell, the whole situation changed, the Somme quickly disappeared from memory, and its importance diminished as it was seen through the new perspective. More and more it came to be recognized as the bloody shambles which were to serve as the training school of the new British army.

When the battle was over the German line was so dented and eroded that a retirement was early seen to be inevitable and the hope was long cherished that the retirement might prove the beginning of a great Allied forward march. But the brutal and indefensible German policy of devastation, which created a desert before that new Hindenburg line to which the foe ultimately retired in the following spring, served its purpose and abolished all chance of an Allied resumption of the campaign in Picardy and prepared the way for the astounding triumph of Ludendorff when the Germans regained the offensive in 1918 and Hutier applied his own method of surprise—itself a derivation from British tactics at Cambrai—in which the tank played so considerable a part.

Moreover, still a new perspective was furnished when in August, 1918, Allied and German armies again faced each other on the identical lines of July, 1916, when British troops once more looked across the Ancre and saw the Ridge occupied by German troops and French and British forces were brought to a halt before the old trenches west of Roye and Chaulnes. And in the future it seems that British, French, and German peoples will all look upon the Somme campaigns as we, North and South—no longer conscious of the emotions, the hopes, and dreams of our fathers and grandfathers—look at the sterile battles fought back and forth through northern Virginia in the first three campaigns of our own Civil War, battles which were marked by ter-



Picture by Paul Thompson

ONE OF GUYNER'S VICTORIES

The enemy machine, out of control, drops through the clouds, throwing the observer out as it falls



Photograph by Paul Thompson


GUYNEMER'S FORTY-FIFTH VICTORY

"Kill or be killed. It means quick thinking and nerves of steel, added to absolute indifference to personal danger. And even then chance says the last word in all fighting in the air."

*Photograph by Merton Nees, after U-123*


AEROPLANE VIEW OF BOMBARDED GERMAN TRENCHES


By the aid of this picture even civilians can form some faint idea of what it would be to burrow in the ground under the hurricane of exploding shells which destroyed these German entrenchments.



AN OBSERVATION BALLOON

Shooting down observation balloons such as this was always one of the many extra hazardous occupations of the aviators





RUINS FROM ABOVE

*Photograph: Central News Photo Service*

This picture shows the crowning infamy of Germany's calculated vandalism. The German idea that to shock and anger civilized peoples past the power of words to express would cow them into quick submission will be one of the hardest things for future students of this war to believe.

THE RUINED VILLAGE OF BEAUMONT ON THE MEUSE AS SEEN FROM AN AEROPLANE






*Photograph by Western News paper Union*

#### DROPPING SAFELY FROM A BALLOON

Five French observation balloons broke loose in a gale and drove rapidly toward the enemy's lines. By means of their parachutes some of the observers dropped safely to earth although the observer here shown unfortunately fell within the enemy's lines.



*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

#### THE NIGHT RAIDER

Held in the converging rays of two searchlights the raiding Zeppelin makes a conspicuous target for the anti-aircraft guns. Shrapnel can be seen exploding around it

rific slaughter and indescribable bravery and sacrifice, but produced no decision and brought no permanent occupation of territory.

At the Somme the German hope of a Verdun victory was destroyed. The hope of eliminating France before Britain was ready had been abolished on the Heights of the Meuse, and along the Somme the British intervened, as Joffre had planned they should. Together, the Somme and Verdun defeated the second German bid for a decision in the west. But the Russian collapse in its turn neutralized the consequences of Verdun and the Somme, and it was presently to be the mission of France and of Britain to play the old rôle on the familiar and mournful Picardy and Champagne fields, while America prepared to intervene, as Britain had prepared in 1916 before the July 1 attack.

#### V. THE DESERT

To complete the record of the Somme one more circumstance is of more than passing importance. Here at last there was revealed the full power of modern weapons of destruction. Before the Somme there had been havoc beyond anything other wars had known. Before even the storm had broken upon Verdun the devastation on about Ypres had become a phenomenon known to the whole civilized world, and all that had occurred in Flanders was but child's play compared with the first bombardment in Lorraine in February. Yet about Verdun, where the fighting took place in a sparsely populated region of forests, a savage landscape disguised some part of the wounds of modern warfare.

In Picardy it was otherwise; a smiling country, of rolling hills and deep and pleasant valleys cut by chalk streams—a land of prosperous farms and fertile fields, sown with small villages—was suddenly smitten by a storm which did not pass away but endured for weeks and for months. Over an area ten miles wide by twenty long the whole face of the earth was changed; the heart of the hills blown out, the smoothly rounding slopes of other elevations concealed craters, like those of famous volcanoes; all the interior of the hill had been blown out by mines, and in the chasm that remained an ocean liner could be concealed.

Eastward of Albert, itself a shell-wrecked town, along the roads by which the flower of young British and Imperial manhood had marched to death and mutilation—roads the sole surviving detail of old order in a world of chaos—roads recalling the Appian Way in the Campagna—stretched a region indescribable in its ruin. Whether one travelled by the northern, eastern, or southern roads one passed suddenly and almost without warning into a land of desolation terrible beyond words. Westward of Albert, in this time—although later devastation returned with the German, and passed to the other bank of the Ancre—was the pleasant landscape of Picardy, a landscape framed by little woodlands, smiling valleys, coquettish villages; eastward was a Sahara, and something more than a Sahara, recalling the fields about Pompeii or Messina, through which have flowed the streams of lava and of ashes which not only engulf but endure.

At the Battle of the Marne and in the opening campaign of the war the destruction was little more complete than that which might have followed the passage of armies in the Napoleonic era. On the field of the Champagne offensive of September, 1915, the villages were, it is true, almost totally destroyed in places and everywhere reduced to hopeless shells; but the fields, the country itself, remained to be reclaimed by the plough and the farmer. The shallow trenches and the inconsiderable dugouts had survived the artillery preparation of the guns of the calibre employed in that opening period of high explosive warfare.

But at the Somme there was nothing more terrible than the mutilation of the surface of the earth itself, the permanent destruction of hills, the everlasting scarring of the hillsides, the creation of new mountains by mine explosions, and the excavation of valleys where once the hills had been. Where the first-line German trenches had extended from the Ancre to the Somme there was left neither trenches nor the semblance of trenches, the dugouts and their inhabitants alike had been buried as beneath an avalanche, the surrounding hills had been worked by shell fire until they resembled nothing so much as the pictures of the surface of the moon, familiar to readers of old-fashioned geographies.

From the slopes of Mametz Hill, at the very starting place of the

British offensive, one might look north and south and east upon the sites of many little villages, which nestled under the crests of the sharply rising hills. At the very foot of Mametz Hill had been Mametz, but of it not a stone, not a fragment, remained. It had not been buried, it had been literally blown from the surface of the earth; it had dissolved in dust and the dust itself had been swept away. Where once had been a well-built little French village, with its solid houses of plaster and stone, old houses which had endured other centuries and survived other wars, there was nothing. There had been the usual church, the familiar square, the invariable fountain; all the slight but permanent details of the French village; and of all these there was left just nothing.

And what was true of Mametz was equally true of Montauban and Fricourt, of scores of villages from Roye below the Somme to Mirau-mont above it. The villages were gone, the hills about them had disappeared; the woodlands were obliterated; a streak of red dust amidst the chalky white of the roadside was the sole suggestion of what had once been a village—an occasional half-excavated stump beside a shell crater the only reminder of what had been the communal forest; but for the most part the woods of Picardy, like those of Lorraine about Verdun, were gone and there remained neither stumps nor stump holes, only vast pits dug by the heavy artillery, pits into which in the period of rain and fog men and animals fell and were drowned.

It was at the Somme that this new power of destruction first revealed itself in its full malignant power. There it not alone destroyed all that there was of human habitation and of the fields of human effort, but it swept the earth with fire and sowed it, not with salt but with steel, turned it yellow with exhalations of deadly gases, submerged the upper surface of fertile earth with the rocks and gravel, the all-pervading chalk of the under strata, as if seeking to prevent a future return of men to these fields—to create a permanent desert and make it impossible for men to exist or fruits and foods to grow in the soil on which nations had fought.

Such, in some measure, was the destruction of the First Battle of the Somme in 1916. But the same waves of destruction were at least twice

again to cross and even to pass this Somme battle-ground, to approach Amiens and to return to the lines of July 1. And with the advance of the Germans in March, 1918, a wartime legend of Picardy found mournful refutation. In the village square at Albert there stood, through all the First Battle, a wrecked church; across its tower lay the figure of The Virgin, overturned by German shell fire but still clinging to the tower, always seeming as if about to crash downward into the shell-torn ruin beneath it. But the fall did not come in 1916 and there grew up in all the countryside the belief that when the Virgin of Albert did fall, the war would end. Two years later, when the German returned to Albert, the statue crashed down into dust and ruin, but the war went on and a new and Third Battle of the Somme flamed up over all the ruined and ravaged lands between the Ancre and the Avre, and the tides and currents of war continued to ebb and flow over the ruined land as the sea sweeps backward and forward over submerged cities and engulfed shores.

## CHAPTER TEN

### VERDUN—THE EPILOGUE

#### I THE PAUSE

The fighting before Verdun did not immediately die out following the opening of the Battle of the Somme. The Crown Prince was able to promise his troops, in July, when Haig's first efforts had harvested only inconsiderable profits, that the fight for the Meuse fortress would continue. There were German advances in July and even in August, inconsiderable but unmistakable, and those who lived through the whole siege have supplied testimony that in August and the first days of September the situation seemed to them darkest.

During this period the Germans were in the ditch of Souville and had crept forward to the edge of the Froide-Terre. A further slight advance, the capture of Souville, the single one of the Verdun forts which occupied ground as high as Douaumont, and the defence of the east bank of the Meuse would collapse—the Germans would reach and even pass the river occupying the ruins of the city. The military value of such an achievement would have been small, but the moral value incalculable. In every quarter of the globe Verdun had become a fact and a symbol, to take it now would give the Germans a victory uncontested, and bound to excite world attention.

But the advance was not to come. Slowly, very slowly the furnace of the Somme began to devour German effectives and German resources. Little by little men and guns were shifted from the Meuse to the Ancre, and by September the German effort was over. But enemy resources were still sufficient to hold what had been won and French attacks between Hardaumont Quarries and Souville, directed at Fleury and the Thiaumont works, now only a heap of dust, were savagely repulsed on several occasions.

If the Verdun episode was over for the Germans, and their offensive definitively ended by September, the situation still remained one which the French could not permit to endure. While they held Souville, Verdun was safe, but while the Germans occupied Douaumont, a return to the offensive in the future was always possible for them and Verdun remained in danger—in grave danger. Thus, as early as September, began the preparations for a counter-offensive designed to retake Douaumont and Vaux.

In every circumstance this operation was of purely local importance. For the whole task not more than three divisions were immediately employed, while the Germans continued to employ seven on the front of the coming attack. There was no thought in the minds of the French High Command of launching any general or considerable thrust; their purpose was solely to relieve Verdun from the ever-present menace which would overhang it as long as the enemy held two of the forts of the circle constructed to defend the entrenched camp.

In the whole war, up to this moment, no attack had been so carefully or scientifically planned as the first Verdun counter-offensive. The regiment which had been assigned to retake Douaumont spent a month in a village near Bar-le-Duc, daily making an assault upon a fort exactly like Douaumont and thus familiarizing the men with the details of the objective which they were presently to storm—a training which proved invaluable when Douaumont was finally taken on a day of fog and mist. Meantime, the French had at last obtained artillery of the heaviest type, guns of 400 mm. calibre, which far surpassed the 420 mm. of the Germans in the first days of the war. Their mechanical resources were at last equal to those of their enemy and for their new effort artillery was concentrated about Verdun in enormous quantities, while, as always, French aviators remained masters of the air.

The preparation for the attack was the work of three men, all destined to win new fame in the months that were to come: Pétain, defender of Verdun in the early period, now become chief of a group of armies of which that defending Verdun was but one; Nivelle, a subordinate of Pétain in the early days, now his successor in command of the

Verdun army and presently to succeed Joffre as commander-in-chief of the whole French army and, after a brief tenure, to suffer defeat at the Aisne in the campaign of 1917 and then to disappear, giving way to his old chief; finally, as the immediate commander of the attacking force, General Mangin appears. Little known before, save as a brilliant Colonial, who, commanding a brigade, had retaken Douaumont and held it for brief hours in May, Mangin was to win enduring fame in two Verdun offensives, share the defeat and discredit of Nivelle at the Aisne, but to emerge from brief obscurity as the leader of that army which by its brilliant counter-offensive turned the tide in the campaign of 1918 and won the Second Battle of the Marne. However justly criticised for occasional recklessness and habitual lack of concern for the costs of attack, Mangin earned at Verdun, and thereafter retained, the reputation of being the ablest exponent in the French army of the older qualities of French dash and *élan*.

## II. THE OBJECTIVES

For the first counter-offensive Douaumont, Vaux, and the high ground about each had been fixed as the objectives of the wholly local and strictly limited attack. Both forts occupied high ground rather more than a mile inside the German front, as it now existed, and both were covered by intricate trench systems, winding through the wrecks of famous woodlands and along the sides of ravines which had seen the frightful fighting of the earlier periods. Neither fort was itself a defensive work, although both were still intact below ground, and supplied invaluable cover for munitions, supplies, and for a limited amount of reserves. But beyond all else, Douaumont, with its wide sweep over all the surrounding country, was a post of observation, giving a clear view over the enemy's whole field of operation.

Actually the line now ran from the Meuse, between Vacherauville, which was German, and Bras, which was French, eastward along the downward slope of the Côte de Poivre, mainly held by the Germans, and thence southward, along the little saddle connecting the Froide-Terre with the Douaumont Plateau and bearing the Thiaumont fortification

through the ruins of Fleury to the ditch of Souville; thence it curved eastward again before Souville and Tavannes, across the western end of the Vaux Plateau to the little defensive work of Laufée, at which it turned south along the eastern edge of the Woëvre Plain.

The mission of the three divisions of attack was simple. The First was to move westward taking the Hardaumont Quarries and ultimately reaching and seizing the village of Douaumont, north and west of the fort, and occupying the line on which the French had originally checked the German rush and from which they had momentarily retaken Douaumont fort some weeks later. The Second Division was to advance from Froide Terre, take Thiaumont works, Farm and the fort itself; the Third was to move out from the edge of Fleury and Souville upon Vaux.

The distances to be covered were insignificant but they represented the progress which the enemy had been able to make only after six months of the most desperate fighting; every conceivable means had been employed to improve positions naturally strong, and the Germans held these lines strongly, indeed they outnumbered the assailants two to one.

In the plan of operation there was no new detail. There was an enormous multiplication of the number of guns employed and a concentration of the fire upon a very narrow sector. But this had been the characteristic circumstance of many other operations. This was what the Germans had done in February; this was what Haig had done at the Somme on a wider front in July. At the Somme the British front alone had been twenty miles long, in February the Germans had attacked on a front of more than seven, while in the counter-offensive at Verdun the front assailed was less than four; but aside from this, all was planned in the usual way.

The hour for attack was fixed for eleven-thirty in the morning, instead of at dawn, as at the Somme, but it was now late October and the earlier hours were no longer likely to provide an atmosphere clear enough for air observation. In point of fact, on the morning of the attack the greater part of the operation took place in a dense fog and

if, through the concealment of their columns, the French gained, they suffered through the almost complete paralysis of their air service. Between dawn and the "Zero" hour—as the hour of departure was now described in Allied armies—the German lines were to be swept by a frightful bombardment, to be followed, at the appointed time, by the assault itself, covered by the fire of the guns, which, lengthening their range to keep pace with the infantry advance, was to play upon the rearward lines of the enemy to the last possible moment before the victorious troops arrived.

All this had already become an old story in war methods. The thing that is noteworthy about this Verdun attack is the perfection with which all the familiar methods were employed. The numbers engaged were small on both sides, by comparison with the Somme fighting, the area affected insignificant; but, within its modest limits, the Verdun operation was and long remained one of the finest bits of scientific fighting in the whole of the first four years of the conflict. It had a brilliance always to be expected in a French attack, but it had an exactness and a mechanical perfection unexcelled in French, British, or even in German achievement, and possibly unchallenged.

### III. DOUAUMONT AND VAUX

At the hour fixed and covered by one of the not-infrequent fogs of late autumn in the Meuse region, Mangin's three divisions left their trenches and swept forward into the German lines, which for long hours had been pounded by the French artillery. Never was an artillery preparation more complete nor a surprise more absolute. The enemy's first lines were submerged without opposition; only in the Hardaumont Quarries, a circumstance due to the character of the position, did the resistance long continue; not until the French approached the second and even the third German trench did they meet with the customary machine-gun fire from isolated points of support.

But despite these isolated checks, despite savage fighting in many of the ravines, the wave went forward. Four hours after it had set out, the observers from Souville could see through the mists, which were at

last breaking, the brown uniforms of French Colonials on the tortured slopes and remains of Fort Douaumont itself. In four hours the victors had traversed the ground which it had taken the enemy six months to cross, and the price of the German advance had been measured in hundreds of thousands.

It was on February 25 that the Brandenburgers had taken the fort by surprise and their exploit had been celebrated by the Kaiser in a despatch in which he described Douaumont as the cornerstone of the chief fortress of France. The cornerstone now was once more French, solidly French; so was the village of Douaumont; so were a score of positions, farms, and woodlands which had become familiar names to the newspaper readers of five continents.

Only toward Vaux were the plans of the French commanders imperfectly realized. Even here the assailants reached the remains of the old ditch, but northward the progress was less satisfactory between Douaumont and Vaux and the lines were withdrawn a little to permit a new artillery preparation before the attack was resumed. But even this disappointment was manifestly to be of brief duration, for Vaux had been well-nigh encircled, the noose had fallen about it and it remained only to tighten it. Douaumont was taken on October 24 and the fate of Vaux was sealed on the same day.

Six thousand prisoners, more than six hundred officers, fifteen guns, and a vast booty of minor weapons were the immediate prizes of this astonishing exploit in which French losses were inferior to the captures of prisoners, and the attacking force was, itself, less than half as strong as the enemy divisions it thus thrust out of positions which had been defended by the French for more than six months and lost—foot by foot and yard by yard—only to be retaken in four hours of a single brief autumn day.

But it was not until November 2 that the full measure of the success was disclosed when the Germans suddenly evacuated Vaux and retired beyond the ravine north of the Vaux Plateau and into the Woëvre Plain below, leaving the French the wrecked skeleton of the old fort—above ground nothing but a heap of blackened ashes, but underground

still possessing intact all its bomb-proof and vaulted chambers. Thus in German hands as in French, Vaux had proven sturdier in defence than its far more considerable neighbour, Douaumont.

With the evacuation of Vaux on November 2 the circle of Verdun defences was once more restored. Of all the system of detached forts which had been constructed before the war to serve as the cover for the vast entrenched camp facing Metz and guarding one of the main lines of invasion, not one remained in German hands. After eight months of fighting, after eight months of the most dramatic and terrible conflict in human history, the French had made good their boast. They had said in February: "They shall not pass"; and, having barred the road from February to October, they had struck back in October and deprived their foes of every foot of conquered ground which was in any measure a menace to the maintenance of the Verdun fortress.

Thus, although it was, itself, a relatively insignificant combat, the first French counter-offensive at Verdun, in October, was a memorable thing; it thrilled the whole world; it aroused in Germany a passion and a bitterness which were ill-concealed. It supplied the ultimate refutation of the assertion of the German General Staff, the assertion on which their whole strategy was based, that France was bled white, exhausted morally as well as physically. By contrast it revealed the soul of the French people as that soul had been revealed once before—at the Marne.

#### IV. VERDUN ANSWERS THE KAISER

The victory of October 24 had given Verdun security; it remained to give more air to the garrison, still narrowly restrained in the German embrace, which, though partially loosened, was still uncomfortable. From the positions to which they had retired the enemy was still able with his long-range artillery to bombard the town and to cut the lines of communication well behind the town itself. Compared with the situation of the summer, conditions were vastly improved, but the cost of holding the place was still unduly high and might be reduced by another sagacious offensive, also of totally limited character.

Accordingly, all through November and the first half of December there was unceasing preparation for one more thrust, preparation rendered difficult and almost impossible by the character of the country over which the French had to construct new roads and narrow-gauge railways, under German fire and in land torn and scarred by the terrible bombardments, French and German alike, of nine months of unequalled artillery fighting.

But the work was done and on December 15, following closely upon the Kaiser's peace proposal—so closely as to give the appearance that Verdun was itself making historic answer to the German gesture—Mangin again led his troops, this time four divisions instead of three, against the German trenches in another swift surprise attack heralded by another terrific bombardment.

This time the French objectives were north, not east, and they sought, by advancing on the curving front straight across the Heights of the Meuse from below Bras to the Woëvre north of the Vaux ravine, to push them back from the vicinity of Douaumont and enable the French to reestablish their lines on the positions on which they had made their first stand in the great attack of February, the positions on which it had been expected to meet and break any German offensive.

Once more the attack came in the morning but not in the early hours. It was ten o'clock when the French left their trenches, and in a few brief hours they had swept their enemy out of all the useful ground for several miles northward. Vachreauville on the Meuse, the whole of the Côte de Poivre, Louvemont and Hill 378, Bezonvaux and the Hardaumont position between Douaumont and the Woëvre were taken, the main defensive position beyond the circle of forts was reestablished; more than eleven thousand prisoners, 115 guns, and the usual wealth of material were captured.

As a surprise, the operation was even more successful than that of October, and as a result not only were the losses utterly insignificant, but for a period of time the enemy disorganization was so great that French patrols crossed the Côte de Talou and pushed northward for

reconnaissances far in advance of the lines on which the thrust was actually halted. But the purpose of this attack was rigidly limited and the resources of the commanders restricted to the minimum necessary for the defence of the positions outlined in advance of the attack as the objectives of the various divisions.

This December attack was the final operation of Nivelle at Verdun, acting under the directions of Pétain. Immediately after it he left to assume the post made vacant by the promotion of Joffre, who became a Marshal of France, but only to disappear from the French High Command. In a very real sense the Verdun campaign had proven his undoing, for despite all the brilliance of the defence he was held responsible for the blunders which had permitted the fortress to remain in so bad a state of preparation and it was further held against him that he had advocated an evacuation of the town after the first days of the German assault.

In the High Command Nivelle's stay was brief and disastrous; he did not realize the hopes which had been founded upon his share in the Verdun campaign. But when he had fallen, France and the world instinctively turned to the man who had defended the town in the early and critical days and it was Pétain, who, by reason of the Verdun achievement, proved the real successor of Joffre—who reorganized the French army and restored its shaken morale after the bitter defeat at the Aisne. As Joffre is the man of the Marne, Pétain was and will remain the central figure of the Verdun campaign, for the qualities which made the defence possible and the victory attainable were his own. Once more a great crisis had produced a great general, ranking with Joffre and Foch in French service, and unrivalled in any other army.

#### V. AFTERMATH

With the fighting of December 15, the real Battle of Verdun ends. Of all the ground captured during the nine months of struggle the Germans retained, on the east bank of the Meuse, only the advanced positions held by the French on February 21, 1916. On the west bank, however, they still held firmly the important ground taken in the fighting

of April and May, including Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304. While they held this ground, with observation posts on the Côte de Talou, they were still able to hamper French communications and annoy the garrison within Verdun.

As a consequence, Pétain, when he came to the post of Commander-in-Chief in the following summer, promptly organized a third limited offensive and thrust the Germans off both the dominating hills and, in addition, retook the ground south of the Forges Brook, the Côte de Talou and the villages of Samogneux and Champneuville on the east bank of the river, together with Hill 304, thus entirely reëstablishing the old situation, completing the task of restoring that Verdun position from which the French had been thrust in the grim days of February of the previous year and, as it turned out, laying the foundations for an American offensive in September and October, 1918.

By this time Verdun had ceased to have any value in the immediate fighting and the defeat of the Germans was almost more important on the moral than on the military side, for the interest of the world in the fortunes of this Lorraine town did not decrease. But in the story of the Verdun campaign this third and last counter-offensive has a place. Without it the narrative is incomplete. Eight thousand prisoners and many guns were captured in this third blow, bringing the total for the three operations unblocking the town up to 25,000 prisoners and nearly 200 guns.


In the Verdun operation there are three natural phases. The first phase is occupied by the opening attack and the successive following efforts of the Germans on the flanks to prepare the way for the final assault. This is the great period, which endures from February to July, the time in which Verdun bears the brunt of the full German effort and France, awaiting the coming of the British, once more carries the burden of the war upon her shoulders. It is the fighting between February 21 and the hour when the Somme at last began to paralyze German effort on the Meuse which will endure in the minds of men as long as written history endures.

In the second phase, from July to October, Verdun lies vulnerable to

the enemy, her defensive armour pierced from Douaumont to Vaux, momentarily safe but bound to be in danger the moment the German is able to return to the attack. And in all this period the German expected to return and to realize the profits that his preparations had, at a frightful cost, made almost certain.

Last of all in the third phase, in the epilogue, we have the two brilliant counter-offensives of 1916 and the third, in 1917, which together win back all the lost ground, restore Verdun to its old security, and yield a harvest of prisoners and guns which well-nigh balances the original German profit in this respect in the first days of the attack.

VERDUN DELIVERED.



GROUND GAINED BY THE FRENCH, OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1, 1916

In the military history of the war Verdun stands for the service rendered by France in holding the enemy until Britain could prepare. Had France failed the war would have been lost, as the events of the next two campaigns plainly indicated. In this respect Verdun is only less important than the Marne itself.

On the human side Verdun revealed France as those who had really known the nation had always perceived it to be. The qualities which made the defence possible were not those that the superficial student or observer of France and the French people associate with the race.


There were moments of unsurpassed brilliance, but in the main the struggle was one of endurance and tenacious, solid, sturdy peasant virtues, and won for France what must in many ways be regarded as the greatest battle in her thousand years of military history. It is hardly too much to say that the world view of France changed with Verdun; the earlier view had been inaccurate, a reflection upon those who held it rather than upon the French; yet in a very real sense Verdun was a national epic, only complete when victorious French soldiers again held the last of the lost positions of February, 1916.

# FIGHTING IN ITALY




*Courtesy of Miss A. A. Bernardy*

AN ITALIAN SENTINEL IN THE ALPS



A SENTRY AT A MINOR OBSERVATION POST

*Courtesy of Miss A. A. Bernardy*



ITALIAN SOLDIERS SCALING A MOUNTAIN

This is suggestive of some of the difficulties the Italians had to overcome

© Western Newspaper Union



A WRECKED ZEPPELIN FALLING TO EARTH

© Western Newspaper Union

These lonely sentinels are watching the Zeppelin hurtle through space after having been hit by the Italian airplane

C. M. T. Her. Co.  
A SMALL GUARD OF HUMAN SOLDIERS PROTECTING THE  
ENTRANCE TO A MOUNTAIN PASSWAY



C. M. T. Her. Co.  
MANY OF THE HUMANS OBSERVATION POSITIONS WERE CAVES  
SUCH AS THIS DUG IN THE ICE





*Photograph from Brown Brothers*

AN INGENIOUS TROLLEY DEVISED BY THE ITALIANS TO TRANSPORT THEIR WOUNDED  
OVER THE MOUNTAINS



*Photograph from Brown Brothers*

AN ICE FORT ON AN ITALIAN MOUNTAIN

These are not boys playing soldiers in a back yard snow fort as one might think at first glance, but men fighting in the world's greatest war. They are the famous Alpini entrenched in the ice near Cadore



*P. Longra, Neg. : Bros. Brothers*

ARMOUR PROTECTION DEVISED FOR THOSE WHO CRAWL FORWARD TO CUT  
THE ENEMY'S BARBED WIRE



ITALIAN INFANTRY ATTACKING

*Courtesy of Miss A. A. Bernardy*



A NIGHT BOMBARDMENT

© Western Newspaper Union



ST. BERNARD DOGS READY FOR A TRIP THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS

Italy's dogs did their share nobly in helping to win the war. Besides doing their bit for the Red Cross they were invaluable in carrying supplies to troops in the mountains, stationed in places inaccessible to horses and mules

© Western Newspaper Union

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### ITALY IN DEFENCE AND OFFENCE

#### THE GENERAL ALLIED CONCEPTION

##### I

While the German attack upon Verdun was in its second stage, in the middle of May, a terrific Austrian offensive suddenly broke out along the Trentine frontier between the Adige and the Brenta. This offensive was the natural corollary of the Verdun operation, it had the same purposes, both larger and smaller; that is, its main purpose was, if possible, to inflict such a defeat upon Italy as to compel the Savoy Monarchy to retire from the war, just as Verdun was, at its maximum, to eliminate France. But the secondary purpose was to prevent an Italian offensive on the Isonzo front, as the Lorraine operation aimed at forestalling the Somme offensive.

We have then, in turning now to the operations both in the Italian and Russian fields, to remember what were the major strategic conceptions of the two enemies, for the campaign of 1916. The Allies had planned a general concentric attack upon the Central Powers delivered on all fronts and calculated to place upon Germany and Austria a strain beyond their resources to meet. Britain and France were to attack at the Somme, Russia from the Pripet Marshes to Rumania, Italy along the Isonzo and toward Trieste and Laibach; there was to be a thrust upward from Salonica and finally there was the reserved possibility of still further pressure upon Austria occasioned by the entrance of Rumania into the war at the appropriate moment.

To meet such an attack the Central Powers had to choose between passive waiting and action in advance of their enemies. In the German calculation, the advantages of the so-called preventive-offensive, the defensive-offensive were counted overwhelming. It was assumed that Russia, after her defeats of 1915, would be incapable of making any

serious movement before midsummer; that Britain would be unready even at midsummer, and that the Balkan threat could safely be ignored for the time being. This left Italy and France to be dealt with by the Austrians and Germans, respectively, while the two Latin nations were still without the aid of the Slav or the Anglo-Saxon. Berlin could reckon, too, that if Italy and France were heavily beaten, Rumania would hardly venture into the war on what would then obviously be the losing side.

In this spirit, as we have seen, Germany in February undertook her great attack upon Verdun. She counted upon a swift and colossal victory, but when this became impossible, she continued, partly because she had accumulated her munitions, men, and guns before Verdun and must continue there or else abandon the offensive for a period of time; partly because she was still of the opinion that, even though Verdun were no longer to prove the victory she had expected, it might serve as a furnace in which French man-power would be consumed and that, in consequence, France would be unable to participate largely in the Somme offensive, of the coming of which the German General Staff was well informed.

Now with respect of Italy the situation was equally plain. All Italian preparation was directed toward the delivery of a decisive blow toward Trieste and immediately upon Gorizia in the late summer, which was the earliest date possible, given Italy's lack of the necessary military supplies. Therefore, if Austria struck in May, she might win such a victory as the Germans had sought and missed at Verdun, but failing this she might so cripple Italy, so exhaust her slender stock of munitions, that the Gorizia stroke, when it came, would be easily repulsed.

Verdun and the Somme were such colossal episodes that they entirely fill the stage in the campaign of 1916 and serve to obscure the other circumstances. Yet each was a detail in a general scheme. Both groups of contending powers sought the initiative, both planned to attack, but while the Entente nations were still unequally ready and thus unable to act early and at the same moment, the Central Powers

were ready and could throw their main masses upon France and Italy before either could be supported by Russia and Britain. In their first stages both the German campaign in France and the Austrian in Italy sought a decisive victory, but the secondary purpose of each was to prevent a decisive victory of the enemy, by using up the armies of two nations before these of all four could engage.

We have seen that the Verdun attack failed at once as a decisively victorious action, we have seen that it was a partial failure so far as its secondary purpose was concerned. But it is true that in some measure the French effort at the Somme was lessened by the strain of Verdun, and it is conceivable that, within limits, the Germans did thus lessen the extent of peril which the Somme had for them. In the case of Italy, the calculation of the Germans was more obviously faulty. If they underestimated the French power in preparing their Verdun operation and thus met a heavy defeat, by ignoring the Russian conditions they sent Austria into an Italian campaign which occupied her best troops at a critical moment, permitted Russia to win great victories in the east, and almost brought the Hapsburg edifice down in ruin.

Each of the campaigns—that in France, that in Italy, and that in Russia—is of itself a whole and its unity is best preserved by dealing with it separately, but it is equally vital to keep clearly in mind the relations existing between the several operations. Germany struck France in February; while she was still engaged at Verdun she pushed Austria against Italy in May. In June Russia attacked Austria; in July Britain entered the French campaign and attacked at the Somme; in August Italy struck in the Gorizia; and, finally, in September Rumania entered the war and attacked Austria.

Thus German strategy failed because it neither won a decisive victory in France or in Italy, nor prevented Allied offensives. Allied strategy failed later, not primarily because the German attacks had lessened the force of the Allied blows but mainly because the Germans were better organized, possessed the incalculable advantages of a unified command and the interior position, and lastly, possessed on the eastern fronts an overwhelming advantage in heavy artillery. Of all these ad-

vantages most weight must be laid upon the unity of command. Two years and many bitter disappointments were yet to be required to bring the Entente Powers to the point where national pride was laid aside and—in the hour of gravest peril—a French general called to command all the Allied armies and to turn defeat into victory.

But in May, when Austria struck Italy, the Allied campaign was still in the making; Haig and Brusiloff were unready, French counter-blows at Verdun had been checked, and the Germans were advancing on both of the wings, clearing the way for their final attack by the centre, which never came. The moment was promising, the Italians were unready, and the Allied publics were already becoming anxious and disheartened by the long series of unexpected reverses, which had come instead of the opening of the cycle of successes expected and calculated to prove the prelude to decisive victory in the campaign of 1916.

## II. TRENTINE GEOGRAPHY

The front chosen by the Austrians for their attack was the obvious sector. The great mass of the Trentine Alps projects into the Italian plain like an enormous peninsula. It is flanked on either side by huge mountains, by the familiar Dolomites on the east and the Ortler and Azamello groups on the west. Between these two systems of snow-capped peaks the Adige River descends in the narrow Val Lagarina from the north and beside the river are the railway and the highway. Above Botzen two railway lines meet, one coming down from the Brenner Pass and the other eastward from the Pusterthal and both are protected from Italian observation or attack. At the south, just before this corridor reaches the Italian frontier, it opens out into a series of smaller corridors, each of which bears the same relation to the main corridor as the fingers to the wrist. At this point of separation is the Austrian city of Trent, Italian by population and character but Austrian by virtue of Italy's failure to complete her unification in 1866.

Possessing this corridor, the Austrians could move troops secretly and in large numbers south to Trent—which was itself a fortress covered by a series of detached forts—and from Trent the troops could be

sent southward through these smaller corridors, those of the Adige on the west and the Brenta on the east followed by railways, and those of the Vallarsa, the Val Terragnola, the Val d'Astico, and the Val d'Assa between, each of which was followed by a carriage road. Bringing their masses secretly to Trent, the Austrians could then deploy them by the radiating valleys and highways, munition them from the rear by railways, and hurl them at the Italians at the chosen moment.

Such an attack would be instantly perilous for the Italians, for they stood, facing this danger, on the lower slopes of the Alps and had behind them—and not more than a dozen miles away—the Venetian Plain itself. Thus, if the Italians should be forced to retire over this thin edge of high ground which they held, the Austrians would debouch into the plain by half a dozen valleys and would be within a scant ten miles of Verona and Vicenza and thus of the main railroad by which all the Italian armies, a hundred miles to the east and northeast along the Austrian frontier from Cortina to the Isonzo, were munitioned and supplied.

If the Italians were thus pushed off the high ground into the plain, then, at best, they would be able to get their armies back behind the Adige and the Po and lose only the territory and cities east of these rivers, but, at worst—and the worst would be possible—all of Cadorna's troops would be enveloped, cut off from their bases, and captured in a grandiose Sedan. This was the inherent viciousness of the Italian situation. This was the threat Austria had ever held over Italy's head; this was one of the reasons why Italy had entered the war not merely to redeem her Latin brothers of the Trentino, but also to possess the keys to the doorway which led to the very inmost chamber of her own house.

By this corridor invader after invader had descended into the Venetian Plain; it was the immemorial route of the German barbarians; it had been the road of many Austrian eruptions; Napoleon had fought and won two famous victories—Rivoli and Primolano, at the entrance of two of the lesser corridors. While Venice had held Trent, one of the few gateways to the plain was closed, but when Austria gained and continued to hold this gateway, all of Venetia beyond the Adige was well nigh indefensible and all offensives against Trieste

had to be undertaken with full recognition of the great peril existing far in the rear.

Two of the little villages in this region, Arsiero and Asiago, termini of railroads coming up to the edge of the hills, are of more than passing interest, because both were taken in the Austrian offensive and mark its extreme limit, and both were subsequently retaken by Austro-German forces when, after the disaster of Caporetto, Italy was forced to retire behind the Piave and the Central Powers once more endeavoured to reach the Italian rear by the Trentine route. In 1916 Italy escaped disaster, in 1917 it came, but in both cases the successful defence of the very edge of the high ground, the last ridge north of the plain, prevented a complete rout and a retreat to the Adige. Asiago and its plateau, its high grounds of the Setti Comuni, anciently seven German-speaking Comunes, the mountains of Pasubio, Coni Zugna, Cengio and Pau the final strongholds of Italian defence these with Monte Cimone, lost and retaken in the struggle, are the geographical landmarks of the brief Trentine campaign.

### III. THE ATTACK

The Austrian army undertaking the Trentine offensive was commanded by the Archduke Charles, heir to the Austrian throne and destined at no distant date to succeed the aged Francis Joseph. It was of more than passing significance, too, that the heir to the Hohenzollern should have been selected for Verdun and the heir to the Hapsburg throne for the Trentine adventure, in each case the selection was a fair indication of the degree of confidence existing in German and Austrian staffs, for the prestige of such exalted persons is not risked in any doubtful ventures. The Archduke had immediately under his command some fifteen divisions, 225,000 strong, the pick of the Austrian army, but nearly 200,000 other troops were crowded into the narrow corridor and he had also nearly 2,000 guns, many of them of the heaviest calibre—an artillery concentration far in excess of any Italian resource, immediate or eventual.

On May 14 the preliminary bombardment began on the whole

front of the Trentino from Lago di Garda to the heights east of the Brenta. It was a bombardment wholly like that which from the Forest of Gremilly burst upon the Verdun front on February 21 and it had equally devastating effects. Under it the Italian first-line defences disappeared. Once more—as at Verdun, too—the initial phase of an offensive disclosed the defenders unready. Like the French at Verdun, the Italians between the Adige and the Brenta had suspected the coming attack, but they had made inadequate preparation and hopelessly underestimated its violence.

Accordingly what followed in the next few days was a perfect repetition of the Verdun episode. On May 15 the Austrians passed to the offensive and began their attack on the front from the Val Lagarina, through which flows the Adige, to the Val Zugana by which the Brenta comes down to the Venetian Plain. In the next fortnight the enemy advanced rapidly. His progress on the flanks—as at Verdun—was relatively slight, but in the centre he pushed down through Arsiero and Asiago, cleared the Communi Plateau, and arrived within five miles of Schio, which is in the plain and at the same time threatened, by pushing eastward and westward from his advanced centre, to cut off the Italian troops on the flanks still successfully holding the Adige and Brenta valleys. On June 1 there was, then, on the Trentine front, exactly the same crisis which had come somewhat sooner before Verdun, when Douaumont Fort fell and the Germans were at the last line of possible French defence on the east bank of the Meuse.

But, as at Verdun, the defeated and surprised defenders had hung on just long enough to give their general staff time to save the situation. On May 25, Cadorna had prepared his counter-thrust and a fresh army intervened, as Pétain's army had intervened at Verdun. In both cases the situation was desperate by the time assistance came. But in the Italian case the immediate effect of the intervention was more successful. Beginning on June 1, the Italians counter-attacked along the whole front; by June 3, Cadorna could inform the world that the Austrian advance had been checked; during the next ten days most of the lost ground was recovered.

Meantime, on June 4, one day after the Austrian check, the guns of Brusiloff in Volhynia and Galicia sounded the overture to the Russian offensive and in the next few days the terrible Austrian disasters about Lutsk and Dubno and, south, in Bukowina, made an urgent demand upon Austria for those divisions of her best troops concentrated in the Trentine corridor. Thereafter the Austrian effort died out, the Trentine front ceased to be active. Austrian troops hastened eastward to check the Russian advance upon Kovel, Italian troops were moved southward to aid in the preparation of the Gorizia attack.

It is perhaps inaccurate to say that Russia saved Italy, it seems that Cadorna's counter-offensive had already become effective before Brusiloff's attack was launched. Had the Russians not attacked, however, the Italians would have had for a period of time to concentrate their attention upon the Trentine front, and their Gorizia offensive would have had to wait. On the other hand, had the Austrians not embarked upon this costly venture, it may be doubted whether Brusiloff would have won so great a success on June 5 and the succeeding days. In any event, the Trentine gamble was for Austria a costly failure, bringing disaster in the east and having no serious effect upon Italy's main plan which was for her own offensive on the Isonzo. Italy's suffering was not vain—nor was it comparable in extent or duration to French agony at Verdun.

#### IV. ON THE ISONZO

In May and the first days of June Italy had been hard put to defend the back door to her own house. The danger had abated when Cadorna's new army had counter-attacked; it passed when Russia began her victorious assault in the east and compelled Austria to turn from the Italian back door, at the Trentino, to her own back door along the Carpathians. Thus saved from all immediate peril, the first task of the Italians was to guard against a return of the danger—to construct railroads and defences that would prove sufficient if the Austrian should knock at the back entrance again, as he might, as he did in fact less than two years later. By the end of July Cadorna could feel that this

work had been well done and that he could now turn his attention to his main task, the forcing of the front door into Austria.

This front door was the Gorizia stronghold, known for many months thereafter as the Gorizia bridgehead. A parallel for this front—thinking of geography rather than history—is found in a smaller scale in the circumstances of Thermopylæ, although it is well to remember that Thermopylæ was lost, while the position, but not the town of Gorizia, was never surrendered by the Austrians in the campaign of either 1916 or 1917, in both of which it was the objective of terrific attacks.

The Gorizia position, as it confronted Cadorna in July, 1916, was simply a strongly defended system of lines between the Julian Alps and the sea; its extent was little more than thirty miles, but this extent was sharply divided into three distinct regions: the last spurs of the Alps, stretching down in the form of the great Bainzizza Plateau with a series of peaks, to achieve world fame in 1917; lower ground in and about the Austrian town of Gorizia, peopled by Slavs and Italians; and, finally, the Carso, a limestone ridge rising between the valley in which Gorizia huddled and the Adriatic.

In front of all three sectors flows the Isonzo River, coming down out of the gorge at the foot of the Bainzizza Plateau, washing the foot of Monte Sabotino on its western bank, Monte Santo on its eastern, and a little to the south touching Podgora Hill, due west of Gorizia and just across the Isonzo, facing the town. Still farther to the south, but on its eastern bank, rises the Carso Plateau, which crowds it westward in a wide curve, beyond which it enters the usual swampy ground found at the mouth of all Venetian rivers and through this reaches the sea below the little town of Monfalcone, also Austrian.

North of Monte Sabotino the country is such that it offers no adequate communications for an army advancing from the Venetian Plain and seeking to burst into Austria. Actually the only available entrance into Austria for an Italian army of invasion is the narrow stretch between the Alps and the sea, between Monte Sabotino and the southern edge of the Carso, which falls abruptly into the sea. Each of the three distinct sectors was defended by a system of trenches and permanent

works, prepared in the long period between the outbreak of the war and Italy's entrance and constructed with a full use of the lessons taught by trench warfare in France. Monte Sabotino to the north, Podgora Hill west of Gorizia, and Monte San Michele on the edge of the Carso were the three bulwarks of the defence system.

Eastward from Podgora and across the Isonzo stood Gorizia, purely Italian in character despite a large Slavic element in its population. Under cover of Podgora several bridges cross the Isonzo, one of them carrying the main railroad from Gorizia to Udine in the north, while at the foot of the Carso the only other important railroad—that from Venice to Trieste—crosses the Isonzo and follows the coast to the Austrian seaport. Holding both ends of the bridge under Podgora, the Austrians were able to send troops at will to the west bank of the river, and this circumstance earned the whole position the name of the Gorizia bridgehead. (The French position of the Hills of the Meuse east of Verdun and across the river was analogous, and the Germans invariably spoke of the French positions as the Verdun bridgehead.)

Against this Gorizia position Italy had stormed in the first days of her own war, while Austria had her main masses occupied against Russia and Serbia. But on the narrow front only a relatively small Italian force could be employed and Austria with fewer troops but superior artillery was able to halt the Italian advance. In 1915 Italy lacked the guns to undertake any serious offensive against Gorizia; she was still inadequately prepared in 1916, when the first real effort was made; in 1917, when fully ready, her preliminary success was annulled by the defeat of Caporetto.

The Italian purpose in the Gorizia offensive was twofold. Cadorna sought to force the main gate into Austria, to open the way eastward to Laibach, to repeat in some degree Napoleon's great campaign of 1797, which reached Leoben and compelled the Treaty of Campo-Formio. But hardly secondary was the purpose to push southward to Trieste, cut its communications with Austria, and, in due course of time, capture that city, which ever since 1866 had beckoned Italian patriots and constituted the chief jewel in Italia Irredenta. Actually

the fate of Trieste was bound up in that of the Gorizia position, not in the fate of the town itself, but of the whole position. If Italy could force the gateway, thrust through and beyond the narrow gap between the sea and the mountains, Trieste was doomed. But it is well to recognize that the operation itself was not directed at Trieste, which lay to the south and well outside the fighting zone.

Again, it is well to recall the three separate elements of the Gorizia position. It was necessary for Italy to gain all three. For, if she merely broke through at the centre and, taking Podgora, occupied Gorizia, her advance would be checked by the converging fire from both Monte Sabotino and Monte San Michele; while even an extension of her success on the Carso, to the south, would be insufficient to open her roadway while the batteries upon Monte Sabotino and the outlying spurs of the Bainzizza Plateau commanded her flank, her rear, and the two essential lines of communication. To final success, moreover, the capture of all three positions would be but a preliminary part, no success could be of more than local value, while the Bainzizza Plateau with its peaks of Monte Santo and Monte San Gabriele still held out. Actually the fighting in 1916 did not seriously threaten the Austrians on Bainzizza, but the following year the main campaign of Cadorna was concentrated to the north.

For a whole year Italy had been preparing against the day when her troops would be hurled against the Gorizia bridgehead. What the British army went through before the Somme the Italian army experienced in the months preceding the opening of the Gorizia operation. In both cases the enemy sought by a forestalling attack to prevent the Allied offensive, in both cases the attempt failed. In the case of Italy the failure was complete when Cadorna had slammed to the Trentine back door and, two months later, he was able to strike at the Isonzo.

#### V. GORIZIA

On August 6, Cadorna delivered his great blow. At this moment the German advance at Verdun was practically over, the strength of the Germans on the Meuse was rapidly ebbing away, to reinforce the armies

at the Somme. In the latter field the British were at last beginning to make real progress, they were getting their stride. Away to the east Brusiloff's offensive was, in fact, past its crest, but still advancing. East and west alike, the Central Powers were on the defensive and in retreat. The hour was propitious; Allied fortunes were mounting—seemed, in fact, to have reached the highest point since the days immediately following the Battle of the Marne.

The first three days of the Gorizia offensive were days of violent assault, after artillery preparation, against all three sectors. To the north, Sabotino; in the centre, Podgora; and to the south, Monte San Michele were taken and the victorious Italians pushed forward beyond all three. On August 8 they closed in upon Gorizia and took the town. In the next few days they consolidated the conquered ground and pushed the Austrians back off the high ground of which Monte San Michele is the commanding elevation, across a little depression known as the Vallone, and took foot at the base of the main Carso Plateau. Nearly 20,000 prisoners and a vast store of material were captured. The greatest victory of Italian arms had been achieved in a brilliant and inspiring fashion.

Yet, with Gorizia taken, it at once became clear that Italy had only made a beginning. North and south of the valley of the Wippach, at the western end of which Gorizia is situated, the Austrians still held commanding high ground. From Bainzizza, Monte Santo, and Monte San Gabriele they swept Gorizia, which was beneath them, and from the Carso their guns commanded both the Wippach Valley and the narrow shore between the mountains and the sea followed by the railroad and the road to Trieste. Italy had forced the outer door, the vestibule, to the Gorizia gateway, but the Austrians still held their main positions; they had long ago prepared against just what had happened and the Italians, after their first successes, found themselves—like the French after the great preliminary success in Champagne in September, 1915—face to face with new defences manned by rapidly growing reserves.

And—like the French attack in Champagne, like all the many offen-

sives of the past and of the immediate future—the Italian rush at the Isonzo came to a dead halt. There were needed a new artillery preparation, a new concentration of guns, and the creation of an additional system of highways and light railways. Cadorna was where Haig had been after the opening success at the Somme. The success had been vastly greater than that of the British general, but the natural obstacles now confronted were also far greater and Italy lacked both the guns and the munitions for an immediate renewal of the Gorizia campaign.

In point of fact, before the end of August it was clear to all informed observers that Italy had shot her bolt for 1916. She had exhausted her slender stock of munitions. The double strain of the Trentino defensive and the Gorizia offensive had left Cadorna without the material out of which to construct a further successful advance at Gorizia before the end of the fighting season. Costly attacks by brave soldiers lacking in artillery support, there were, but they failed as they had failed in the case of the British and of the French. Only nations like France and Great Britain possessed the resources to transform themselves industrially for a warfare with Germany and her Austrian ally, for a warfare which was mechanical beyond all else.

Thus, exactly at the moment when Brusiloff's campaign in the east was slowing down, and for the same reasons, Cadorna's efforts in the south lessened. The great concentric attack of the Allies lasted little more than a month, it placed a tremendous strain upon the enemy, but the strain could not be kept up for any considerable time. Both in Italy and in Russia the first achievements surprised the Central Powers, who had woefully underrated their foes, but despite the calculations in Allied capitals at the moment, the strain was by no means beyond German resources. It was met promptly and successfully.

Of the balance of the Italian campaign it is necessary to say no more, now. It was a preparation for the larger effort of 1917, which almost achieved success. What is of interest and of importance, however, is the fact that on August 27 the Italian Government declared a state of war to exist between Italy and Germany and thus placed their country

squarely beside the other great powers with which Italy had already made many agreements but in whose enterprise she had hitherto been a partner only in a limited sense.

The reasons for this strange situation were many. With Germany Italy had no quarrel; she had until recently been an ally—and a loyal ally—of the German Empire, despite her age-long hatred of Austria. In her struggle for unity she had fought with the Prussians against the Austrians in 1866; in the industrial development of modern Italy Germany had played a considerable rôle—not without profit to herself but with the result that many influences in the world of finance and commerce in the Italian Peninsula were under German control. No such intense hatred of Germany, as existed in France, was to be found in Italy in the first three years of the war; it was not to protect herself against Germany, but to recover territories held by Austria but rightfully Italian that Italy had declared war; and the necessity of a common battle against Germany was only slowly perceived in Italy.

When Italy did declare war against Germany, her action proved to be the preface to the entrance of Rumania into the conflict and was taken for the express purpose of influencing Bucharest at a critical moment. But although Rumania did promptly imitate the Italian example and declare war alike upon Germany and Austria, her swift fall to complete ruin robbed the Italian action of any vital importance. There was, and there remained until after the terrible Italian defeat at Caporetto, a year later, an unmistakable coldness between Italy and her allies. To some extent Italy suffered thereby, in a certain measure her reasonable demands for aid—for the materials essential to the creation of an adequate war machine—were heard and rejected by those who were still influenced by distrust and resentment that Italy had so long refrained from risking all in a complete commitment to the alliance against Germany.

However just or unjust the feeling, the fact that it existed must be recognized, since it had a certain influence upon the course of the war until the close of the following year. But the declaration of war upon

Germany in August, 1916, was the first step toward a complete understanding between Italy and the nations fighting Germany and, while the immediate effects were unfortunately small, in the larger view it contributed to strengthening the Allied cause and removing what might have proved a later cause of weakness.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### THE LAST RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

#### I


#### LOOKING EASTWARD

While the great events which marked the Verdun and Somme operations were unfolding on the western battle-front; while France was standing with her back to the wall in Lorraine; Britain making her final preparations in Picardy, and Italy desperately struggling to hold the Trentine gateway to the Venetian Plains, another great campaign was in progress on the eastern front. In the first days of June Russia was launching what was to prove the last campaign of the Romanoff Empire. The narrative of the western operations has been told as a separate phase of the campaign of 1916, because only in this way can the unity of that campaign be preserved; yet it is essential now, when we look eastward, to recall how considerable was the interdependence between the eastern and western operations and to emphasize the time relations between the larger events on either front.

The Russian campaign opened in the first days of June. It had been preceded by considerable but relatively unimportant operations by Kuropatkin and Evarts northward of Pripet Marshes, which attracted passing attention at the moment but resulted in no real achievement. At the hour when the armies of Brusiloff launched the great assault from Pinsk to the frontiers of Rumania, German troops were mounting the Vaux Plateau in Lorraine, and before the Volhynian offensive had reached its first crisis, Fort de Vaux had fallen and Verdun was palpably *in extremis*. At the same hour Austrian troops were still threatening to pass the last barrier to the Venetian Plains and the new British armies were still unready to begin the Somme offensive.


The Russian blow had, therefore, an important influence upon western events; it produced an immediate interruption of the Austrian of-

# PLAN OF A MODERN BATTLEFIELD



A typical section of trench line of about six miles showing (A) enemy first line, (B) first line, and the supporting and communication trenches behind, with the disposition and numbers of the troops in the first line, in support, and in reserve. A section of front held by one battalion (1,000 men) may be from 250 to 1,000 yards long, or more than half a mile. Half the battalion is in the first line and the other half in support in the other trenches. Behind these are an equal number of reserves at brigade headquarters, and still farther back another force equal to all these to alternate with them.

The contour lines, showing the ground elevation in metres (3.28 feet), are important, as they show the reason for the location of batteries, trenches, hospitals, etc., on this and on maps on succeeding pages. Parallel lines indicate roadways, heavy crossed lines are railroads, and shaded sections are woods.



© American Press Association

#### A MODERN BATTLE FRONT

Showing an attack. The men in the foreground leaving their trench, corresponding to "B" on the map on the opposite page, are charging toward the trench line, corresponding to "A," visible in the background of the picture



#### AN ATTACK—CROSSING "NO MAN'S LAND"

What the trench lines look like in a chalk country. The troops are leaving trench corresponding to "B" on the map and attacking "A." The supporting and communication trenches show plainly



#### ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND OBSERVATION STATIONS

The light batteries, marked "A," consisting of 3-inch field guns (18-pounder guns and 75-millimetre guns) and howitzers up to 4.5 inches, and the medium batteries, marked "B," of field guns up to 4.5 inches calibre (105-millimetre field guns, 60-pounders, and 155-millimetre howitzers) have their fire directed from observation stations (marked "Obs. sta.") and regulated by airplane observers. The heavy batteries are usually directed by balloon observation and regulated by airplane observation. The batteries are usually placed behind the crest of a hill or under cover of woods and buildings and as often as possible where they can enfilade a part of the enemy's trench, as shown by the second "B" battery from the right, which has the railroad crossing and enemy's trench within range.



#### AN OBSERVATION BALLOON LANDING

The balloons on the map on the opposite page are about two miles from the firing line. In practice they are pushed up as far forward as the control of the air will allow.



#### A HEAVY 6-INCH GUN


The fire of the heavy guns is chiefly directed by balloon observation. The usual position of the guns is from three to six miles from the enemy first line (see "C," on map on facing page). Their duty is to bombard and destroy supporting points, communications, dugouts, and trenches, and headquarters if it can be located. The effective range of a 6-inch gun is about 15,000 yards.



#### A LISTENING POST

Com. - Paris Information

This papier-mâché dead horse is a kind of modern Trojan horse. He proved particularly useful as a listening post for engineers




#### GUN OF A MEDIUM BATTERY


The gunners know the results of their fire only by reports from their observers. Medium batteries ("B" on map, page 219) are located from one to three miles from the enemy, and their task is to help destroy enemy trenches, try to put enemy batteries and captive balloons out of commission, and they are also used in barrage fire to cover attacks

*Courtesy British Bureau of Information*

PREPARATIONS FOR A NIGHT ADVENTURE INTO NO MAN'S LAND


These men are getting ready for the night's work. They are taking bombs from their pockets and putting them into their pouches or into Lewis-gun buckets. On the right is an observation officer signalling with a flashlight captured from the Germans.






A DIAGRAM OF AN INTRENCHED HOWITZER

A plan often used to conceal and protect both the batteries and the men from enemy observation and fire. The gun crews live in the dugouts in the rear. In many of the gun positions on the map on page 219 this intrenchment would not be necessary, for the batteries and crews are placed in positions sufficiently concealed to protect them.



A HEAVY HOWITZER BEING INTRENCHED

Artillerymen engaged in placing a gun in a position like that in the diagram above. The position of this gun, or more particularly of the one above, will explain why it is difficult to move heavy artillery rapidly either to follow up an attack or to escape an advancing enemy.



#### AN INTRENCHED LIGHT BATTERY

A diagram of the protection of each gun and a map of a battery with dugouts for men and officers and communication trenches between and an observation station near by, as shown in the extreme right-hand light battery ("A") on map on page 219.



*French Official from Committee on Public Information*

#### AN INTRENCHED GUN CONCEALED FROM ENEMY AERIAL OBSERVATION

fensive, enabling Italy to go eastward to the Isonzo and resume preparations for the later attack which captured Gorizia; it drew divisions from France which reduced the German reserves and hastened the day when Verdun attacks would have to be abandoned. Beyond this it accomplished the hitherto-impossible feat of placing the Central Powers upon the defensive on all fronts, a situation not to recur until Foch should regain the offensive in the west, two years later, at the successful Second Battle of the Marne.

In June, 1916, Russia played a loyal and a vital part in the common task of the nations allied against Germany. Her blow was a mighty one and if it raised hopes which the future was to demonstrate were unfounded and proved to be but the prelude to a Russian desertion of the Allied cause, consequent to the collapse of the Russian Empire and the coming of the Bolshevik madness; we have nevertheless to recognize that the blows delivered by Russia against Austria-Hungary were bound to have consequences in the future and that, even dying, Russia dealt a heavy stroke to the endurance of the already-shaken Hapsburg Empire.

In the examination of the Russian campaign of 1916 we approach a great tragedy, one of the greatest tragedies in all human history. It was hidden completely from contemporary vision. The western Allies saw in the return of Russian armies to the offensive the authentic sign of approaching victories. The early successes—coinciding with the first advances of the British and French at the Somme (advances which were presented in a wholly inaccurate light), coinciding with the decline of German effort before Verdun—aroused an optimism, a confidence in London and in Paris, which was not to return for two long, bitter years.

In these capitals the true situation in Russia was unknown. Confused whispers and warning murmurs were silenced by an efficient censorship or a ready unofficial optimism. While Russian armies were advancing the west saw only a restored Russian military establishment. The canker that was eating at the hearts of the Russian masses, the corruption that was corroding official life, the exhaustion which was swiftly becoming complete, economically and morally, these were things that the west did not suspect and the Germans only partially measured.

Now that the whole truth is known and the bitter disillusionment of the following year is a matter of record, it remains necessary to preserve something of a balance. When Russia abandoned the Allied cause and fell to swift ruin, the deserted Allies found themselves face to face with possible defeat, which, by the spring of 1918, became almost assured disaster. The emotions born of that agony served to eliminate a proper appreciation of what Russia had accomplished on the military side in three campaigns in which Russian armies fought bravely and under a leadership that will continue to command admiration.

Stripped of all detail, Russia in her last offensive literally beat herself to pieces. When the first rush was over she had again, as at the close of the campaign of 1914, exhausted her slender stock of munitions. Her armies sought by the sacrifice of numbers to compensate for the lack of adequate material, for the absence of sufficient guns and munitions. Her victories were won at a price in casualties which could only have been borne by a people in Russia's condition. From the struggle of 1916 Russia sank back exhausted; her generals had served her well, her soldiers had fought in a manner beyond praise, but her rulers had betrayed her, her statesmen had sold her military secrets to the enemy, a corrupt Court gave itself over to the scandals of Rasputin and the intrigues of German coteries. Russian autocracy under the menace of revolution held out its hands to German tyranny. Beyond all else, the unworthy rulers taught the people to hope for defeat as the sure relief from an agony for which there was no other remedy.

The measure of the progressive degeneration of national spirit and national determination is to be found in the fact that the soldiers, who, in the face of untold sacrifice, pressed forward from Volhynia to Rumania in the summer of 1916, fled the same fields, a cowardly and disorganized mob, less than a year later. We have seen in the case of the British Empire how the Irish disaffection led to the tragedy of Easter Week, how a local weakness in the national structure of Britain developed under the strain of war. In the case of Russia the disease was far more deep-seated, far more dangerous. Ever since the domestic disturbances of 1905 had compelled the Russians to make the humiliating Peace of

Portsmouth, the spirit of economic unrest and political revolution had spread and grown. A lost war, a long war; either was bound to be too great a strain upon the shaken edifice of Romanoff power.

Thus, one year after Brusiloff launched his great offensive, Russia collapsed inward. She was incapable of another military effort. This collapse was in some degree due to the strain of the final campaign, to the terrible cost in blood; it was due even more to the strain this campaign put upon the crumbling fabric of economic life. Like a weak bridge under a heavy load, Russia was collapsing when the campaign of 1916 opened, continued to crumble while the campaign progressed, and was in fact a ruin before the campaign had closed, although the fact was still hidden from the western world.

It is with a full recognition of the brutal truths of the Russian situation that we must examine the last Russian offensive. Seen in this light what was at the time recognized to be a fine soldierly achievement becomes something little short of miraculous. Nor should we fail to pay proper tribute to what was accomplished. Had there been no Russian offensive in 1916 the consequences might have been fatal for the Allied cause; had Russia collapsed in this year instead of the next, we might have had the terrible German campaign in the west in 1917 instead of 1918 and the Allies would have been condemned to fight without American help and while Austria was still capable of giving aid and not yet shaken by the long series of disasters which marked the summer months of 1916.

Falling herself, Russia dealt to Austria a blow from which the Hapsburg Monarchy did not recover in the two years and a half of the war.

How different might have been the story if Russian withdrawal in May of 1916 had permitted Austria to send all her strength against Italy, and Germany to concentrate in the west that mighty host which was, two years later, to approach Paris once more and for four months win victory after victory between the Channel and the Marne! Instead, Russia played her part, striking Turkey in Asia Minor and Austria in Galicia and Bukowina, took her high toll of Austrian and

even of German man-power, and fell to anarchy and ruin only when the campaign was over.

Yet, looking backward over the brief time that has elapsed since that summer offensive, it is impossible not to recall mournfully with what high hopes the western world read the daily reports of Russian advances, which approached the gates of Lemberg, reached the slopes of the Carpathians for yet another time, swept through the Bukowina (become the Shenandoah Valley of the Eastern war zone), and finally forced Rumania to the decision which, for a moment, led the west to expect victory and for two years thereafter awakened only sorrow and helpless anger. If one would understand the mood of the western publics in 1917—the confusion, the disillusionment, the temporary halting—it is necessary to recognize how terrible was the fall which between July and December brought Allied hopes from the heights to a Dead Sea level and destroyed confidence and courage alike.

## II. RUSSIAN STRATEGY

When the fatal campaign of 1915 came to a close the beaten Russian armies occupied a front from Riga to Rumania, behind the Dwina and the Styr, stretching across the Pripet Marshes and just touching the Austrian frontier far east of Lemberg. The armies themselves were exhausted. They had preserved a semblance of organization, they had survived by retreat, but they were in terrible need of reorganization—of reinforcement; they lacked alike guns and munitions, the loss of trained officers and soldiers had been enormous. Of man-power there was enough, more than enough; the life of the country had been weakened by the enormous drafts made upon the male population in excess of all immediate need, but for the millions, the guns were lacking. Indeed in the terrible retreats unarmed reserves had waited to take the rifles from their fallen comrades and then fill their places in the line.

That Alexieff should have been able to create out of this chaos, and in a period of six months, great armies—armies which were to win memorable victories—must remain a marvellous achievement. Nor was it less amazing that out of such confusion Brusiloff could fashion instruments

which should beat down Austrian military power and push to the very gates of Lemberg. The speed with which Russian military strength was restored deceived the world, as it surprised the German, who had turned westward to Verdun convinced that Russia was finished as a foe.

Yet long before the campaign of 1916 opened in Europe there came from Asia Minor in February an authentic sign of Russian strength. On February 16 the great Turkish fortress of Erzerum fell to the Grand Duke Nicholas and a few weeks later Russian armies entered Trebizond and completed the conquest of Turkish Armenia. Other Russian troops pressed southward seeking to effect a junction with the doomed British already immured in Kut. Thus early a blow—and a heavy blow—was struck one of Germany's allies and Turkish conditions were unmistakably critical again in this period.

The Erzerum episode was necessarily minor, another side show—cheering but of small value, since the fate of Asia was still to be determined in Europe and on the battle-lines east and west of the solid block of the Central Powers. And, so far as Russia was concerned, the operative front was to be the three hundred miles between the Pripet Marshes at Pinsk and the Rumanian frontier east of Czernowitz. Two groups of Russian armies north of Pripet, commanded by Everts and Kuropatkin, were to make various feints and even attempt considerable operations of a subordinate character, destined to come to nothing but to hold a certain number of German troops immobilized. The main task was that of Brusiloff to the south.

Russian strategy envisaged three objectives. It was necessary to act in order to remove the pressure now being exerted by the Germans upon the French at Verdun and by the Austrians upon the Italians in Venetia. The whole Russian campaign was to conform to the general Allied conception of a concentric offensive to be delivered by all the Allies upon the Central Powers; by the Anglo-French forces at the Somme, by the Italians at the Isonzo, and by Brusiloff's Russian armies in Volhynia and Galicia. The major strategical purpose of the Russians was, however, to crush the Austro-Hungarian military power, mainly concentrated on the southeastern front.

As the campaign progressed the attention of the world was fixed upon certain geographical points—upon Kovel, Lemberg, and Stanislau, upon the capital of Galicia above all else—but although the possession of these was of utmost value to Brusiloff, their importance lay solely in the extent to which their capture of the towns would contribute to the destruction of the enemy's military establishment, to breaking his morale and his military strength. The campaign of Brusiloff was not conceived in relation to any fixed geographical objectives; his purpose was to attack upon a very wide front, to exploit successes when they had come, and to use the last ounce of power in his grasp to put Austria once and for all out of the war. The fate of Austria once more turned upon a Russian campaign, and once more Austria was to be saved, after deadly peril, only by German intervention. Thus the campaign of 1916 was to recall vividly the issues and circumstances of the earlier operation over much the same territory in 1915; it was to hold out the same promises and to end in even greater disappointments, after preliminary successes rivalling those of the former year.

### III. BATTLEFIELD AND ARMIES

On the front from Pripet to Rumania five Austrian armies faced four Russian. The Austrian armies from north to south were: the First, under Puhallo; the Fourth, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand; the Second, under Boehm-Ermoli; an Austro-German Army, which was mainly Austrian, under Von Bothmer; and the Sixth, under Pflanzer-Baltin. Facing them were: the Eighth Russian Army, under Kaledin; the Eleventh, under Sakharoff; the Seventh, under Scherbachoff; and the Ninth, under Lechitsky. Still another Russian army, under Loesche, was to appear on the north between Pripet and the bend of the Styr, after the first offensive had driven its deep wedge toward Kovel.

Of the five Austrian armies only two were fatally involved in the first phase of the Russian offensive: that of the Archduke facing Rovno, occupying the fortresses of Dubno and Lutsk and covering the vital railroad junction of Kovel, which became the geographical objective of

Kaledin in June; and that of Pflanzer, defending Bukowina from the Dniester to the Rumanian boundary on the Pruth. Both of these armies were substantially destroyed and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was replaced by a German general, Von Linsingen, when German reserves were sent to save the day. It was the steadfast resistance of the army of Bothmer which actually saved the situation in all the critical period of June and July, by covering Lemberg and holding fast when the armies on either flank crumbled.

As to numbers engaged the Austrians, with small German contingents, had, when the battle opened, some forty-one divisions, rather more than 600,000 men. The Russians were at least three times as strong. As the struggle progressed the numbers were somewhat equalized by the arrival of Austrian troops recalled from Italy and German troops sent from France, but throughout the campaign the Russian advantage was very great in numbers, although after the first months this advantage was counterbalanced by the familiar exhaustion of Russian munitions.

The three hundred miles of front on which the campaign was fought extended from the marshes and lowlands about Pripet southward across the higher ground of eastern Galicia and presently to the Carpathian Mountains at Kimpolung. The Russians, advancing from east to west, had to cross a number of considerable rivers, flowing from south to north and from north to south—notably the Styr and the Stakhod in Volhynia and the Sereth and the Strypa in Galicia; they had also to force a passage of the Dniester and the Pruth on the frontiers of Bukowina. They were handicapped at all times by the scarcity of roads and railroads and, in the north, by the marshy nature of much of the country.

On this front, more than half as extensive as that between Switzerland and the sea, the Austrians had not constructed defences rivalling the German systems at the Somme. For these the distances were too great. Over much of the front there were no continuous trenches and behind the first lines were no such switch lines and second and third systems of defences as had been revealed at the Battle of Champagne and were again to be disclosed at the Somme. Yet even on this front

open warfare of the old-fashioned sort was not to take place on any large scale. Driven from one system of defences the Austrians were presently to be found behind hastily constructed trenches, before which the fury of Russian advance was checked in due course of time.

During the Russian advances, the railway junctions of Kovel, Lemberg, and Stanislau came to have an extraordinary value. Could the Russians have taken Kovel they would have broken the connection between German and Austrian armies; could they have taken Lemberg they would have paralyzed all Austrian connections in Galicia; the value of Stanislau was less considerable but it was unmistakable. But while these railway points remained in their hands, the Austrians were able to move reserves from one point to another with the greatest ease, while the Kovel-Brest-Litovsk line insured the arrival of German reinforcements at critical moments. Of these three junctions the more important, Kovel and Lemberg, were never lost during this campaign, and the Austrians were therefore at all times infinitely better off, both in the matter of trunk and lateral communications, and were thus enabled to use a smaller number of men to a far greater advantage than their foes, whose ultimate failure may, in some measure at least, be traced to the poverty of communications. Stanislau was finally captured, but the consequences were slight.

#### IV. JUNE 5


Turning now to the actual progress of events: the first warning of the coming storm reached the Austrians on June 4, when the Russians began a deliberate bombardment of their lines from Pripet to Rumania. It was not a concentrated fire like that which struck the French before Verdun or which had overwhelmed the Russians themselves at the Dunajec the previous year. An attack on so wide a front, too, was a novelty in the war, for hitherto the widest front assailed had been the twenty-mile stretch along the Dunajec. By contrast the Russians swept three hundred miles.

The following day all five Austrian armies were assailed by Russian

# THE LAST RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

233

## THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN JUNE, 1916



**BLACK SHOWS GROUND GAINED.**

infantry in one of the greatest battles of the war. The results of this grandiose attack varied along the front, quite as was to be expected. From the Pripet Marshes right down to Kolki in the bend of the Styr there was no marked Russian gain. Below Kolki, on the other hand, as far as the Galician frontier, there was a material gain, which in the centre developed into the piercing of the Austrian front by Kaledin's

army at half a dozen points, notably at Olika, due west of Rovno, and the immediate inrush of the Russian flood.

In the next few days this flood swept forward fifty miles. Dubno and Lutsk—which, with Rovno (never lost by the Russians), constituted the Volhynian triangle of fortresses—were promptly taken; the Styr was passed, and Kaledin's army approached both Kovel and Vladimir-Volynski, road and railroad junctions of utmost importance. By the end of the first week a wedge over forty miles deep, and twice as wide at its base, had been driven into the Austrian front between the bend of the Styr at Kolki and the old Austrian frontier northeast of Brody. More than 70,000 prisoners had been taken from the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, which had been routed and had fled westward toward Kovel.

While the Austrian armies in the centre, those of Boehm-Ermoli and Bothmer, had suffered only local reverses, the fate of the Archduke's army had also overtaken that of Pflanzer and it had been driven in rout southward through Bukowina—which was totally cleared—into the Carpathians and westward along the Dniester upon Stanislau. In its first resistance it had lost more than 40,000 prisoners and had practically ceased to exist as an army.

By the middle of June the situation had become critical. Unless the beaten Austrians were promptly reinforced, a gap was sure to open between Austrian and German armies, when the Russians reached Kovel; the advance of Lechitsky south of the Dniester was threatening Lemberg from the south, while that of Sakharoff was becoming equally menacing from the north along the Lemberg-Rovno railroad toward Brody. Only in the centre and before the army of Bothmer were the Russians checked, and Bothmer's position was becoming perilous, since both his flanks were threatened. On the map his situation had already become impossible, but owing to the character of the country he was able to hold on for many weeks and ultimately make good his retirement.

In this situation German intervention was rapid and efficient. While the Archduke's routed army streamed back to Kovel, German

divisions were hurried down along the railways from Poland and the Russian front; a new army was created, and the defeated Archduke deprived of all but nominal authority. By the third week in June the Germans were counter-attacking on the northern side of the Russian wedge, driven toward Kovel, and in the next few days the counter-attack achieved its purpose. The Russian advance was first checked, then thrown back a small distance. The peril to Kovel was abolished and time was allowed the Germans to reorganize the defences in this quarter. When these reorganizations were completed, ground would be surrendered to a new Russian drive, made to the north of the salient, and the Russian advance would reach the Stakhod from the Pripet Marshes southward; but not again during the campaign would Kovel be in danger.

Rarely has a German stroke been more skilfully delivered or more promptly and completely successful. It did not achieve as much as the Germans had hoped for it; neither Dubno nor Lutsk was retaken; substantially all the ground gained by the Russians was either retained or presently recaptured, but the German counter-offensive did break the force of the Russian thrust in the direction of Kovel. In doing this Linsinger accomplished for the Germans what Ivanoff strove to accomplish at the San in the previous year, when, after the defeat of the Dunajec, he strove to stabilize the whole front at the San River. Had Linsingen failed as Ivanoff had failed, the dislocation of the Austro-German lines would certainly have extended northward into Poland and a general German retirement might have resulted.

#### V. THE END OF THE FIRST PHASE

By the end of June the first phase of the Russian offensive was over. More than 200,000 prisoners and 200 cannon had been taken, together with an enormous booty in material and supplies. A large portion of the Russian province of Volhynia had been cleared; all of the Bukowina had been reoccupied or was destined soon to be taken. The German counter-offensive east of Kovel had been halted and was manifestly on the wane. Loesche's army, brought south, was already preparing to advance north of Kaledin's salient, and the ultimate retirement of the Ger-

mans to the line of the Stakhod was plainly forecast. To the south, Sakharoff's army was advancing up the Styrl and astride the Lemberg-Rovno railroad; it was almost at the frontier and within striking distance of the considerable frontier town of Brody. Scherbachoff's army was less successful and had made only minor progress against Bothmer, west of Tarnopol; but on both sides of the river Lechitsky was pushing up the Dniester Valley; was approaching Kolomea, had taken Czernowitz, and was threatening Stanislau and—beyond it—the vital railroad communications between Lemberg and Hungary. Actually the Russians were now nearer to Lemberg than they had been to the front which they now held in Volhynia, facing Kovel, when they had begun their great offensive a little more than three weeks earlier.

By comparison with what the British and French were to accomplish in the next four months at the Somme, the Russians' achievement was already colossal. The attack had been a surprise to the foe; this surprise—a factor not to appear effectively on the west front until the great German offensive of 1918—had enabled them to break through at a number of points on the Volhynian front, to break through as no western offensive prior to that of Ludendorff in 1918 was to break through, and, following the initial piercing, the victorious Russians had covered nearly fifty miles before they were checked.

This was assuredly a marvellous reversal of form after the long and terrible months of disaster in the previous year and the retreats that seemed to have no ending. Yet there were signs—which the Germans recognized and promptly reported—signs which should have had a warning for the western powers, but had no meaning. If Russia had inflicted terrible losses upon the Austrians, the method of her generals had imposed upon her troops colossal sacrifices. Long before the campaign had reached its climax German statements fixed the Russian losses in killed alone at 264,000, which was far above the total of captured Austrians and indicated that the total of Russian losses was above a million.

Moreover, great as had been the immediate success, it had not resulted in the sweeping advances of 1914. Bothmer stood on the ground

over which Brusiloff himself had advanced in the first considerable battle of the eastern front, and the result of that earlier battle had been an Austrian defeat and the evacuation of Lemberg. A single defeat in August and September, two years earlier, had sufficed to turn the Austrians out of eastern Galicia as far as the San. But the later Austrian disaster, great as it was, had not produced a general dislocation of the Austrian front. The old story of the warfare of positions had been reproduced on the grand scale of eastern operations. The victorious Russians had outrun their guns and their supplies, the routed Austrians had retired upon guns and German reinforcements; a balance had presently been restored and the Russian advance pinned down—thrown back slightly.

And in point of fact this Russian check was as fatal to the main Russian purposes as the check which Ludendorff suffered—two years later in his Picardy offensive of March—was to the German purpose to seek a decision by a single blow. Brusiloff had borrowed the German strategy, the Napoleonic tradition. He had sought to crush the Austrian armies and he had dealt them a terrific blow, but the blow just lacked the weight which would insure a decision. When next he struck he would find German divisions along his front and German generals in command of the opposing armies.

Thus, while London and Paris were once more acclaiming the Russian “steam roller” marvellously restored to efficiency and this time setting out not for Berlin or Vienna but for the more modest objective of Lemberg, the real opportunity was passing—had, in, fact passed; the Russian offensive was assuming the familiar and the fatal character of so many western offensives which had opened with bright hopes and material initial success only to end in dismal slaughter and unmistakable check when the effort was made to exploit them after the first hours of success.

#### VI. THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE SLOWS DOWN

We have now briefly to summarize the further phases of the Russian offensive, to narrate how it gradually lost power and slowed down, spent

its resources and its energies. There was no defeat, there was not even a positive check along the whole front. Armies continued to advance, ground was still gained right up to September, when the Rumanian entrance into the struggle transformed the whole situation; but from July onward the larger possibilities had vanished. By this time the German intervention was becoming effective. German generals and German divisions were appearing along the whole front.

In this period German strategy—for it was German strategy that dominated—did not seek an offensive victory. As at the Somme, the Germans sought only to make the price of advance prohibitive and to wear out the force of the still superior opposing numbers, before the Russians should reach Lemberg or Kovel. Between these towns and the front as it existed on July 1 the Germans were prepared to surrender a certain amount of ground; to hold both these railroad centres was, however, a fixed purpose.

Russian strategy had aimed at the destruction of the Austrian armies. But after the first attack this was no longer possible. On the contrary, it became necessary for Brusiloff, before he could resume a general offensive, to reorganize his own front. He had created in the enemy line two enormous pockets—one along the Styr in Volhynia, the other in the Bukowina—two pockets strikingly recalling those which were the consequence of Ludendorff's mighty offensives in Picardy and Champagne two years later. But these pockets or salients were vulnerable to attacks on the flank, as the German counter-offensive from Kovel had demonstrated, and Brusiloff's first task was to straighten his front, to bring it into line with points of the wedges he had driven into the Austrian line in June. In the main, he accomplished this in July and August; but, in doing it, he consumed the time and the resources which were needed for a new general attack. And as a consequence this attack never came; it was attempted one year later, in the pathetic Kerensky offensive which, despite its forlorn failure, began with victory, but, because it was not pressed, promptly collapsed.

The first and most obvious duty was to establish the safety of that great wedge driven toward Kovel, now rather less than twenty-five

miles distant from the Russian front. Its weakness was demonstrated by the German counter-offensive from the north, delivered in June, and again outlined by a second counter-offensive prepared at the south, in front of Sakharoff's army, but never delivered because it was fore-stalled by a Russian thrust.

Accordingly, in the first days of July, Loesche's army, brought south from the region north of Pripet Marsh, attacked on a front from the bend of the Styr to Kolki, broke down the Austrian defences, crossed the Styr, and carried the whole Russian line forward in a straight line from the point of the Kovel wedge to the marsh. Finally checked at the crossings of the Stakhod River it did not pause until it had accomplished the main purpose. The Lutsk salient was ironed out on the north; the rear and flank of Kaledin was assured against a new thrust from the north. In point of fact, Kaledin was able to get forward and retake the ground lost in mid-June, but was promptly pulled down before he had again threatened Kovel. And with this operation the campaign for Kovel ends. Kaledin and Loesche have done their work, they must wait for the armies to the south to complete theirs, and this work will not be completed when the campaign ends.

Having straightened his front to the north about the Lutsk salient, Brusiloff in mid-July turns to the southern side of the salient along the Upper Styr, where the Germans and Austrians are preparing a new counter-offensive designed to retake Dubno and Lutsk and turn the southern flank of Kaledin. In a series of brilliant offensives Sakharoff pushes down the Rovno-Lemberg railway, defeats the army of Boehm-Ermoli, takes more than fifty thousand prisoners, and presently captures Brody and arrives on the northern flank of Bothmer's army, which is standing like Thomas at Chickamauga, standing behind the Strypa facing Tarnopol—a rock on which all the German strategy in this eastern field is founded. More than this, the Sakharoff advance draws close to the Tarnopol-Lemberg railway, which is vital to the existence of Bothmer's northern wing. In July, however, Bothmer still holds on.

Brusiloff has thus secured his northern positions. Now his line runs practically straight from Pripet to Brody, along the Stakhod and

the Upper Styria. He threatens Bothmer's left flank along the Brody-Lemberg railway, but on this front and southward Bothmer's position is too strong to be forced by frontal attack. Accordingly, it is the turn of Lechitsky, astride the Dniester and already victorious in the Bukowina, to push up the middle Dniester. When he has advanced to Stanislau and approached Halicz, he will have turned Bothmer's southern flank, and Bothmer, with both flanks turned, will have no choice but to retire toward Lemberg, behind the Zlota Lipa or even the Gnila Lipa, where Brusiloff found and routed the Austrian armies in September, 1914. Once Bothmer is in retreat, then the road to Lemberg should be open.


But it is only in August that Lechitsky can get into motion, the heavy rains bringing the rivers up to a flood stage. August 7 Lechitsky sets out. He is in Stanislau on August 10, while Scherbachoff to the north, advancing in line, gives him aid north of the Dniester, and the vital crossings and roads on Bothmer's flank are by this date lost to the general, who has made such a long and gallant fight in his first positions. As a result Bothmer at last gets up and retires behind the Zlota Lipa, in good order, with only a moderate amount of losses in guns and prisoners. By the second week in August he is in his new position, having postponed his withdrawal for ten priceless weeks and thus prevented Brusiloff from reaping immediate rewards for his great successes north and south.

We have then, by the middle of August, this situation: From Pripet right down to the Dniester and thence to the Carpathians the Russian line has been pushed forward from thirty to fifty miles; Kovel is hardly twenty miles away, Lemberg only a little more. Twenty thousand square miles of territory, 300,000 prisoners, and an immense booty in supplies have been gathered in. German divisions have been drawn from France, Austrian divisions from Italy; a terrific strain has been put upon the resources of the Central Powers and it still seems possible, now that the whole Russian front has been brought forward, that another general attack may bring the Czar to Lemberg and insure the reconquest of Eastern Galicia.

*From a painting by Léon Gérôme. Courtesy of the artist.*

#### CAPTAIN BONE DOWNING A BOCHIE

A remarkable exploit of Captain Bone, one of the well known British airmen. Perceiving an enemy airplane coming to drop bombs on houses near the shore, he gave chase, overtook it, and sent it plunging down into the sea.





## VII. THE END

After August 15, the story of Brusiloff's offensive is briefly told. For three weeks there is a desperate struggle between Scherbachoff and Bothmer north of the Dniester and the Austrian is pushed back slightly on both flanks, straight in upon Halicz to the south, but manages, with the aid of German divisions, to hold on. The Russian effort wears out and the whole Russian offensive from Pripet to the Dniester is over. Meantime Lechitsky has been diverted from his operations up the Dniester and, in accord with Scherbachoff, by the entrance of Rumania, and the necessity of covering the flank of the Rumanian army along the Carpathians, while that army is still invading Transylvania.

Lechitsky's earlier successes in sweeping the Bukowina had enabled Rumania to concentrate her efforts on the west instead of the north; indeed, without this reconquest of the Bukowina, the Rumanian entrance into the war might not have occurred; but the moment Rumania did enter, Russian attention was diverted from Galicia to the Bukowina and presently Russian divisions were, all too tardily, sent to support an ally, overcome in the first weeks of the war. Had Rumania not entered the war it is conceivable—just conceivable—that Brusiloff, by concentrating all his armies and all his remaining resources upon a final drive at Lemberg, might have taken the city. But this is merest speculation; in any event, after September 1 this was no longer a possibility. His campaign had, moreover, lost its original value.

And thus in September and in October the last Russian offensive eventually wears itself out. Rumanian events fill the newspapers and banish the minor incidents of the Russian offence. All the larger hopes of June and even of July perish. Despite great early victories and continued progress, Russian resources have proven inadequate for the task set by Russian strategy. Austrian armies have been shaken, desperately shaken, but German reserves and German generals have restored the balance. Russia has received even more deadly wounds than she has inflicted, and the territory which has been conquered in

## HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

THE ADVANCE ON LEMBERG, JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1916



BLACK SHOWS GROUND GAINED

the brilliant campaign will have no value in the future—will be surrendered to Austria almost without a struggle in the next summer.

Recalling the prompt Austrian collapse in the first days of Kerensky's despairing offensive of the next year, it is not too much to say that had Russia been able to exploit her victories of 1916 by a campaign of 1917, Lemberg would have fallen promptly and Eastern Galicia have been cleared as promptly as it had been in 1914. As he ended his campaign Brusiloff stood in advantageous positions from Pripet

to the Carpathians. Another winter of preparation like the previous one would assure him of sufficient resources to make a new drive as great as that of the preceding June, and such a drive would have carried him, victorious, into Lemberg for a second time.

But all of this was not to be. The Russian army had fought its last campaign. It closed that campaign victoriously and with the prize for which it had contended well within its grasp. After four campaigns Austria was only capable of a limited further resistance, made possible by German aid. In September, 1916, every outward sign pointed to the collapse, not of the Romanoff but of the Hapsburg Empire. Even the disaster to Rumania seemed but a passing incident to be repaired, when Russia was again ready to move in the spring. But at work behind the victorious armies of Brusiloff were treason of the Court and autocracy and the anarchy of the Bolsheviks. We leave the Russian army in the autumn of 1916 still a powerful, organized, disciplined force; we shall find it in the spring of 1917 a mob, destitute of discipline, courage, loyalty. It was destined to disappear, not like Napoleon's Grand Army in a defeat made glorious by the valour and devotion of the vanquished, but in a flight from a field on which it was still actually victorious and from which it had driven its opponents.

For all practical purposes Brusiloff's campaign is over by the middle of September, the operations of Lechitsky in the Carpathians have become a detail in the Rumanian campaign to the south.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### RUMANIA IS SACRIFICED

#### I THE BATTLE OF EUROPE

On August 27 Rumania declared war upon the Central Powers and her first troops crossed the Austrian frontier. By September 1 her army was at work and the decisive moment arrived in that grandiose, struggle, unequalled in extent and numbers engaged, which had already been described on both sides of the firing lines as the Battle of Europe.

Before passing to a discussion of the political and military circumstances of the Rumanian episode, it is necessary to consider for a moment the exact situation as it existed on September 1, 1916. For two years no such season of hope and eager expectation of victory was to come again to the nations allied against Germany. At this precise moment Allied confidence and Allied calculations were at the highest level they had reached since the opening of the conflict. Looking backward now over the grim and bitter days that were soon to come, Allied optimism and blindness in this September period seem almost unbelievable.

Yet they are not inexplicable. The Germans and the Austrian allies had undertaken two great offensives: Verdun in February, and the Trentine adventure in May. Both had long ago been checked. Verdun had now become as patent a failure as the Venetian effort. The German and Austrian failures had been in turn followed by great Allied offensives, and at the moment Rumania entered the war the Somme campaign was developing into a real success; Haig was at last sweeping up and over the Ridge between Albert and Bapaume; Brusiloff was still advancing both in Volhynia and in Galicia; in the Bukowina his troops were forcing the last barriers of the Carpathian passes. Along the Isonzo Italy had taken Gorizia, was still victorious in the present, and

apparently capable of making still further progress in the immediate future.

In the west, Bapaume and Péronne were to all appearances almost within Anglo-French grasp; in the south, Italian hands seemed closing on Trieste; in the east, Lemberg and Kovel were universally regarded as certain fruits of the next Russian harvest—soon to be gathered. Far down in the Balkans Sarrail's army was giving sure signs of an impending offensive. Not only was the Battle of Europe in progress but on all sides Germany and Austria were being assailed—were on the defensive and were threatened by disasters and defeats which seemed certain to arrive at no distant date and bring with them the authentic evidence that the Central Powers had lost the war.

September 1, 1916, was one of the great moments of the war; it was a moment when Paris, London, and Rome were already convinced that decisive victory was at hand. Only in Petrograd was there a suspicion of the truth, and what was going on in Petrograd, vital as it was to the whole Allied cause, was totally unknown in all other Allied capitals. Now as we must understand the Allied mood in September, 1916, when Rumania brought a new front and a new army to the campaign, it is equally essential that we should see facts as contrasted with appearances—the facts out of which was now to develop one of the grimdest tragedies of the war (comparable only with the Belgian episode), namely, the destruction of Rumania and, as a consequence, a decline in Allied confidence and morale, which opened the way to the German peace offensive of December.

The fact, as contrasted with appearances, was this: Despite material gains, the Somme offensive had failed to pierce the German line and was destined in part at least, because of weather conditions, to continue to fail—to remain nothing more than a pounding operation, enormously costly to both contestants but without chance of a decisive issue. The Italian offensive at Gorizia was over. The Russian offensive in the east had already been checked and was now dying out. Brusiloff, like Cadorna, had exhausted his resources and in exhausting them he had missed a decisive victory. The gains on the west, the east, and the Italian

fronts were relatively unimportant; they had no decisive value. On all fronts the enemy armies remained intact, and behind the enemy lines the hostile nations stood with unshaken confidence and unbroken morale.

The Rumanian enlistment was hailed in all Allied quarters as destined to prove the final and decisive action; the intervention of a powerful reserve which, at the moment when the issue of the Battle of Europe was to be determined, would fall upon the exhausted armies of the Central Powers and produce what Napoleon was accustomed to call "the event." But the truth is that Rumania, led into the war by Russian treachery, was already marked as a victim, both by the reactionary elements in control in Russia and by their partners in the conspiracy, the German General Staff.

Actually the Rumanian army was used as the reserve of the Allies. It was thrown in at the moment regarded as likely to be decisive, but it was thrown against an unshaken enemy, still strong in reserves, who was able to break the attacking reserve, throw it back in utter ruin, advance and win the Battle of Europe, and, thus, the military and the moral advantage of the campaign of 1916. We have now come to the decisive moment. It is of utmost importance now to lay aside any limited view of the battlefield, to dismiss any estimate of the relative value of the separate spheres of operations, to see the thing as a unit—as a single battle—and to recognize that it was because the Germans saw the situation in the single and unified fashion that they won the battle, the campaign, and—almost—the war itself.

If one should go back to the Civil War for a parallel—always tempting and always dangerous—the situation in the Battle of Europe in the opening days of September was the situation of Gettysburg on the third day, and the onset of the Rumanians was like the charge of Pickett's troops. In both instances an undefeated enemy was assailed in his chosen positions, precisely as he had hoped to be assailed; and in each case the assault failed. As a consequence, the assailants were compelled to abandon their whole strategy, which sought a decision in the campaign. And in the case of the European struggle, the victors—unlike Meade at Gettysburg—passing to the offensive in their own turn, har-

vested great profits from their victory, in territory, prisoners, and in the moral values which, in the existing situation, were of far greater importance.

The cause of the Rumanian failure is to be found in Russian treachery, in the treason of the ministry of Stuermer and Protopopoff. They deliberately planned that Rumania should attack and be destroyed, that Russia might obtain peace—the peace of the vanquished, but without decisive defeat of her own armies—and that thus the domestic revolution, already visible to them, might be averted and the soldiers at the front be turned against the Russian people in a desperate effort to suppress the insurrection, bound to come if the war were protracted through another winter. Yet, recognizing all this, what is to be said of the blindness of Allied statesmanship, which permitted the terrible tragedy to occur without suspecting a single minor circumstance of it?

## II. THE POLICY OF NATIONAL INSTINCT

The reasons which underlay Rumania's entrance into the war, the larger impelling motives, are easily explained. Rumania enlisted with the nations fighting the Central Powers for precisely the reasons that Sardinia had allied herself with France and then with Prussia in the last century. In both cases the Italians sought to free portions of their own race and areas of territory inhabited by Italians and which belonged by all rights—based upon race, language, and common national aspiration—to a united Italy.

In the same fashion Rumanian patriots pursued a policy which one of the most distinguished Rumanian statesman, M. Take Jonescu, defined as the policy of national instinct. In the Bukowina, Transylvania, and Banat more than 4,000,000 Rumanians lived under the harsh yoke of Austrian and Hungarian rulers. The claim of Italy to Venetia was no more valid than that of Rumania to Transylvania, and just as Italy was indefensible, while Austria held the Venetian passes, Rumania was condemned to exist as a pliant tool of the Central Alliance while the Austrians maintained their sway in the southern half of Bukowina and the Hungarians continued to hold Transylvania.

And in these regions of Rumania Irredenta Austro-Hungarian rule had been consistently brutal and inhuman. All the hideous circumstances of Austrian oppression in Northern Italy in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, which had stirred Europe and even America, were repeated in the unfortunate lands about the Transylvania Alps. It was not mere land hunger or grandiose and selfish ambition that led the Rumanians to enter the war. They sought territorial aggrandizement, yes; but they sought it only to obtain that race unification which was equally desired by the Rumanians of Austrian and Hungarian provinces alike. Left to themselves, the inhabitants of the Bukowina, of Transylvania, and of large sections of the Banat would have chosen the Rumanian nationality. They were held by Austrian and Hungarian bayonets; they were held as the Italians of Lombardy and Venetia had been held more than half a century before, as the people of Trieste and the Trentino were still held when Italy entered the war for reasons wholly comparable to those which later led Rumania to the fatal decision.

The facts of the Rumanian situation were little understood in the west, where the accession of Rumania was hailed merely because the new ally brought half a million bayonets and was believed to bring the decisive aid which would win the victory. When Rumania had failed, after the most shameful betrayal in modern history, the Germans skillfully covered the beaten foe with discredit by alleging that the motives of this little Latin state were selfish, as selfish as the German ambitions. And in a certain measure the western world absorbed this poison. Yet nothing could be more untrue or unjust. Rumania sought to liberate men and women of her own race eager to become fellow citizens; Germany brought the terrible war upon the world to enslave people of alien races whose desire—expressed in gallant and despairing resistance—was to escape the German yoke and preserve their own national liberty.

Rumania was crushed as Sardinia was crushed at Novara; all her patriotic dreams were extinguished, for the time being, in the terrible disasters of the last weeks of 1916. Afterward, the collapse of Russia led to the final betrayal; Rumania, powerless to resist longer, was thrown to her enemies by the Bolsheviks; she had to accept the terms of a new

Treaty of Bucharest which bound her hand and foot to the Central Powers—politically, economically, in all respects save morally. But the very circumstances of her betrayal and surrender were such that a duty was placed upon her western allies—who were powerless to prevent the destruction, who had welcomed an ally already marked for slaughter—to demand and obtain for Rumania (exactly as for Serbia equally unfortunate), not merely liberty and a restoration of the lands seized in the present war, but the realization of the larger but not less valid moral claims upon Rumanian peoples beyond the limits of the political map of 1914.

Belgium, Serbia, Rumania; these are the three small states which were, each in turn, sacrificed to the German power, while their great allies stood helpless and hopeless, unable to foresee the truth as to the situation in each of these countries, unable to aid when the truth became manifest. For the Belgian martyrdom there was, perhaps, no remedy; but it is impossible to believe, now, that both the Serbian and the Rumanian disasters could not have been avoided had western statesmen been capable of perceiving the truth and seeing the battlefield of Europe as a whole.

### III. CONSPIRACY

At the outset of the World War the aged King Carol—to whom Rumania owed much of her prosperous development in previous decades but who was a German and a Hohenzollern by derivation and tradition—sought earnestly to persuade his country to enter the struggle on the side of the Central Powers. In this his failure was absolute. Bound, like Italy, by a defensive alliance with Germany and with Austria, Rumanian statesmen, like Italian, instantly asserted that the war upon which the Central Powers had embarked was offensive, not defensive, and that, as a consequence, Rumania was under no obligation to furnish military aid.

The early death of King Carol removed the one force which might have preserved Rumanian neutrality; no force could have availed to enlist Rumania on the Austrian side. The new sovereign, Ferdinand,

did not share his predecessors' extreme German sympathies and his wife—a daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh and a brilliant and beautiful woman—was wholly devoted to the idea of Rumanian participation on the Allied side. Like the Queen of Greece, who is the Kaiser's only sister, the Rumanian Queen, whose mother was a Russian Grand Duchess, played a powerful part—although in an opposing cause—in all the Balkan intrigues of the first two years of the war.

Yet before the struggle was far advanced it was patent that Rumania did but await the favourable moment to enter the conflict, that Rumanian policy was identical with that of Italy. Both Latin states foresaw the need of temporary neutrality, pending alike the reorganization of their military power and the arrival of the moment when their intervention might be effective. In 1915, when Italy cast her lot with the Allies and declared war upon Austria, Rumania would have followed suit promptly, but the Russian defeat at the Dunajec and the expulsion of Russian armies from the Bukowina and Galicia, together with the far-swinging German invasion of Russia, forbade Rumanian intervention. Not until it was clear that Russia could react after such a series of disasters was a Rumanian declaration conceivable. Moreover, in the period just preceding the Dunajec, Russian statesmen had adopted, with respect of Rumania, a high tone and an uncompromising spirit in the matter of territorial arrangements, which had contributed to delaying any possible Rumanian participation until the Dunajec defeat arrived.

But Brusiloff's victories in June, 1916, had changed the situation. Lechitsky's successful advance through the Bukowina to the Carpathian passes had secured the northern flank of Rumanian forces and insured communications between Russia and Rumania. These victories, too, gave early promise of leading swiftly to a decisive triumph over Austria and the downfall of the Hapsburg Monarchy. In Bucharest and elsewhere it was believed that Rumania's hour had come, and the reports of German and Austrian ministers in the Rumanian capital alike bore testimony to the fact that the entrance of Rumania could no longer be postponed for any considerable time.

It was, however, from Petrograd and not from Bucharest that the

word came. An ultimatum was suddenly despatched from Russia to Rumania demanding that Rumania forthwith enlist or pay the penalty in the surrender of all hopes for territorial and racial unification at the close of the war. In substance the Stuermer Cabinet said to the Rumanian Premier, Bratiano: "Either you now throw Rumania into the struggle on our side or you forfeit all claim upon us for any future benefit when Austria, now on the point of collapse, is finally beaten." To such an ultimatum there could be but one answer.

Yet the purpose of Stuermer and his associates is now clear. Already they realized that Brusiloff's offensive had reached its crest. Treason, corruption, incapacity, added to the natural lack of industrial machinery, had made impossible the task of munitioning and supplying the vast Russian armies sufficiently to permit the continuation of the victorious advance in the southeast. And unless a decisive victory were to be had, only peace could prevent a Russian revolution, fatal to the Crown and to the bureaucracy alike. Since the decisive victory was not to be obtained, peace was to be had only when a new German military victory should establish the fact that no complete or even relatively complete Allied victory was possible. Such a German victory, if won against Russia, would discredit further the already discredited Russian Government, but if Rumania were defeated, instead of Russia, the régime might escape and—peace by negotiation following—its hands might be left free for a campaign of repression within Russia, which would prevent the revolution otherwise inevitable.

This much has already been made clear by the documents which were spread before an astonished Allied world in the early stages of the Russian Revolution. Rumania was ordered by the Russian Cabinet to go to what was expected and even planned to be certain defeat. Not only was all necessary aid refused to Rumania in advance of the opening of her campaign, but she was betrayed into the Transylvania offensive by the express assurance from Petrograd that Bulgaria would remain neutral. Yet as soon as Rumania was deeply committed in Transylvania, Bulgaria—as she had done in the case of Serbia in the previous year—threw off the mask and declared war, and thus opened

the way for the campaign of Mackensen, which led to the fall of Bucharest and the ruin of Rumania.

Such, in their broadest details, are the circumstances of the betrayal of Rumania. The Russian bureaucracy prepared a defeat of the Rumanian armies that the way might be opened for a peace by negotiation. We are left to conjecture how far this conspiracy was based upon utter treason to Russia—procured by German intrigue at the Russian Court—and German corruption in high places, and how far it was the result of the conviction of the reigning bureaucracy that only peace could save Russia from revolution. In any case, it was beyond any conceivable defence. It was the shameful betrayal of a little state, forced by a brutal ultimatum to take up arms in the face of certain ruin. Seeking to escape domestic revolution, the Russian Cabinet invited defeat on the battlefield—but defeat, not for its own armies, but for those of a state, that was powerless to resist the imperative order of Petrograd that it take up arms or forego its legitimate national aspirations.

And when Rumania had fallen, Germany, true to her agreement with Petrograd, made her proposal of peace by negotiation; but the western nations declined the proffer. Russia fell into revolution as a consequence, just as Stuermer had foreseen. One other consequence of the Revolution—satisfactory to all the world which at last knew the truth—was the execution of those ministers and agents who had procured the Rumanian betrayal. Their treason was in vain; neither Russia nor their own régime was saved; but they did not meet their doom until Rumania had been wrecked and their western Allies had lost the Battle of Europe.

#### IV. THE RUMANIAN OFFENSIVE

On the morning of her declaration of war Rumania's situation was this: She had 300,000 first-line troops and had added to this number sufficiently to bring the field strength of her army to about half a million. The troops were fairly well equipped in minor details, but were woefully weak in the all-essential departments of heavy artillery, field artillery, and machine guns. There was, also, only a scanty supply of

munitions for such artillery as was available. Tardy but sincere efforts made by France and Britain to equip their prospective ally had been thwarted by the treachery of Russian officials and the inefficiency of Russian transport. Guns intended for Rumania were presently discovered in the Ural Mountains and vast quantities of munitions remained at Archangel.

At the outset of the campaign the Rumanian problem was twofold, Rumania had to face two eventualities represented by an existing army in the Bulgarian frontier regions and by the sure arrival of an Austro-German force on the northern and western frontiers beyond the Transylvanian Alps. But at the moment Transylvania was empty of all but a few divisions of garrison troops. Some effort must be made westward, because there was already gathering on the flank of Lechitsky's forces in the Bukowina a counter-offensive, designed to restore the situation which had been compromised by Brusiloff's series of victories in June and subsequently.

The temptation was to extend this necessary operation into a real invasion of Transylvania, the passage of the mountains, and the occupation of Transylvanian territory until the line should run straight from Dorna Watra, where the Rumanians made contact with the Russians, straight down to the Iron Gates. This would shorten the extended front by a third, give the Rumanians the advantage of lateral communication behind the new front—a thing that was lacking, if they stood at the frontier—and it would instantly liberate a large portion of the territory which all Rumanians looked forward to seeing incorporated in their national domain as a result of the war.

The danger of such a venture—the fatal danger, as it was to develop all too soon—lay in the fact that if Rumania sent her masses northward, the Dobrudja district would be open to immediate invasion from Bulgaria and even Bucharest would be exposed to ultimate peril when the enemy forces south of the Danube reached sufficient strength.


All turned upon the attitude of Bulgaria, and the tactics of Bulgaria, with respect of Serbia a year before, gave a fair indication of what might be expected now. On the other hand, imperious directions came from

Petrograd to Bucharest for the invasion of Transylvania, coupled with the assurance that Bulgaria would remain neutral so far as Rumania was concerned; in fact, it was the identical assurance which, before Mackensen had struck south, had come to Belgrade in 1915, while Bulgaria was still unmobilized and a Serbian army on foot could have struck the Bulgarians down.

Had Bulgaria been actually an enemy, Rumania then would have had no choice but to go south and dispose of the Bulgarian force before she turned north and this was possible, because it was bound to take time for the Austrians and Germans to get together a force to attack Rumania. Moreover, this course would give promise of an eventual junction with the Salonica army, which was bound to advance when once the Bulgarian forces before it were drawn northward to defend Sofia. The result might have been a fairly accurate repetition of the events in the Second Balkan War, three years before.

Advised by Russia, however, that Bulgaria would not take a hand, Rumania sent her armies across the Transylvanian frontier on the first day of the war. This frontier was three hundred miles in extent and followed the crest of the Carpathian Mountains, which made a fairly regular right angle, enclosing Transylvania on two sides and separating it from Wallachia on the south and Moldavia on the east. These mountains were cut by a number of passes, the chief of which on the southern side of the right angle and from west to east were the Vulkan, the Red Tower, and the Predeal, and on the east side, from south to north, the Oitoz, Gyimes, and Bekas.

Rumanian forces were divided into four armies—three of them destined to invade Hungarian territory and the fourth, whose mission it was to defend the Danubian frontier and the Dobrudja district between Selistria on the river and Kavarna on the sea. The mission of the First Army was to pass the mountains by the Vulcan Pass and seize Hermannstadt; of the Second, to penetrate the Predeal Pass and take Kronstadt, while the Army of the North—always preserving its contact with Lechitsky's Russian forces—was to advance through all three of the eastern passes. If the invasion was pushed with sufficient speed



A-A LIMIT OF RUMANIAN ADVANCE. B FALKENHAYN'S ADVANCE.  
 C MACKENSEN'S ADVANCE. ■ ■ ■ LIMIT OF GERMAN ADVANCE.

the Rumanians could hope to absorb all of the Transylvanian territory enclosed by the two sides of the right angle, occupy the valley of the middle Maros, and turn to their own uses the very considerable number of railroads in the occupied districts, which were admirably adapted to aid an army that had reached the Maros Valley.

We have, then, the objectives of the invasion clearly defined, and during September they were all, in large part, realized. The Army of the North reached the edge of the Maros Valley at Parajd; the Second Army took Kronstadt; the First Army arrived before Hermannstadt, but was unable to occupy it. Meantime, events to the south were taking

a serious turn. First of all, Bulgaria promptly declared war upon Rumania, so that all the calculations based upon Bulgarian neutrality went into the discard. Secondly, on September 7, Mackensen—taking command of the forces of Bulgarians, Turks, and Germans immediately available—pushed across the Dobrudja frontier, destroyed one Rumanian division about Turtukai on the Danube, and drove the other division of covering troops back toward the vital Constanza-Bucharest railway.

Instantly it became necessary to detach troops from the armies engaged in the invasion of Transylvania and send them southward across the mountains to the Dobrudja. Arrived there they did temporarily arrest Mackensen well south of the Constanza railway, but their departure fatally compromised the Transylvanian campaign. Meantime Mackensen, having accomplished his purpose, halted, and proceeded to organize the reinforcements which were swiftly sent to him from Austria and from Germany. Henceforth, while matters were beginning to go badly in the north, a new menace was gathering in the south. Already Rumania was beginning to be fatally caught between the upper and the lower millstones.

#### V. FALKENHAYN AND MACKENSEN

At the outset of the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania there was little resistance; refugees from the invaded districts, which were German and partly Magyar in population, flowed back to Vienna and to Budapest; there was great commotion in the Hungarian Parliament and passionate appeals to Berlin for aid. These appeals were heard. Falkenhayn—who had been succeeded on the General Staff by the great Hindenburg, as a consequence of the Verdun failure—was assigned to command the army that Germany at once began to organize for a counter-offensive.

It was a powerful force, too, which Hindenburg entrusted to his predecessor. First and last, the Central Powers employed not less than thirty-seven divisions against the Rumanians of which twenty were first-line German units. But powerful as was this force, numerically

# IN THE PATH OF WAR



A SYMBOL OF KULTUR


*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

It was through no will or intention of the Germans that the saints on either side of the cross were spared.

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

**THIS WAS A VILLAGE**

The ruined village of Farbus, captured by the Canadians






Photograph by Central News Photo Service

THIS WAS A FARM

Shelling the ruins of towns and villages seemed to give the Teutons positive pleasure. They kept it up as long as anything remained standing.

THIS WAS A HOSPITAL  
This is a typical example of Hun inhumanity. The picture shows the interior of the St. John Hospital, Venice, after bombardment by the Germans



*Photograph by Western News Paper Union*

THIS WAS A CHURCH

The ruins were still under shell-fire when this picture was taken





THIS WAS A TOWN—BAPAUME

*Photograph from Central News Photo Service*

The church in the square at Bapaume, taken while the town was burning

“No blade of grass was ever seen  
Where Attila and his hosts had been.”—Old Ballad



#### THIS WAS A ROAD

This road, one of the magnificent highways of France, had been all but obliterated by German shells. If any trees were left standing after the bombardment, they were girdled or cut down.

Photograph by Central News Photo Service

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

THIS IS NOT A SCENE IN ANCIENT GREECE, BUT ONE IN MODERN FRANCE

Mesnil-les-Hurlus was destroyed with German thoroughness—especially the church. But what is left standing is still suggestive of beauty



and otherwise—and the German contingent was as strong as the forces which had been thrown against Verdun in the first month of attack—its artillery train was even more imposing. Once more Germany proposed to destroy an enemy—as she had destroyed Belgian, Serbian, and Russian armies—by bringing to bear upon its victim a vast mass of heavy artillery, to meet which the opposing commanders could only employ field pieces.

The German counter-offensive was launched on September 20 and two groups of armies were employed: that directed against the south side of the Transylvania right angle included the Ninth German Army commanded by German generals; the force sent against the eastern side was mainly Austrian and under the direction of the Archduke Joseph; but Falkenhayn was commander-in-chief. On the date of the opening of the counter-offensive the Rumanians were still somewhat east of the valley of the middle Maros, facing west, from Dorna Watra to Orsova, on a line which curved in slightly at the centre.

Falkenhayn's strategy was simple. He would throw his main mass of manœuvre against first one and then another of the Rumanian armies, defeat them in detail, push through the Predeal Pass, and, debouching in the Wallachian Plain, join hands with Mackensen, come north across the Danube, under the walls of Bucharest. This operation, if it achieved maximum success, would cut off all the Rumanian armies west of the Dimbovitză (on which Bucharest stands), prevent their retreat toward the Russians, and capture them.

The opening blow fell upon the First Rumanian Army standing before Hermannstadt; it was heavily beaten, driven south through the Vulcan Pass, one section of its force separated from the main body and driven eastward upon the Second Army, standing about Kronstadt. The next blow fell upon this Second Army, which was now standing with its flank uncovered by the retreat of the First Army. Defeated about Kronstadt the Second Army was compelled to retire upon the Predeal Pass. Meantime the Army of the North, its flank uncovered by the retreat of the Second Army, had no choice but to retire to the Moldavian boundary. The invasion of Transylvania was now a thing

of the past. There remained the question of the defence of Rumanian territory from the threatened invasion of Falkenhayn.

Meantime, the moment had arrived for Mackensen to move again. The Rumanian armies were heavily engaged to the north, desperately seeking to prevent the enemy from coming southward. Accordingly, in the third week of October, Mackensen suddenly took the offensive on the Dobrudja front, pushed northward across the Constanza railway, occupied Constanza on October 22, and thus cut Rumania off from her one seaport, interrupted the main line of water communication between Rumania and Russia, and occupied a considerable portion of the Dobrudja province. His offensive again came to a standstill upon the arrival of two Russian divisions sent by Brusiloff, which arrived too late to save Constanza.

In the same period Falkenhayn had been trying to get through the Predeal Pass, nearest to Bucharest, but had been checked. He had been no more successful at the Red Tower Pass to the west and had suffered a preliminary check at the Vulcan. But Rumania was not capable of presenting equal strength at four points: at the Predeal, the Red Tower, and the Vulcan Passes, and before Mackensen in the Dobrudja. The inevitable weak point was at the Vulcan Pass and in the first fortnight of November the moment had arrived when, with the weak point exposed and the preparations made, Falkenhayn could deal the decisive blow.

This blow was the defeat of Ter Jiu, in the upper reaches of the Jiu River, where this stream emerges from the mountains and enters the Wallachian Plain. November 17 the First Rumanian Army was decisively beaten. The invaders, preceded by a mass of cavalry, swept down into the plain, cutting off the troops defending the frontier toward the Iron Gates and, wheeling into line between the Danube and the mountains, began an irresistible march toward Bucharest. Faced with disaster, the Rumanians retired behind the Alt, which comes down from the mountains through Red Tower Pass and flows straight across the Plain to the Danube.

Before this line could be made good, however, the Germans to the

RUMANIA IN THE LION'S JAWS.



BLACK SHOWS TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE CENTRAL POWERS. A-VULCAN PASS. B-RED TOWER PASS. C-PREDEAL AND TOMOS PASS. D-GYMES PASS. E-BEKAS PASS.

north descended through Red Tower Pass and occupied positions east of the Alt and between it and Bucharest. Meantime, while the Rumanians were endeavouring to rally behind the Argelu—another river crossing the plain parallel to the Alt and constituting the last natural defence of the Rumanian capital—Mackensen forced the passage of the Danube, east of the point where the Argelu enters the larger river; his point of passage was at Sistova, where the Russians had crossed in 1877. In the first days of December Mackensen and Falkenhayn had united before Bucharest, and Falkenhayn's northern army was already on the flank of the last position on which Bucharest could be defended.

The last battle—that for the capital, the Battle of the Argelu—was over by December 4. In its last stages three Russian divisions fought, but the aid had come too late. Bucharest was evacuated on December 5 and occupied by the armies of the victorious Central Powers on the following day. In the next few days the Rumanian army, not without grave difficulty, slipped out of the enveloping arms of Mackensen and Falkenhayn and retired upon the lines of Sereth, covering the region between the Danube and the Moldavian stretches of the Carpathians. Two thirds of Rumania was in enemy hands; the Government had fled to Jassy, on the Russian frontier; the Rumanian army had lost more than 300,000 men, two thirds in casualties and the balance in prisoners. In their retreat the Rumanians had fired their great oil wells and burned their wheat crops, but if the booty of the Germans was far less than they had expected, the defeat of Rumania was absolute; she had been temporarily ruined. Once more, as in the last Russo-Turkish War, the intervention of her armies had averted a prospective Russian disaster, for had the forces thrown against Averescu's Rumanian armies been used against Brusiloff, another Dunajec might have resulted. Once more, as after Plevna, Rumania's reward was to be the sacrifice of her own territory—and, this time, of her own political and economic freedom.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### SALONICA AND MONASTIR

#### I AT SALONICA

In the general scheme of the combined Allied offensives, the Salonica army had been counted upon to act against Bulgaria. When Rumania entered the war the obvious necessity to use every effort to contain Bulgarian troops in Macedonia and prevent their transfer to the Rumanian front gave new value to the Salonica force. But neither before nor after Rumania's entrance could this army accomplish anything of material value.

The reasons were almost innumerable. In the first place, the Army of the Orient had been sent to Salonica to save the Serbs; it arrived too late to accomplish its purpose and, instead of reaching Uskub, it was compelled to retire hastily upon Salonica. Then began a long debate as to whether an army should be maintained in the Orient or the Salonica force be recalled as that of Gallipoli had been. The soldiers argued for recall, the politicians were divided. Briand in France at last exercised the decisive influence and the army stayed. But having decided to maintain an army in the Near East, the politicians who had overborne the soldiers now compromised with them and permitted the soldiers to neglect the army.

To command on the new front France sent Sarrail—an unwise appointment made at the behest of Joffre, who was eager to get out of France a political general who deserved his evil opinion. Sarrail was the friend of Caillaux and of Malvy; he was supported by their political influence, and that influence was at no time exerted for the decisive military victory that the French nation and its allies sought. In Salonica Sarrail did no material harm, but he accomplished no great result. Ultimately, when Clemenceau came to the helm in France, he was re-

called, but until Clemenceau did come, no one dared to disturb the friend of such powerful politicians.

But even had Sarrail been a Foch or a Pétain, his task in the Orient would still have been well-nigh impossible. Such troops as were sent him were in the main of the least tactical value. They were a strange assortment of the colonials of all the nations at war, and to them were added Russians and Italians. The best single unit was the Serbian army, which was presently reorganized by France and sent back from Corfu; but this was long in coming.

Meantime, with the relatively weak force at his immediate call, Sarrail had to transform Salonica into an entrenched camp capable of resisting the assault of a German army if the Kaiser should presently decide to complete his domination of the Balkans by driving into the sea the intruders at Salonica. This involved the construction of railways, roads, and innumerable trenches and fortifications; it involved, also, the transformation of the harbour of Salonica, destitute of all the machinery of a modern port.

Difficult in itself, the task was rendered even more burdensome by the political circumstances. The Allies were on Greek soil, whither they had come at the invitation of the Greek Premier, Venizelos, who had sought to throw his country into the alliance against Germany. But Venizelos had failed and fallen. King Constantine was now in complete control and his sympathies and his influence were all with his brother-in-law, the Kaiser. Unable to compel the Allied army to quit Salonica, he used every possible means to impede it. His garrisons were hostile, his civil officials were invariably obstructive.

Even more grotesque were certain other circumstances. As Salonica was a Greek city and Greece nominally a neutral nation, representatives of the Central Powers, consular and diplomatic, continued to live in it and to serve their governments. Every ship that entered the port bringing men or munitions was duly reported; every movement of troops promptly described to hostile general staffs. And while every instrumentality of the Greek Government was employed to impede the Allies, it was with equal industry serving the interests of the Central

Powers. Actually Sarrail occupied a hostile city, with none of the powers which usually accrue to a general commanding an army in similar circumstances.

Worst of all was the ever-present possibility, destined to increase with the months, that, in addition to an attack from the avowed enemy on the north, Sarrail might have to face an onslaught from the rear by the Greek army and made in close coördination with a German offensive launched from the Vardar Valley. In this situation the Allied statesmen shuffled and the Allied army suffered. The situation was impossible and intolerable, and yet it was not cleared up satisfactorily during all of 1916.

## II. INCIDENTS

At the outset of the year the condition of the Allies in Salonica was almost incredible. They had constructed landward defences, still inadequate but now considerable. But the forts at the entrance to the harbour—Karaburnu, in particular—were in Greek hands and the guns and the garrison were ready, at the slightest pretext, to fire upon Allied shipping and Allied troops. Not until German air raids had roused Sarrail was any step taken to abolish a situation which was as dangerous as it was absurd. But on January 28, after amusing preliminary performances, Karaburnu was taken over by the Allies. Somewhat later the consular and other agents of the enemy powers were sent away, but before this there occurred a new incident.

Greece was at peace with Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian army had halted at the Greek frontier in its pursuit of the French and British troops who had sought to rescue the Serbs at the Greek frontier. But on May 26 the Greek garrison, holding Fort Ruppel—which commanded the outlet of the Struma Valley and thus the direct road from Sofia to the Ægean—surrendered to a Bulgarian force. The surrender was at the direct command of the Greek King, who negotiated a loan of \$15,000,000 from Germany as a payment. Its consequences were serious for the Salonica army.

Hitherto there had only been a northern front, but now the Bulgars

came south and occupied all of the Kavala-Drama district, all of the Greek territory east of the Struma, seized the Adrianople-Salonica railway east of the Struma, and thus possessed themselves of a valuable line of communication. Henceforth their troops could be munitioned and supplied by this railway line and the difficulties incident to the transport of men and material over the mountain trails of the Struma Valley was abolished. Sarrail had now to watch the Struma and to be on his guard against an attack from the east as well as from the north.

The campaign of 1916 for the Salonica army was to be a push up the Vardar Valley, but the push never was made for the Bulgarians anticipated Sarrail and thrust southward, across the Greek frontier at Florina and along the Monastir-Salonica railway. They began their attack on August 17 and in the next few days came south as far as Ostrovo Lake, driving the Serbs before them. Again there was Greek treachery and the Greek frontier guards discreetly retired in advance of the Bulgarian attack.

As a result of this new thrust Salonica was now threatened from the east, along the Adrianople-Salonica railway; from the north, down the Vardar Valley along the Salonica-Belgrade railway; and from the west, along the Monastir-Salonica railway. Always, too, there was the possibility that the Greek army would strike from the south and join hands with the Bulgars at Lake Ostrovo. The Bulgarian offensive, however, was checked and the danger from the west temporarily abolished, but the invaders continued to hold their conquests.

Meantime, events in Greece were taking a favourable turn at last. The Greeks of Macedonia—seeing Kavala and Drama surrendered to the hereditary enemy, seeing the Bulgars advancing from the west, knowing that the entrance of a Bulgarian force into Salonica would mean the extinction of Hellenic rule in this portion of Macedonia—suddenly rose against their king and, in the last days of August, Sarrail recognized the revolutionists. A little later, on October 9, Venizelos came to Salonica and assumed direction of the new government, which had the support of the Greeks in the islands and in Macedonia. This new government declared war upon the Central Alliance and began

to enlist troops for service against the Bulgars, but Constantine still ruled in Athens and controlled the mainland as far as the immediate environs of Salonica itself.

All this time negotiating and bickering were going forward between Constantine and the Allies. Greece was blockaded and then the blockade was raised, as a result of a paper concession of the King, never realized in fact. All the time the hostility of the King grew, the activity of the German agents increased. In December, eighty-three French sailors were murdered in Athens and there was a general killing of the Venizelist leaders by the King's adherents. Short of the removal of the King no solution of the problem was possible, but to the very last moment Allied governments could not make up their mind to take this step. The result was the constant hampering of Sarrail's plans, for he had ever to guard against an attack from the rear and by the Greeks, while facing the open enemy in the field.

### III. MONASTIR

It was not until September 13 that the Army of the Orient was at last able to take the field. The plans for an offensive up the Vardar Valley had been upset by the Bulgarian thrust south from Monastir, the possibility of using the army as a whole in any offensive had been thwarted by the Greek surrender of Fort Ruppel, which had opened the flank toward the Struma to an enemy attack and the very menacing attitude of the Greek army in the rear, which seemed always about to assail the Allies.

With a relatively restricted force, consisting of Serbs, French, and Russians, Sarrail began his operation at the close of the second week in September by driving the Bulgarians back from Ostrovo Lake. He advanced astride the roads and railway leading to Monastir. As he advanced he forced the Bulgarians back upon their final positions, covering Monastir, and stretched across the lower end of the Plain of Monastir to the mountains on either side of the Cerna River, where it makes its great northward bend.

In all the fighting of this campaign the greater task belonged to the

Serbs and the most distinguished generalship was revealed by their commander, Marshal Mishitch. In the first days of November the Serbs at last stood on their own soil again. In the next few days they drove northward along the high mountains in the bend of the Cerna, which command the plain and the defences of Monastir. On November 17 and 18 the Serbs cleared the eastern hills and the defence of the place was no longer possible. On November 19—the fourth anniversary of their capture of the town in the First Balkan War—the Serbs again controlled Monastir, although the town was actually occupied by French troops, whose advance along the plain had been made possible by the Serbian successes on the heights.

Unhappily the victory could have no considerable consequences. Rumania was already beaten, and no pressure upon Bulgaria in this quarter could be of use to the stricken ally. Winter had come to the Balkans; the mountains were covered with snow; and, worst of all, new activities of the Greek army to the south and in the rear of the troops at Salonica compelled Sarrail to send French troops south to guard against a hostile move on the part of Constantine.

As a consequence, it was not even possible to clear the hills north of Monastir, much less push northward over Babuna Pass to the Vardar Valley or by Resna to Ochrida and the Drin Valley. Accordingly, enemy artillery on the heights continued to pound the troops in Monastir and the town itself had to be evacuated by its civil population. The Allies had taken Monastir, they continued to hold it, but the possession had no military value; and, as long as they held the hills above the city, the Bulgars suffered no material loss by their defeat.

With the taking of Monastir the Balkan campaign ends. Nearly two years were to pass before the city reappeared in the official reports of battles or the country in the bend of the Cerna saw severe and sustained fighting. Henceforth the Salonica adventure steadily lost value in the eyes of Allied general staffs. With the fall of Rumania Germany had acquired new avenues from her own and Austrian soil to Bulgarian and Turkish territory. The Danube was open from the head of navigation to its mouth. The Rumanian railways were available. A thrust

up the Vardar Valley to Nish, thus cutting the Belgrade-Sofia link in the Vienna-Constantinople railway, could no longer sever the single life line between the northern and central members of the Central Alliance.

The great opportunity for the Allies in the Balkans had been lost in 1915 when Serbia had been suffered to go to disaster while British and French forces waged their futile fight at Gallipoli. If Rumania could have struck down Bulgaria at the outset of her campaign in 1916 it might have been possible for Sarrail to join hands with Averescu across Bulgaria, as the Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians were on the point of doing when Bulgaria gave up the struggle in 1913. But with the collapse of Rumania, the Allies lost their last immediate hope in the Balkans and for two years Salonica was to lose interest for the world, and its army be forgotten in the rush of events on the western front. When it did reappear, however, the consequences of a single victory were destined to justify all the efforts, realize all the hopes, and endorse all the claims of the champions of the Army of the Orient.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

#### I THE EFFECT OF BUCHAREST

With the fall of Bucharest the campaign of 1916 ends. It had been, all things considered, the bloodiest and most terrible campaign of the first three years of the war. Verdun, the Somme, and Brusiloff's offensive had involved the sacrifice of more human lives than had been exacted as the price of any single campaign in human history. And with the fall of Bucharest all the hopes and aspirations of the western powers and the western publics went instantly to dust and ashes; in place of optimism, little warranted by the facts, there now succeeded a period of gloom and despondency which the enemy was to turn to his own advantage.

Looking backward over the progress of the campaign of 1916 we can now see that there was not the smallest chance that either contestant could achieve a decision in it. The larger strategy of both groups of nations was equally based upon misconceptions. The Germans had attacked Verdun in the late winter, convinced that France was bled white and that the moment was ripe for the final thrust. Nothing could have been more absurd. France had suffered, but she had reserves; she had not merely divisions and corps, but armies—available for attack as well as defence—and the French spirit in and out of the army was, in 1916, unshaken. The result was the unmistakable defeat of the Crown Prince before Verdun and the German loss of the offensive in the west.

In the same fashion Austria had attacked Italy, convinced that heavy artillery, massed in the Trentino, would repeat the success achieved in Serbia the previous autumn against troops at least as good as the Italian but similarly destitute of heavy artillery. Moreover, Berlin and Vienna were equally convinced that Russia had been so

heavily beaten in the previous year that any new Russian offensive, while the Verdun and Italian operations were in progress, was unthinkable. Here, again, was a singular misconception. Russia was capable of another great effort—her last, to be sure—but this effort was to tax Austria-Hungary to the uttermost and make demands upon Germany which were at least awkward to meet.

On the other hand, Allied estimates of the conditions existing in enemy countries were even more grotesque. The firm conviction that Germany and Austria were starving, that the people of these countries believed themselves beaten, that German man-power was failing, a child-like faith in the resources of Russia imagined to be without limit, a blindness to the growing exhaustion of the Russian nation, moral as well as economic; above all, an inability to see the struggle as a whole or to perceive the western struggles in their true perspective; all these errors of judgment and calculation led to bitter disappointment following severe military defeats.

There was still an absence of unity of thought, interest, or strategy in the Allied countries. In France the necessities of the situation imposed a certain coördination of military operations, but even this was restricted. Actually not one but half a dozen wars were being conducted against Germany and Austria, against Bulgaria and Turkey, by the nations of the opposing group and each of the nations striking at the Central Powers was conducting its operations in conformity with its own strategy, its own policy, and its own theory of the necessary political and economic readjustments of the period after the war.

The result was chaos, only a little modified by occasional crises when the very greatness of some immediate peril imposed upon all concerned the necessity for some momentary harmonizing of activities. The result of this lack of central, directing authority and vision was to be seen in the disaster in Mesopotamia, the failure to turn to any profitable end the enormous investment of men and material at Salonica, in the shuffling policy with respect to Bulgaria in 1915, and with respect of Greece all through 1916. As a consequence, so utterly inconsiderable and personally insignificant a personage as King Constantine was able,

in the presence of his amazed and bewildered subjects, to flout the Great Powers of Europe and thwart their plans, murder their soldiers, and, with long-continuing impunity, wage war under their noses, while still preserving his highly placed champions in London and in Petrograd.

By contrast Austro-German policy—the policy of the whole group of Central Powers—was made in Germany. The Turks in Mesopotamia, the Austrians in Volhynia, the Bulgarians in the Dobrudja and Macedonia, quite as much as the Germans at Verdun and the Somme, marched to the same orders and responded to a single impulse. Germany fought one war; her foes, a dozen. She sought one objective at a time, her foes pursued innumerable ends simultaneously. For her single purpose Germany mobilized an immense army and a vast train of artillery; she never had more than one major operation in view at a given moment, and, for this, she had ever the necessary resources. Thus it was that, with an inferior population, an infinitely smaller reservoir of men, material, and money, the Central Powers were constantly able to thwart the undertakings of foes who, in all fields, were now becoming the superiors of their enemies in all that material and man-power could mean.

The Rumanian campaign was the best example of the German method. Rumania was coerced into her declaration of war by a Russian Ministry already dominated by defeatist sentiments; Rumania was to be the sacrifice by which Stuermer was to save Brusiloff and the prestige of the Russian army; but with the defeat of Rumania, peace by negotiation was to come. Yet Russia's allies, oblivious of the conditions within the Slav nation and to the influences dominating the Government, joined with the Stuermer Cabinet in exerting pressure upon Rumania, which could only result in throwing a Rumanian army, without heavy artillery or any of the vital equipment of war, against the German veterans, who were supplied with unlimited resources in guns and in munitions.

All through 1916, as in the previous campaign, the Allies were hypnotized by the western front. London and Paris could not perceive the fact that Russia was sinking, would not listen to the few informed

voices which uttered warnings deserving at least of passing attention. While Haig and Foch were taking a few hectares of Picardy, Russia was swiftly, surely, sinking into hopeless weakness. Another year was to disclose Russia gone; German victory in the east, as in the Balkans, established; German armies in the west preparing for the final campaign, which should abolish the last danger to Mitteleuropa and place William II in a grander and more secure position than Napoleon had ever occupied.

Three great western powers were conducting a World War as if it were for each of them a separate war; they were conducting it with a vision as limited as that of a provincial or colonial public. Britain did not understand France; French impatience at the delay in British preparations; Anglo-French misapprehension of Italy and blindness to Italian problems; the complete ignorance on the part of Britain, France, and Italy as to the truth about Russia—these were circumstances that must puzzle future generations. They led to mistakes which almost lost the war; they were mistakes which were not remedied until Ludendorff had well-nigh won the war in Picardy in March, 1918, and impending ruin at last imposed upon the western allies that essential unity of command and of purposes which alone could be the foundation of victory.

By contrast, Germany's mistakes were less obvious and, in a sense, less culpable. The German saw the smaller facts as they were. He knew always what objective he sought and he bent the will of his allies until they joined in the pursuit of his objective, or he modified his objectives in such fashion as to embrace operations dear to the hearts of his allies and which might contribute to his own ends. He was not led into any error because he overestimated the value of the west or ascribed to a minor operation the value of a major campaign. His miscalculations had a sound basis; he knew what was going on in Russia, but his conclusion that, as a result of domestic conditions, Russia was already out of the war in June, was a premature conclusion; he perceived the terrible difficulties of the Italian situation, but in sending Austrian troops to the Trentino, he anticipated the hour when a great blow might

do almost incalculable harm. In 1917 he accomplished, in respect of Russia and Italy, what he had failed to achieve in 1916.

Only one mistake of the German was capital, colossal; he continued to think solely in material terms. He could not understand the spiritual forces which he had enlisted against him; he could not estimate the material importance of the moral indignation he had roused all over the world; he could not understand the spirit of France—revealed at the Marne and again, in even greater splendour, at Verdun. He could not understand that, having sought the life of the several nations at war with him, he must expect that these nations—however stupid and clumsy their leadership, however faulty their military commanders—would fight for their lives, refusing all accommodations possible between rivals contending for some prize in territory or trade, but inconceivable between men fighting—on the one hand, at least—for their lives, the existence of their country, the permanence of their civilization; every one of which had been placed in jeopardy by the German attack fighting in very truth for all that men hold worth while.

## II. THE RESULT

Looked at from the largest possible perspective, there can be no questioning the fact that Germany had won the campaign of 1916. She had not taken Verdun or occupied Venetia; she had suffered local reverses at the Somme, and Austria had endured approximate disasters in Galicia, Bukowina, and Volhynia; even Bulgaria had lost Monastir; but never was the relative unimportance of geographical incidents more clearly emphasized.

The central purpose of German strategy in 1916 had been based upon the assumption that in 1915 Germany had won the war, provided that what had been gained could be held. Frederick the Great had seized Silesia in the first hours of his initial campaign. Thereafter he had held it through long years of war—years in which his strategy and his ambition had been comprehended in the determination to retain what he had seized. The case of William II was wholly analogous, although the stakes were immeasurably greater.



*From a painting by Lieut. Henry Farre. Courtesy, *Illustrated London News*.*

#### AN AÉRIAL COLLISION

Between a Baby Nieuport and a German Rumpler. The German plane had been in the habit of coming over the French trenches for photographs and had always returned safely to its lines. On this day three French airplanes attacked the Boche on his return. Quartermaster de Ferline, arriving at the proper altitude, noticed that his two companions had been forced to abandon the pursuit—from motor trouble as it happened. Ferline, thinking his two comrades wounded, dashed at his adversary 3,500 feet above the earth and sent the German machine crashing to the ground.



At the opening of the campaign of 1916 Germany had in her hands the framework of that Mitteleuropa which had been the dream of her patriots and her statesmen for at least half a century. From the Baltic to the lower Euphrates, from the Pripet Marshes to the Belgian Coast, one will reigned and one purpose prevailed. More than 150,000,000 people were gathered within the firing lines, which had become the frontiers of Europe; if Germany could preserve this colossal creation throughout the war—as Frederick the Great had retained Silesia in the face of all Europe—a few years of peaceful organization under German direction would make this solid block of territory the seat of the greatest empire since the days of Rome, and give to the German Emperor the right to speak in the tone of the Cæsars.

The sole object of German military strategy, now, was to preserve this magnificent edifice, to repel the attacks from without, to seek to shorten the period of strain by counter-offensives. Two dangers and two alone threatened: the one was a military defeat, such as Leipsic, which should compel the Germans to quit their conquered districts, as Napoleon had been compelled in 1813 to retire from Germany, leaving his allies and subject nationalities to fall the willing or reluctant prey of his conquerors. The other peril was that too great prolongation of the war might so exhaust Germany as to render her incapable of harvesting where she had sown.

But of the two dangers only one was immediate. The German was still fascinated by the splendour of his achievement and enthralled by the brilliance of the prospect while his morale, his will to win, was unbroken. It was only necessary to repel the enemy at the gates of Mitteleuropa. It was only essential to preserve the edifice by campaigns which, whether defensive or offensive, should bring to nothing the efforts of the enemy to burst into the territory of the Central Powers, to isolate Bulgaria and Turkey from Austria and Germany, to bring Austria to her knees by invasion and defeat, to compel the German armies to retire from France and eastern Belgium, as a prelude to a retreat to the Rhine and to German territory.

And this danger had been fully met. More than this, the campaign

against Rumania had completed the task of rounding out the frontiers of Mitteleuropa. While Rumania was neutral and preserved her economic and political independence, the corridor from Austria to Bulgaria was narrow, the single railway passing through it from Vienna by Belgrade to Sofia and Constantinople was within striking distance of the Salonica army, while the Danube, the true artery of the Central European group, was commanded by Rumanian guns from the Iron Gate to the Black Sea.

But with Rumania crushed, the Danube—in Lincoln's vigorous phrase applied to the Mississippi after the fall of Vicksburg—"flowed unvexed to the sea." All the Rumanian railways were in German hands, and the interruption of traffic upon the Belgrade-Sofia route would have not the smallest effect upon German communications with her Balkan and Asiatic allies. Moreover, in taking Constanza, Germany had laid the foundation for future domination of the Black Sea. Once Russia should fall, the Black Sea would become—like the Baltic—a "closed sea," and the main trunk line descending from Germany to Constanza would be the route by which German troops would descend to pass the Black Sea and take foot upon its eastern shores, where the Caucasus railway begins its march to the frontiers of India.

Rumania, too, with its great oil resources and its wheat fields, was an important item in Pan-German calculations. It had escaped the German influence because the Rumanian Government and the Rumanian people alike had cherished ambitions which could be gratified only by the mutilation of Austrian and Hungarian frontiers. But these dreams had been extinguished in the defeats of the autumn, which had cost Rumania all but a shadow of her old independence and of her former territory. By contrast with the occupation of Rumania to the Sereth, the loss of territory in Bukowina, in Galicia, in Picardy, in the Isonzo region, was nothing. Not a foot of territory vital to the Mitteleuropa conception had been lost. When the campaign of 1916 came to its dismal close Germany had achieved all that was necessary for her to achieve, she had defended her conquests, she had increased the area of her empire at the single vulnerable point. In exchange,

she had sold to Russia, to Britain, and to France, certain territories of minor value at prices which were prohibitive—territories which she would in the east presently regain without cost to herself.

In point of fact, Germany had done more; she had substantially broken the Russian power for war; she had furnished to Austria the men, the guns, and the generals, with which the great Brusiloff offensive had been slowly beaten down. Had Rumania remained neutral the force thrown against that state might have been used against Russia and the result would have been equally disastrous, but in this field Germany could afford to wait. Events were ripening, Russia was disintegrating so rapidly that an attack, which might have encountered sharp preliminary resistance in 1916, would bring down the whole military edifice in swift ruin a year later.

The campaign of 1916 is, then, the final operation in the east. By it Germany at last accomplished the purpose she had undertaken in the autumn of 1914, when affairs in Galicia had recalled her from the still undecided conflict beside the Yser. In 1915 she had sought to crush Russia while holding firm on the west, and thus to preserve the opportunity to resume her offensive in France when the eastern campaign should be terminated. At the outset of 1916, misjudging the extent to which Russia had been crippled, she tried at Verdun, again seeking a western decision. Recalled to the east by Russia's victories and again condemned to the defensive in the west, she held her western positions with only minor losses of ground, while she disposed of Rumania and dealt to the Russian military power blows from which it was not to recover.

The Allied strategy had envisaged a concentric attack, that "encirclement," so much in German mouths, before the war and now translated into military terms. But when this strategy had been put into operation, Germany, while holding the western Allies, turned east and crushed Russia. At last her hands were becoming freed for the decisive campaign in the west. The next time she struck in France she would have no anxieties on her frontiers from the Baltic to the Black Sea. From the outset of the war Germany had said: "I must hold my west-

ern enemies while I defeat the eastern foe"; or, as at the Marne: "I must crush France before Russia can become dangerous." It had taken more time than the Germans had calculated upon, the effort and strain had been far more considerable, but in December, 1916, the end was at last in sight. The circle of steel and fire, so frequently described in Allied discussions of the war, was become—on one side at least, for half the circumference—little more than a ring of smoke which was destined to dissolve before another year had ended and leave Germany free to deal with France and with Britain. Unhappily for herself, while getting rid of an old enemy, Germany was to arouse a new antagonist and the United States was to appear in Russia's place before Germany could exploit the advantage gained by the elimination of the Slav.

As to the moral advantage of the 1916 campaign no one who recalls the effect upon the western world of the announcement of the fall of Bucharest can question that it belonged to Germany. The emotion was like that excited by the fall of Antwerp; neither event had great immediate military importance, but each was symbolical. The fall of Antwerp heralded the arrival of German armies at the coast, witnessed the extinction of Belgian independence, and testified to the complete falsity of the western view that Germany was beaten and in retreat. The fall of Bucharest was a decisive demonstration that German manpower and military strength had not been broken at Verdun or the Somme, that the Russian victories in Galicia had been inconclusive, that the war was no nearer a victorious conclusion. On the contrary, for the first time, whispers were heard in London and Paris that the war might, after all, be lost. The promises of victory immediate and decisive, mainly based upon the Verdun, Somme, and Russian campaigns, had raised hopes which, falling, gave place to fears destined to have grave substantiation in the next year.

But the fall of Bucharest had more than a moral value. For the first time the people of the western nations were able to gather something of a notion of the facts of the war. At last they were able to perceive that one nation and only one; their enemy, had a clear and ordered purpose. They saw in the results of two years and a half of war the

revelation of a guiding intelligence and an approximate appreciation of the material facts, but they saw it in their foe. They became acutely conscious of what they had hitherto only vaguely felt, namely, that neither their political leaders nor their military chiefs, not even their press and their pulpit, had seen facts as they were or pursued a definite objective with any singleness of purpose.

The public men had been deceived and had communicated their misapprehensions to their followers in statements which were grotesquely inexact. The soldiers had seen only their own little corners of a world strife and translated the taking of trenches or the retention of positions into the language of victors. The press had been muzzled; the censor had eliminated fact, and the more pliable organs had readily substituted fiction, pleasing alike to the censor and to the Government, but destitute of justification.

While Kaiser, Field Marshal, newspaper, and pulpit in Germany—in complete accord and with a single objective in mind—had marched in perfect unison, even in their lies and their mistakes carrying the German people with them—for a new victory invariably covered a previous miscalculation—the Allied statesmen quarrelled alike with themselves and with their generals; the pulpit was dumb, and the press blind or blindfolded, yet it was impossible that the masses should forever fail to see what was written on the map, what no press censorship could suppress or journalistic pen camouflage. In December, 1916, the Allied publics lost confidence in their leadership, civil and military alike. In their press they fell into a confusion which was to endure until the enemy's return to their very doors should, by arousing the instinct of self-preservation, restore determination and, by threatening military triumph, impose military unity upon his enemies. Thus, in every respect, the end of the campaign of 1916 was the passing of one phase and the opening of another.

### III. EXEUNT OMNES

As the year closed the signs of impending transformations were unmistakably revealed in the removal both of allied politicians and soldiers.

After three campaigns neither the ministers nor the generals had won the war; they had, on the whole, revealed no such competence as suggested that they could win the war. Popular judgment ran against them and popular sentiment demanded a change.

Thus in December Asquith fell. In the previous year his party government had been replaced by a coalition ministry assembled from all parties and momentarily regarded as combining "all the talents." But in fact it combined nothing. Mr. Asquith remained master of phrase, and—assured of the loyalty of his great following in the House, where his personal popularity was enormous—Sir Edward Grey continued in the Foreign Office the personification of high-minded purpose and lofty principle; unaccompanied by the slightest grasp of essential facts. Neither Asquith nor Grey gave any evidence of appreciating, after two years of struggle, the European conditions out of which, without their smallest effective suspicion, a world war had developed.

For many months Britain had been looking to Lloyd George as the one man who might win the war in public office. His past mistakes and older animosities stood in his pathway; it was not willingly that a majority of the Unionists turned to the man whose name had been anathema but a few brief years before. Mr. Asquith suited English ideas precisely as he fitted into the dignity and tradition of the House of Commons; he was a typical Englishman; of his own class, he was an ideal party and parliamentary leader; but his strength in Parliament and in peace was his fatal weakness in war. He lacked decision, breadth of vision, force of character. His fatal phrase—"Wait and see"—became the epitome of a policy which permitted blunder after blunder until national confidence was shaken and the apprehension of defeat was abroad.

It was by a political shifting that Lloyd George at last overset his former chief and took his place as the leader of the British Empire in one of the most critical hours of its history. The men who gave him their votes begrudged them. Popularity among the members of Parliament, such as Mr. Asquith retained even in defeat, Lloyd George never possessed; he was not trusted by those who saw in his force, his

energy, his imagination, qualities without which victory now seemed impossible. But Lloyd George had the supreme merit of having been right when Asquith was wrong in recent instances; he had solved the munition problem, when British armies were fighting with shrapnel against high explosives. He was not a safe man, as England understood safety, but the "safe" men had brought her to the edge of defeat.

In France the Briand Ministry endured one more storm but its end was marked. A far abler man than Mr. Asquith and with a wholly different tradition, M. Briand had much of his charm and many of his weaknesses. In the great international conferences he had presided with dignity and grace, he was regarded as the one available man, by French politicians and publics, who still shrank from Clemenceau yet saw no other premier. In his political career Briand was nearer to Lloyd George; like the new British chief, he had risen from the ranks, and his pathway was marked by many conflicting courses and abrupt changes. But, though he was to outlast the winter storm, the defeats of 1916 had made his ultimate retirement inevitable. Prime Ministers, like generals, cannot survive defeat indefinitely.

In Russia a far more sordid struggle was going on. Early in the year Stuermer had come with his sinister purpose. By August, Sazonoff—the ablest of the foreign ministers of the Allied governments, the most loyal and earnest champion alike of his nation's interests and of Allied solidarity—had been forced out. The treason which was abroad was openly denounced in the Duma. Stuermer and his associates were deprived of their offices but their work was done, and the patriotic ministers who succeeded them were able to accomplish little before the Russian Revolution first overthrew them and then ruined the nation which Stuermer had betrayed.

On the military side the changes were even more considerable. Kitchener was dead. On the morrow of the Battle of Jutland he had set sail for Russia, and, in a stormy night, his ship, *Hampshire*, had touched a mine and sunk. In the manner of his death and the moment of his disappearance Lord Kitchener was fortunate. His great work had been done. About him had been built the new British army, and his

name and the glamour of his personality had contributed mightily to the construction. He had been a pillar upon which the British public had rested in the early days of defeat and anxiety. He had been for the English a symbol, and if, as Clemenceau once grimly remarked, "A symbol is a man about whom some people still believe what was never true," it was at least true that the value of Kitchener as a symbol in 1914 and 1915 could hardly be exaggerated.

It would be impossible to maintain that he had been equal to his opportunities or his previous reputation. The task was beyond him and his mistakes were many. The shell scandal had grown out of his blundering. He had lacked the courage to forbid the Gallipoli expedition, which he opposed. Had he lived, he would have been bound to share the retirement of other soldiers and statesmen, whose failure was not more undeniable. All this he escaped. Still, loved, admired, trusted, a figure unique in all British public life, he perished upon a mission of danger and of duty and, thus dying, remained a symbol, his hold upon public affection and confidence unshaken.

In France, December saw Joffre lay down the great burden which he had carried for three campaigns. In becoming Marshal of France the victor of the Marne became a memory, while still living. Verdun explained his removal, although there was added to Verdun the belief that the generalissimo was growing weary. Political influence played its part, for Joffre had never been popular with the Deputies, and Chantilly, where his headquarters were, had become a word of derision in the Chambre. But at bottom the demand for victory explained the retirement of a general whose services had been great and to whom the gratitude of the whole civilized world will always be due. In the gravest crisis of the whole war Joffre had saved France; he had turned back the German flood. He had sent his staff officers to prepare for a retirement behind the Loire before the Battle of the Marne was joined, resolved to continue the struggle and unshaken in his confidence in the destiny of his country and the devotion of his army.

To succeed Joffre, Nivelle was chosen, largely through the influence of the politicians. Nivelle came to his new post with the fame of the

latest Verdun success in everyone's eyes. He was hailed as the exponent of the offensive; he and not Pétain had been chosen because there was a feeling that, like Joffre, Pétain was too cautious. Nivelle's stay was short; it led to the cruel disappointment of the Aisne; but what was lost there was retrieved when Pétain succeeded Nivelle. Neither Pétain nor Nivelle captured the imagination of the world as did the heavy, awkward figure of "Papa" Joffre—a peasant of the peasants, sturdy, solid, with a clear brain and not a few other qualities of our own Grant. Like Kitchener he left a place that was not to be filled, although, unlike Kitchener, he had earned enduring fame upon the battlefield by winning one of the decisive struggles of human history.

In Germany the changes were military. Falkenhayn fell as a consequence of failure at Verdun; Hindenburg came west, bringing with him the mysterious Ludendorff who was henceforth to grow upon the imagination of friend and foe until the day would come that he would appear to be Hindenburg, in fact. The arrival of Hindenburg was the signal for popular rejoicing in Germany, for no other soldier had won the same popularity; even the Kaiser's hold upon the admiration of his subjects was overborne by that of the victor of the Masurian Lakes and the conqueror of Tannenberg, and at this very moment a novel, describing the invasion of Britain by the old Field Marshal and his entrance into London, was selling by the million copies.

#### IV. FRANCIS JOSEPH DIES

And as if to give final emphasis to the transformation which was coming on November 22, Francis Joseph, the aged Emperor of Austria, died. Sixty-eight years had passed since the Countess Karolyi, whose son had been one of the victims of the executions following the Hungarian revolt, thus cursed the young Emperor, Francis Joseph:

"May Heaven and Hell blast his happiness! May his family be exterminated! May he be smitten in the persons of those he loves! May his life be wrecked! May his children be brought to ruin!"

Rarely in human history has a curse been more completely fulfilled than in the case of the dead Emperor. His brother, Maximilian, died

before a firing squad in Mexico; his sister-in-law lost her reason as a consequence. His only son perished in the shameful tragedy of Meyerling. His wife was murdered at Geneva. As for his other relatives, the tragedies and follies of the archdukes had long been a European by-word, and the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, at Serajevo, two years earlier, had been but the last in the long series of family and dynastic tragedies as well as the signal for the world catastrophe.

Louis XIV covered the span between the Thirty Years' War and the emergence of Modern Europe living under the new system of the balance of power. Francis Joseph, when he came to Schönbrunn as master, found about him the memories of a Napoleonic occupation not yet remote; he lived to the hour when a new Napoleonic struggle had convulsed the world.

Francis Joseph was thus the last remaining monarchic link with the Nineteenth Century. When he was young Metternich still ruled in Vienna and maintained his losing fight against the ideas and principles of the French Revolution. The great figures of the fight against Napoleon were many of them alive. When he came to power the revolution of 1848 was still in progress and men were striving to restore and to preserve the liberties of the earlier and greater French Revolution. He was still young when Cavour won Italian unity, when Bismarck created modern Germany, and both achievements were the consequences of Austrian defeats. William I, Victoria, Louis Napoleon, Victor Emmanuel; these had been his contemporaries but had now all become shades. The world he had known had also vanished. Republican institutions had returned to France and the ideas of the French Revolution, hateful to all his world, still continued to march triumphantly forward.

In the threescore and eight years during which he had reigned Francis Joseph saw all of Europe, save only his own realm, made over. The war with Napoleon III drove him out of Italy as far as Venetia; the war with Prussia expelled him from Germany and from Venetia. From that moment onward Austria declined visibly; hers was no longer

one of the dominating voices in the European councils; she became more and more the vassal of that Prussia whose rise she had opposed so long in the Eighteenth Century. For a full generation Europe had a phrase to describe the future, to express the conviction of the time when the inevitable European catastrophe was to come: "When Francis Joseph dies," men had said wisely and sadly for many, many years. But now Francis Joseph's life flickered out after the Great War had shaken the Continent for more than two years and while the future remained still obscure and the fate of his ancient empire still in doubt.

Francis Joseph was not a great emperor like Napoleon, nor yet a great king like Louis XIV. He had no wide outlook upon world affairs. He was a typical product of the Hapsburg Family, whose reactionary ideas he shared and served. When he was young the theories of Metternich ruled, and he accepted them. He fought to prevent the unity of Italy and the rise of Modern Germany. He sought to enslave the Balkans as his predecessors had endeavoured to enslave Italy. Yet Francis Joseph resembled Louis XIV in his fidelity to the task that had come to him unsought. "Farewell to my youth," he is said to have exclaimed when he was suddenly summoned to mount the Hapsburg throne as the last hope of an ancient race fallen upon evil days. No man ever worked harder, no man ever devoted himself more unsparingly to the business of ruling. He did not create, he did not transform, but he did preserve; he did ultimately, by dint of his devotion to what he conceived to be the welfare of his people, build up a tradition and construct a legend.

The time came when the Emperor himself was the real unifying element in the disintegrating structure of his empire. The Hungarians forgave him and respected him. He found affection even among the Slavs, whose unhappy lot he did not much mitigate, whose racial ambitions he opposed at all times. When he took the throne the executioner was busy over all Austria and in his name; yet, as the years passed, he came to be loved, reverenced, honoured by his people as the sole barrier against revolution and anarchy and as a sovereign who was literally the father of his people, however narrow his vision and limited his ideas.

When death at last overtook him, the first thought in all minds was for the future. Francis Joseph was the centre about which gathered all that was national and independent in Austrian life. His family was older than the Hohenzollern, and there clung to it a dignity not yet acquired by the latest ruler of a house which was but a small German affair two centuries ago, when the Hapsburg princes mounted the throne of the Holy Roman Empire in regular rotation.

Would the passing of Francis Joseph be followed by the permanent subordination of the Hapsburg to the Hohenzollern? Would Berlin, joining hands with Budapest, reduce Vienna to a place of relative unimportance? Would an Allied victory in the future bring about that dissolution of the Austrian Empire so many times threatened, so often imminent? Already the meaning of an Allied victory was not hidden. Galicia, Bukowina, Transylvania, Temesvar, Croatia, and Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Istria and the Trentino; these had been marked by the foes of Austria and beyond them lay the ever-present threat of Hungarian secession.

Like Louis XIV, Francis Joseph passed at a dark hour, leaving a plain heritage of danger and suffering for his people. But his own suffering had perhaps surpassed that of any of his subjects. "Fate is not kind to old men," Louis XIV said to one of his marshals returning after a disaster; and Fate had been singularly unkind to Francis Joseph. Yet through all the storm and stress of national and personal grief he had lived on. There was a legend that in all his last months his active mind had followed on the map the progress of the war, but that memory had so far failed him that he had continued to believe that it was the Prussians, and not the Russians, that his armies were fighting.

In his later days Sieyès was once asked what he did during The Terror, and his answer was: "*Mon Dieu ! j'ai vécu.*" And if one should seek to sum up in a phrase the life work of Francis Joseph, one would say of his empire that, through him and under him, it had lived; for sixty-eight years it had survived a ruin that seemed imminent when he mounted the throne and certainly seemed no nearer on his

death than at his accession. The old Emperor was not a thinker; he was not a leader; but he had become an institution. And in later days he had come to seem the immortal emperor of a dying empire.

Men the world over asked whether the passing of Francis Joseph made for peace or for war. Actually, it was hard to see how his death could affect the situation. The flames which were still mounting higher and higher were beyond the control of one man or of many men; it might be doubted whether William II himself could influence the course of the gigantic struggle now. In truth, the event to which the world had looked forward with apprehension so long—the death of Francis Joseph—seemed now, when at last death had come to him, to be but a minor detail in the tragic history of his country and of all European countries.

As for the young archduke who succeeded to the Dual Monarchy, he did not find its fortunes more desperate than had Francis Joseph. About him the world knew next to nothing—less than it knew of that other archduke who had perished at Serajevo; but now that races and nations were struggling, with a full consciousness of the issues at stake, it was hard to believe that this sovereign could, in any large way, shape the course of human history. As for Francis Joseph, it would seem that the story was told in the fact that an old and tired King had at last laid down a burden beyond the strength of any man, after having borne it bravely and with dignity, if never with supreme skill or enlightened statesmanship.

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

### THE FIRST GERMAN PEACE OFFENSIVE

#### I GERMANY'S PROPOSAL

On December 12, six days after the fall of Bucharest, the German Government—with a dramatic suddenness which took all the Allied statesmen and peoples by surprise—proposed a conference for the exchange of views and the formulation of conditions on which might be terminated the world conflagration. The text of the German Note addressed by Germany and her allies to all the hostile nations was as follows:

The most terrific war ever experienced in history has been raging for the last two years and a half over a large part of the world—a catastrophe which thousands of years of common civilization were unable to prevent, and which injures the most precious achievements of humanity.

Our aims are not to shatter or annihilate our adversaries. In spite of our consciousness of our military and economic strength and our readiness to continue the war (which has been forced upon us) until the bitter end, if necessary; at the same time prompted by the desire to avoid further bloodshed and make an end to the atrocities of war, the four allied powers propose to enter forthwith into peace negotiations.

The propositions which they bring forward for such negotiations—and which have for their object a guarantee of the existence, the honour, and the liberty of evolution for their nations—are, according to their firm belief, an appropriate basis for the establishment of a lasting peace.

The four allied powers have been obliged to take up arms to defend justice and the liberty of national evolution. The glorious deeds of our armies have in no way altered their purpose. We always maintained the firm belief that our own rights and justified claims in no way controvert the rights of these nations.

The spiritual and material progress which was the pride of Europe at the beginning of the Twentieth Century is threatened with ruin. Germany and her allies—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—have given proof of their unconquerable strength in this struggle. They have gained gigantic advantages over adversaries superior in number and war material. Our lines stand unshaken against ever-repeated attempts made by armies.

The last attack in the Balkans has been rapidly and victoriously overcome. The most recent events have demonstrated that further continuance of the war will not result in breaking the resistance of our forces, and the whole situation with regard to our troops justifies our expectation of further successes.

If in spite of this offer of peace and reconciliation the struggle should go on, the four allied powers are resolved to continue to a victorious end, but they disclaim responsibility for this before humanity and history. The Imperial Government of — [here is inserted the name of the neutral power addressed in each instance] is requested to bring this communication to the knowledge of the Government of — [here are inserted the names of the belligerents].

On this same day, in a crowded Chamber, the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, explained the German peace proposal to the Reichstag, in this memorable speech. He said (in part):

In a deep moral and religious sense of duty toward humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action toward peace.

His majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our allies, decided to propose to the hostile powers to enter into peace negotiations. This morning I transmitted a note to this effect to all the hostile powers, through the representatives of those powers which are watching over our interests and rights in the hostile states. I asked the representatives of Spain, the United States, and Switzerland to forward this note.

The same procedure has been adopted to-day in Vienna, Constantinople, and Sofia. Other neutral states and His Holiness the Pope have been similarly informed.

After reading the note addressed to the Entente Allies the Chancellor said further:

Gentlemen: in August, 1914, our enemies challenged the superiority of our power in the World War. To-day we raise the question of peace, which is a question of humanity. We await the answer of our enemies with that serenity of mind which is guaranteed to us by our exterior and interior strength and by our clear conscience.

If our enemies decline to end the war, if they wish to take upon themselves the world's heavy burden of all these terrors which hereafter will follow them even in the least and smallest homes, every German heart will burn in scared wrath against our enemies, who are unwilling to stop human slaughter that their plans of conquest may continue.

In a fateful hour we took a fateful decision. It has been saturated with the blood of hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers who gave their lives for the safety of their homes.

Human wits and human understanding are unable to reach to the extreme and last questions in the struggle of nations, which has unveiled all the terrors of earthly life but also the grandeur of human courage and human will in ways never seen before.

God will be the judge. We can proceed upon our way without fear and unashamed. We are ready for fighting and we are ready for peace.

Finally, the Kaiser notified his commanding generals of the German peace offer, while informing them that it was still uncertain what reception it would meet. The Emperor's order was addressed also "To

my navy which, in the common fight, has staked all its strength, loyally and effectively." The order follows:

"Soldiers: In agreement with the sovereigns of my allies and with consciousness of victory, I have made an offer of peace to the enemy. Whether it will be accepted is still uncertain. Until that hour arrives, you must fight on."

## II. PRESIDENT WILSON INTERVENES

On December 18 the President of the United States, after some obvious hesitation, addressed to each of the belligerents a Note, which, in effect, asked for a restatement—by each—of its purposes. Written in part before the German Note, although not without a measure of information as to the imminence of this proposal, the President's communication gave obvious strength to the German manœuvre and as such was hailed in Germany and viewed with a measure of resentment in Allied capitals. Nor was this resentment lessened by the speech made by the President to the Senate, on January 22, in which he uttered the phrase, "peace without victory," which at once astounded and angered the nations fighting Germany, who had already found cause for grief in the fact that, in his original note, the President had seemed to imply that both groups of nations were seeking the same objects—thus placing the Germans and their opponents on common ground.

An examination of the President's document belongs to the next volume, where America's own relation to the war will be discussed. The President's Note was an American affair, it had relation to American conditions, and its international aspects were of relatively less importance. But it is significant as marking the extreme point of the divorce between American and Allied sympathies as represented by official utterance. From January, 1917, onward, the course of American policy and purpose was to run rapidly toward a parallel direction with that of Allied policy and interest, and what was said in December and January was quickly forgotten in the enthusiasm excited by what was done in February, April, and June.

Yet we have now to look at things as they then appeared to the world. Germany had made a peace gesture, promptly supported in

STATUES SAVED FROM ARRAS CATHEDRAL.

Stored in a tiny church far behind the Canadian lines, works of art that could be removed from the cathedral were saved from the enemy's shells





Photograph by Western Newspaper Union


#### ONE OF THE MIRACLES OF THE WAR

Interior of a church, showing how the statue of the Blessed Virgin and a saint escaped destruction though tons of débris fell all around them

*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

### THE MIRACLE OF MONTAUBAN

"Let me tell you of a miracle. We came upon it suddenly and the roots of my hair stirred coldly with a sense of the unseen Presence. The Virgin of Montauban stood amidst a chaos of destruction, serene, benign, the only thing that the shells had spared."—Private letter from a soldier





*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

#### THE FALLEN BELL AT NEUVE CHAPELLE

All observers of the war have reported case after case of what could only be deliberate destruction of French and Belgian churches, even when there was no possible pretext of "military necessity"

*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

A TRIUMPH OF GERMAN GUNNERY

The crucifix was thrown down by a shell, but the figure remained intact




*Photograph by Western Newspaper Union*

#### AN AMAZING OVERSIGHT

A bell was left behind in the wreck of a church in a small village near Lens. Every other bit of fine metal had been sacked even to stew-pans and fastenings of doors. One official loot gatherer must have been winged at his work.





*Photograph by Central News Photo Service*

THE PUBLIC SQUARE AND CATHEDRAL AT YPRES

Ypres has suffered much. In the vortex of the fighting for several years, it was captured and recaptured by both sides. But its framework still stands, and it can be repaired.

*Photograph by Underwood & Underwood*

KING ALBERT'S CASTLE NEAR YPERN IN RUINS

Castle Hollbecke, one of the residences of King Albert of Belgium, partially wrecked. Some of the most stubbornly fought battles of the war took place here



fact, although neither in intention nor language, by the course of the President of the United States. As in war, so in diplomacy, the initiative is of priceless value and the Germans had secured the offensive by a surprise attack, supported at the critical moment by the recently re-elected President of the most powerful neutral state in the world.

To accept the German peace proposal did not for a moment enter the heads of the men charged with the direction of Allied policies, but to reject it was to run obvious risks—the risk of giving to the German the appearance of moderation, as contrasted with his opponents, and the peril of flouting the President of the United States and at once driving American sympathy and American influence to the German side. The moment, therefore, was critical, and although the larger perils were avoided, certain other hardly less serious dangers were not—and perhaps could not be—avoided. Since the German peace offensive could only be repulsed, it was inevitable that the Allies should be condemned to bear the responsibility for the prolongation of the war in the eyes of the German people and in those of a certain section of their own peoples.

### III. WHAT IT MEANT

We come now to the necessary analysis of the German manœuvre. What were the purposes of the Kaiser and his advisers in proposing peace negotiations at the moment when the taking of Bucharest had restored their military prestige and placed them in the strongest position they had occupied since the Verdun defeat—and the Somme offensive had shaken their hopes and ruined their plans for a military decision?

Wise, after the fact, we may at once exclude the interpretation immediately placed upon the German move by many contemporary observers. It was not fear of impending defeat, excited by recent events upon the west front, which led the Kaiser to take his momentous step. No idea of defeat entered the head of the German rulers and soldiers in 1916 or in the following year. The west—unable to perceive the eastern situation as it was, incapable of judging Russian facts and Ger-

man truths—saw in the peace proposal the obvious attempt of a starving and beaten Germany to transfer the struggle from the battle field to the green table and seek to win by other weapons the victory already lost in the military sphere.

Nothing could have been more inexact. It was the settled conviction of the German Government and the German people that the war had been won, and history will not adjudge this conviction half as absurd as the views held by Allied publics and voiced by Allied statesmen, concerning German prospects. Abroad, German arms were still strong and Germany had just won a shining victory. At home, despite discomforts and real hardships, the morale of the German people was stronger than that of the people of Britain or France, as the events of the next year were to disclose. It was not to avoid defeat that the Kaiser proposed peace by negotiation; this much is unmistakable.

Was it with the idea of seeking, in a negotiation conducted in some neutral capital, to separate the Allies? Did the German, in fact, expect, or actually much desire, an international conference? Again the answer must be in the negative. The German knew the sentiments of those who directed the policies of France and Britain. He realized, as every one in the world then realized, that neither the French nor the British Government would or could consent to peace negotiations at that moment. The replies which ultimately came from all enemy nations were clearly anticipated. On the morrow of the German peace proposal, despite the temporary disarray of Allied statesmanship, there was no doubt anywhere expressed as to what the response would be.

We may then at once dismiss the notion that the German manœuvre had in it any intent to bring peace by negotiation. The German did not expect this result, he did not desire this result. He now possessed all that he had hoped to acquire by the war—~~save the decisive victory itself~~; but he still regarded the decisive victory as not impossible, provided that he could destroy the morale of the peoples with whom he was fighting. And between a decisive victory and a long-drawn-out negotiation in which he would be overborne by numbers if not by brains, the German had every reason to prefer to stick to the pursuit of a decision by arms.

In analyzing the German motives we have to examine both the domestic conditions and the foreign circumstances that were in the mind of the Kaiser and his advisers in December. As far as the domestic conditions were concerned the German people believed themselves victorious, as they still believed themselves the victims of a European conspiracy. But, after so many victories, they could not understand the prolongation of the war and they saw, in the fact that their armies were everywhere fighting on foreign soil, a strange contradiction to the German Government's repeated assertion that the war was one of defence.

It was essential to demonstrate to the German people, if it could be done without damage, that the responsibility for the continuation of the struggle was not Germany's. If a proposal of peace, too vague, too impalpable to lead to anything, could be put forth by German statesmen and rejected by the representatives of Allied nations; if the rejection were accompanied by bitter words and fresh denunciation or by the formulation of terms incompatible with the views of the German people (who believed themselves victorious and, while eager for peace, had not the smallest intention of accepting anything but a victorious peace), then there would result an immediate hardening of the resolution of the German people; the Government would gain new support; it would absolve itself from the single reproach now beginning to be directed at it, namely, that it was responsible, not for the war, but for the failure of the war to reach a logical conclusion.

This was the home manœuvre—important, but not controlling.

#### IV. THE RUSSIAN MANŒUVRE

But it is to the foreign field that we must look to gather any accurate notion of German designs. First of all, the German proposal envisaged the Russian situation. In the Muscovite Empire the Germans had corrupted the bureaucracy and subsidized the revolutionists. Russian affairs were marching to complete and inescapable ruin. The bureaucracy had made its bargain with the Germans. The fall of Rumania—betrayed by Russia, by Stuermer—was the price the Russian Cabinet had paid in advance for a German peace proposal, recognizing

that only by obtaining peace abroad could it resort to repression at home and save the system by which it lived.

True a new ministry, patriotic in its purposes, had succeeded Stuermer; but the harm had been done. And even though the new ministry should, as it did, repulse the peace proposal, it was only necessary for the Germans to redouble their efforts to stimulate into action their subsidized agents of revolution. Russia was exhausted; she had neither the moral, the military, nor the material resources out of which to build another campaign. If the bureaucracy could not provide peace, the Revolution would. Peace—peace at any price, on any terms—this was the desire of the people.

And Germany offered peace. Therefore, nothing was more inevitable than that the Revolution, passing rapidly from the control of the relatively restricted patriotic group, should fall into the hands of those extremists, many of them Germany's tools, who undertook to give the people what they desired most. The patriotic ministry which took command at the first stage of the Revolution, and Kerensky, who succeeded, might seek to preserve the solidarity of the Alliance with the western nations, but the mass of the people cared only for an end of the struggle, and since the Czar had allied himself with France, with Britain, and with Italy, and as these nations insisted upon war, the Russian extremists turned without hesitation or compunction to Germany, who had offered peace and continued to offer peace.

The main concern of Germany at all times in the first three campaigns had been to dispose of one of her larger foes, to win, in the east or in the west, a decision which would permit her to concentrate all her energies and all her resources in a single field. Three campaigns had passed without the attainment of this object, but it could be obtained without a fourth campaign if Russian military power were overthrown by revolution or if the Russian Government should, of its own will, decide to save itself at home by giving its subjects what they desired, even at the cost of breaking faith with the western nations. This was what the Stuermer Ministry had sought to do. It had fallen, after performing only half its task, after having merely supplied, by the

betrayal of Rumania, a basis for peace by negotiation. Since the ministry that succeeded was patriotic and loyal, Germany would now turn to the other end of the line; she would go from the Cabinet to the *canaille*, from the palace to the gutter.

We shall see, in the analysis of the events of 1917, how completely the Germans subordinated military to diplomatic operations on its eastern front; how they substituted intrigue for heavy artillery; how they lured Russia, one step at a time, to ultimate ruin, and their purpose accomplished—they were at last free to turn westward, having destroyed the Russian nation and written at Brest-Litovsk a treaty more sweeping than that which Napoleon formulated with respect of Prussia at Tilsit. But until the Russian ruin was achieved, Germany steadfastly adhered to the peace offensive, and it is by the methods and by the result of this campaign, as they were later disclosed, that we must analyze the German peace manœuvre that began in December, 1916.

In sum, and looking for the moment at Russia, alone, Germany employed her peace operations exactly as she was accustomed to use her heavy artillery, to prepare the way for her infantry attack. She was not seeking peace but victory; she was not striving for an arrangement by mutual accommodation because she was still in the mood of a conqueror. A gesture of peace would placate certain elements at home, but it was not necessary, yet, to placate them. A peace gesture would serve to deceive the weary Russian people, to beguile the mad extremists, it would aid the revolutionists, an influential element of whom were in German pay. But it would be but a prelude; the infantry would advance exactly as after artillery preparation. And this is precisely what did happen at Brest-Litovsk, when a disarmed and helpless Russia confronted the essential Prussian, at last drawing his "good German sword" from beneath the white mantle of Peace, where it had been hidden but ready at all times.

#### V. THE AMERICAN ASPECT

If the Russian objective was more obvious, it was not less clear that Germany also aimed at achieving certain results in America. In

recent months there had been a superficial improvement in German-American relations. The tense situation following the *Sussex* outrage in the winter had given way to a relative calm when Germany had accepted the terms insisted upon by the United States Government with respect of submarine operations. There had been an interruption in the incidents which had been so frequent in the previous year and the danger of a break with America seemed past.

But the German Government was already completing its preparations for that unlimited submarine warfare that was to be the opening move in the campaign of 1917. The submarine weapon had not been abandoned because of the success of the British navy in dealing with the U-boat. Nor had it been abandoned out of fear of American complications. In fact, it had not been abandoned at all but simply interrupted. When the Germans had made their concessions to the United States, they had made them because, at the moment, they did not have a sufficient fleet of U-boats to make a persistence in the campaign—with the probable entrance of the United States into the war as a consequence—profitable.

From that moment onward, however, the German leaders had concentrated their energies upon the construction of a fleet which should be adequate; the moment was approaching when the fleet would be ready; and Germany was prepared to lay aside the mask when that moment came. But even though she was willing to risk involving herself in war with the United States, Germany was still eager to avoid this increase in the number of her foes, if possible. Her strategy with the United States at all times had been to postpone to the last moment the entrance of that nation, but there had been a perception in Berlin that the postponement could not be indefinite.

In the peace offensive Germany saw a chance to gain a further postponement. While she exaggerated the American desire to remain outside the area of conflict; while she underestimated popular sentiment and Presidential firmness once a direct issue should be made, she still calculated—not overblindly—that, should she make a peace proffer and should this proffer be rejected by her enemies, then the

consequence might be to turn American sentiment against the Allies; saddle upon them, in American eyes, the responsibility for the prolongation of the struggle; and thus lead the American people and the American Government to tolerate a new submarine campaign as the last resort of a German people, pacifically inclined but fighting for its life with implacable enemies resolved to resist all overtures for peace.

The course of the President, in calling upon the belligerent nations for a restatement of purposes, after the German Note had been issued, unquestionably contributed to convincing the German Government that its manœuvre had been successful in America. In this it was mistaken. American opinion was taking form and the American Government, despite the President's clear determination to leave no step unturned to avoid war if it could be avoided, was getting on to firm ground. There was no chance now that the American people would submit to German prescriptions as to how and when they should use the sea. The long nightmare of German intrigue and German outrage in the United States was about at an end.

Yet the facts, as they afterward disclosed themselves, must not blind us to the motives of the Germans, motives which were the natural result of a reasonable interpretation of the American attitude. The German was making his best bid to keep America out of the war, just as he was making his best effort to eliminate Russia. To accomplish both these things would be to prepare the way for military victory; to postpone American entrance would, not impossibly, lead to the same result. There was no other appeal which could be made to America, and the peace offensive was bound to have a profound effect; it was bound to deceive, it was bound to confuse; it might—there was a chance—arouse American resentment at Allied persistence, at British and French obstinacy, which would give Germany the free hand she wanted for her submarine campaign. The explanation of the purpose is revealed in the direction of German intrigue and German propaganda in America at the time.

In its American phase the German peace offensive was a failure;

America did enter the war on the Allied side, but the American aspect of the German operation is none the less interesting and important.

#### VI. IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE

The peace offensive, in its British and French aspects, was, however, more serious immediately and eventually than in America. In American politics the old alliance between "the Puritan and the Blackleg" was not unfamiliar; in Russia the German had sought to achieve his purpose by harnessing the Court and the gutter to his car; in Great Britain and in France his tactics were similar; he made allies alike out of idealism and selfishness, his ends were served by those who sought peace for reasons which were above suspicion or reproach and by those who were seeking to advance or preserve selfish interests at the sacrifice of all else.

In the first three years of the war the people of the Allied nations believed, and their leaders and press told them, that there was a gulf between the people and the rulers of Germany. The legend, eagerly seized upon and steadily accepted, pictured the German people as ever on the point of throwing off its masters and seeking peace through the medium of that form of democracy familiar to the western nations. The truth was quite different. The German people were not in revolt against their masters nor was there as yet any cleavage between people and government, between parties and the Kaiser.

But the situation in the Allied countries was not the same. There was discord, there was lack of common purpose and equal determination. In England and France there was an element—made up of men of commanding integrity and unquestioned ability and intelligence—who opposed war as such, who had opposed the entrance of their country into the present war, who saw in their own nation's cause, its war aims, and its international policies, faults as grave as those disclosed by the German programme. Some of these believed any peace better than every form of war; more of them believed that the war was unnecessary and that, but for the chauvinism in Allied quarters, it could have been avoided. All of them accepted the German peace proposal as

made in good faith and began an industrious campaign to force their governments to meet the German suggestion.

The result was an instant outburst of criticism and denunciation, not of the enemy, but of the governments of the men who uttered the condemnation and—which was worse for Allied solidarity—of the purposes of Allied nations. Distrust of Russia was a long-standing British tradition and, while Russia still stood, Russian ambitions toward the Near East were a target for attack. French claims upon Alsace-Lorraine were assailed, Italian ambitions along the Adriatic were denounced. The assertion was made, repeated, proclaimed, that all nations were equally selfish and all war aims coloured by the same international selfishness. The demand for a restatement of Allied war aims, coupled with an insistence upon the elimination from these war aims of all territorial claims, however just, was heard on all sides, and the Allied cause was weakened in the eyes of those who were bearing the burdens of the defence of that cause—not by the enemy abroad, but by the friend at home or the ally in a friendly nation.

For the first time there was a palpable decline in the moral vitality of the Allied publics. And this was what the German had sought. He had framed his peace proposals to catch the emotion and the sentiment of the pacifist and of the idealist; he transferred the discussion from the area of his own actual misdeeds to the real or imaginary purpose of the Allies to imitate in some lesser degree, not his crimes but his territorial aspirations; and, in doing this, he temporarily deprived his opponents of that moral initiative that they had possessed from the moment when his invasion of Belgium had aroused the moral indignation of all non-Teutonic civilization.

At the other end of the rope he appealed to the selfish, to the rich and the powerful, who saw the war undermining the existing social system, eating up their fortunes in war taxes, levelling all the barriers of class, transferring from Capital to Labour the real control of industry and of nations. His statesmen and his propaganda artfully emphasized the approaching destruction of wealth and of “Kultur”—the ruin of European civilization. Nor did his appeals have less attraction for

the labouring classes, whose war with the capitalists had been halted by the world struggle, who feared for the privileges and rights which they had newly acquired and saw in each governmental requirement a new invasion of their recently acquired powers.

Lastly, and this is of capital importance, the German peace proposal fell upon a war-weary world. The agonies and sacrifices of three campaigns had been beyond description; for millions in the trenches and in the factories, and for the other millions who suffered in the persons of those they loved, the strain had been terrific. And for this strain there was no apparent relief in any immediate future. Victory no longer seemed at hand; it was to seem more and more remote in the next eighteen months. In invaded France, in blockaded Britain, human endurance had its limits; men and women were approaching the point where, if honourable peace could be obtained, prolongation of the war, for any purpose, seemed a crime.

It was the mission of the German propaganda to create in the minds of the pacifists and the idealists the notion that peace—with all their ideals and dreams assured—was to be had; that the obstacle was not the German Government but their own statesmen. It was the purpose of German propaganda to convince Capital that an escape from impending perils was available, if only the leaders of Allied countries would lay aside a mad pursuit of impossible military triumphs and listen to the voice of reason. It was the mission of German propaganda to shake the confidence of Allied publics in their governments—of Allied peoples in the honesty of purpose of their statesmen. It was the mission of German propaganda to play upon the agony, the credulity, the selfishness, and the idealism of men of enemy nations, to the end that the spirits of these peoples should weaken, that the desire for peace should overwhelm the determination to achieve victory.

And while Germany's manœuvres seduced the idealism it satisfied the selfishness and purchased the venality of the nations at war with her. A huge defeatist manœuvre was carried on in France coincident with the idealistic campaign conducted in Britain. This was to be the true campaign of 1917 and it was to bring the Allies, in

whose number America would be included, to the very edge of ruin, before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk revealed the German as he was and disclosed the weak, the wicked, and the unfortunate elements of the Russian Revolution in circumstances which the western world could not mistake.

#### VII. REJECTED

Such, in substance, was the first German peace offensive. The German proposal was promptly rejected, its rejection was contained in speeches by British, French, and Italian prime ministers; even the Russian Government, now brought to the edge of ruin, repulsed the offer for which its predecessor had striven. In due course of time the Allies returned to the President of the United States an adequate but not unambiguous explanation of their war aims, which he accepted with the good grace which was required. Meanwhile, the German press and the German statesmen signalized the rejection of their peace proposal by declarations intended to convince their own public and the publics of the enemy nations that their sincerity had been beyond question and the responsibility for the prolongation of the struggle rested with the nations whose determination to destroy the German people was revealed in their brusque rejection of Germany's generous offer to lay aside the rights of a victor and treat with her enemies as with equals.

But with the speeches of the statesmen, German or Allied, we need have little concern. The Germans spoke wisely and for a purpose, the Allied orators foolishly, because they only partly fathomed the meaning of the German manœuvre and were as blind to conditions within their own countries as they were misled as to conditions within Germany. With the rejection of the German proposal the Allied press celebrated the repulse of an enemy attack, convinced that such danger as there had been was abolished by the incantations of the orators in the several parliaments.

The truth was otherwise. The German peace offensive had not failed; on the contrary, it had undermined Allied solidarity and shaken

the morale of Allied publics; it had loosed centrifugal forces which were to operate with ever-increasing energy. It was a beginning, not an end; it was the artillery preparation before the infantry attack, and the infantry attack would not only come, but would temporarily break the home front. Had the German been as successful in America as he was in Europe, the Allies would have lost the war. It was the failure of the German peace offensive in America, the failure to prevent or postpone American entrance, which saved the compromised situation, when Russia had collapsed, France been beaten at the Aisne, Britain's splendid young army decimated in the Flanders bogs, when defeatism and war weariness had swept over the western nations and the German peace offensive had at last prepared the way for the resumption of the military offensive by Ludendorff in March, 1918.

"Germany must squeeze her enemies with a pair of pincers. The German armies must continue to fight vigorously, while the German Socialists encourage and stimulate pacifism among Germany's enemies." This was the programme of a German Socialist. This is the epitome of the first and of all other German offensives. Germany was seeking to win the war by all means available. The Peace offensive was a method. December, 1916, was an appropriate moment to invoke this method. Nations which could not at once be conquered by German ruthlessness might be disarmed by their own idealism.

And with the launching of the German peace offensive the history of the year 1916 ends. In a sense this German manœuvre belongs rather to 1917 than to the preceding year. It was the first step in a new campaign rather than the last one in an old. It was the preface to the Russian collapse, to the Italian defeat at Caporetto, to the German victories of the spring of 1918. It was an attack upon the "home front" after two great repulses upon the battle front. But it was a logical and natural climax to the campaign of 1916, in which both contending parties had failed to achieve a decision and in which the Allies were left without a policy or a purpose, aghast at the Rumanian disaster, humiliated at the sacrifice of another little state whose doom they had not been able to foresee or to avert.


The German had regained the military initiative at Bucharest; by his peace offensive he had now, for the moment, grasped the moral initiative. Both had been won in 1916, both were the results of his successes. He would make effective use of both advantages. He could hope and did hope that, combined, they would enable him to win the war. In this he was mistaken; but again the Allies would escape utter defeat by a narrow margin and once more their blindness would bring bitter disappointment and deadly peril. They were still failing; the German was still winning, and, as the year closed, had shifted the attack to a new field and taken his enemy unprepared and unawares. For eighteen months he would be able to exploit this new triumph and it would bring him again to the Marne, before France rallied and America arrived, before British and French idealism and pacifism were silenced by Brest-Litovsk and a common peril restored the home front in the Allied countries and thus laid the foundations for victory in the field.

The German peace offensive was the third German attack upon the western nations. It was repulsed, but not before it had once more brought the Allied cause to the brink of ruin. And it did complete the work of Hindenburg and Mackensen in the east. It opened a campaign longer than that at Verdun, and, all things considered, more costly to the Allies than that at the Somme. With these two great operations it divides the interest in the history of 1916. With the rejection by the Allies of the German proposal there ends, not a campaign, but a period. With the new year were to appear new leaders, new soldiers, new issues, and new problems. And yet, in December, 1916, only Germany detected signs of the impending change. She saw only the material side, but such vision as she had was to permit her to go forward far on the road to victory before she encountered at the Marne and for the second time, a spiritual rebirth beyond her power to conquer.

**MR. SIMONDS'S HISTORY OF THE PROGRESS  
OF THE WAR WILL BE CARRIED FOR-  
WARD IN THE SUCCEEDING VOLUMES  
EDITOR**

## **MY TRIP TO VERDUN**

**By FRANK H. SIMONDS**



# I

## MY TRIP TO VERDUN\*

### GENERAL PÉTAIN FACE TO FACE

THE MEN WHO HOLD THE LINE—WHAT THEIR FACES TOLD OF THE PAST AND  
THE FUTURE OF FRANCE

By FRANK H. SIMONDS

My road to Verdun ran through the Elysée Palace, and it was to the courtesy and interest of the President of the French Republic that I owed my opportunity to see the battle for the Meuse city at close range. Already through the kindness of the French General Staff I had seen the Lorraine and Marne battlegrounds and had been guided over these fields by officers who had shared in the opening battles that saved France. But Verdun was more difficult; there is little time for caring for the wandering correspondent when a decisive contest is going forward, and quite naturally the General Staff turned a deaf ear to my request.

Through the kindness of one of the many Frenchmen who gave time and effort to make my pilgrimage a success I was at last able to see M. Poincaré. Like our own American President, the French Chief Magistrate is never interviewed, and I mention this audience simply because it was one more and in a sense the final proof for me of the friendliness, the courtesy, the interest that the American will find to-day in France. I had gone to Paris, my ears filled with the warnings of those who told me that it was hard to be an American in Europe, in France, in the present hour. I had gone expecting, or at least fearing, that I should find it so.

Instead, from peasant to President I found only kindness, only gratitude, only a profound appreciation for all that Americans had individually done for France in the hour of her great trial. These things and one thing more I found: a very intense desire that Americans should be able to see for themselves; the Frenchman will not talk to you of what France has done, is doing; he shrinks from anything that might suggest imitation of the German method of propaganda. In so far as it is humanly possible he would have you see the thing for yourself and testify out of your own mouth.

Thus it came about that all my difficulties vanished when I had been permitted to express to the President my desire to see Verdun and to go back to America—I was sailing within the week—able to report what I had seen with

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my own eyes of the decisive battle still going forward around the Lorraine city. Without further delay or discussion, it was promised that I should go to Verdun by motor, that I should go cared for by the French military authorities, and that I should be permitted to see all that one could see at the moment of the contest.

We left Paris in the early afternoon; my companions were M. Henri Ponsot, chief of the Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and M. Hugues le Roux, a distinguished Frenchman of letters well known to many Americans. To start for the battlefield from a busy, peaceful city, to run for miles through suburbs as quiet and lacking in martial aspect as the regions beyond the Harlem, at home, was a thing that seemed almost unreal; but only for a brief moment, for war has come very near to Paris, and one may not travel far in Eastern France without seeing its signs.

In less than an hour we were passing the rear of the line held by the British at the Battle of the Marne, and barely sixty minutes after we had passed out through the Vincennes gate we met at Courtacon the first of the ruined villages that for two hundred miles line the roadways that lead from the capital to Lorraine and Champagne. Suddenly in the midst of a peaceful countryside, after passing a score of undisturbed villages, villages so like one to another, you come to one upon which the storm has burst, and instead of snug houses, smiling faces, the air of contentment and happiness that was France, there is only a heap of ruins, houses with their roofs gone, their walls torn by shell fire, villages abandoned partially or wholly, contemporary Pompeii's, overtaken by the Vesuvius of Krupp.

Coincidentally there appear along the roadside, in the fields, among the plough furrows, on every side, the crosses that mark the graves of those who died for France—or for Germany. Along the slope you may mark the passage of a charge by these crosses; those who fell were buried as they lay, French and Germans with equal care. Indeed, there is a certain pride visible in all that the French do for their dead foes. Alongside a hamlet wantonly burned, burned by careful labour and with German thoroughness, in villages where you will be told of nameless atrocities and shameful killings, you will see the German graves, marked by neat crosses, surrounded by sod embankments, with plaques of black and white; the French graves are marked by plaques of red, white, and blue, and are invariably decorated with a flag and flowers.

Once you have seen these graves by the roadside going east you will hardly go a mile in two hundred which has not its graves. From the environs of Meaux, a scant twenty miles from Paris, to the frontier at the Seille, beyond Nancy, there are graves and more graves, now scattered, now crowded together where men fought hand to hand. Passing them in a swift-moving auto, they seem to march by you; there is the illusion of an army advancing on the hill-side, until at last, beyond Nancy, where the fighting was so terrible, about

little villages such as Corbessaux, you come to the great common graves, where a hundred or two hundred men have been gathered, where the trenches now levelled are but long graves, and you read, "Here rest 179 French soldiers," or across the road, "Here 196 Germans."

Take a map of France and from a point just south of Paris draw a straight line to the Vosges; twenty or thirty miles to the north draw another. Between the two is the black district of the Marne and Nancy battles. It is the district of ruined villages, destroyed farms; it is the region where every hillside—so it will seem to the traveller—is marked by these pathetic crosses. It is a region in which the sense of death and destruction is abroad. Go forty miles north again and draw two more lines, and this is the region not of the death and destruction of yesterday, but of to-day; this is the front, where the graves are still in the making, the region of the Oise to the Meuse, from Noyon to Verdun.

On this day our route led eastward through the villages which in September, 1914, woke from at least a century of oblivion, from the forgetting that followed Napoleon's last campaign in France, to a splendid but terrible ten days: Courtacon, Sézanne, La-Fère Champenoise, Vitry-le-François, the region where Franchet d'Esperey and Foch fought, where the "Miracle of the Marne" was performed. Mile after mile the countryside files by, the never-changing impression of a huge cemetery, the hugest in the world, the stricken villages, now and then striving to begin again, a red roof here and there telling of the first counter-offensive of peace, of construction made against the whirlwind that had come and gone.

Always, too, nothing but old men and women, these and children, working in the broad fields, still partially cultivated, but no longer the fields of that perfectly cared for France of the other peace days. Women and children at the plough, old men bent double by age still spending such strength as is left in the tasks that war has set for them. This is the France behind the front, and, aside from the ruined villages and graves, the France that stretches from the Pyrenees to the Marne, a France from which youth and manhood are gone, in which age and childhood remain with the women. Yet in this land we were passing how much of the youth and manhood of France and Germany was buried the crosses indicated at every kilometre.

But a hundred miles east of Paris there begins a new world. The graves, the shell-cursed villages, remain, but this is no longer the France of the Marne fighting and of the war of two years ago. At Vitry-le-François you pass almost without warning into the region which is the back of the front to-day, the base of all the line of fire from Rheims to the Meuse, and suddenly along the road appear the canvas guideposts which bear the terse warning, "Verdun." You pass suddenly from ancient to contemporary history, from the killing of other years to the killing that is of to-day—the killing and the wounding—and along

the hills where there are still graves there begin to appear Red Cross tents and signs, and ambulances pass you bearing the latest harvest.

And now every village is a garrison town. For a hundred miles there have been only women and old men, but now there are only soldiers; they fill the streets; they crowd the doorways of the houses. The fields are filled with tents, with horses, with all the impedimenta of an army. The whole country-side is a place of arms. Every branch of French service is about you—Tunisians, Turcos, cavalry, the black, the brown, and the white—the men who yesterday or last week were in the first line, who rest and will return tomorrow or next day to fight again.

Unmistakably, too, you feel that this is the business of war; you are in a factory, a machine shop; if the product is death and destruction, it is no less a matter of machinery, not of romance, of glamour. The back of the front is a place of work and of rest for more work, but of parade, of the brilliant, of the fascinating there is just nothing. Men with bright but plainly weary faces, not young men, but men of thirty and above, hard bitten by their experience, patently fit, fed, but somehow related to the ruins and the destruction around them, they are all about you, and wherever now you see a grave you will discover a knot of men standing about it talking soberly. Wherever you see the vestiges of an old trench, a hill that was fought for at this time twenty months ago, you will see new practice trenches and probably the recruits, the "Class of 1917," the boys that are waiting for the call, listening to an officer explaining to them what has been done here, the mistake or the good judgment revealed by the event. For France is training the youth that remains to her on the still recent battlefields and in the presence of those who died to keep the ground.

Just as the darkness came we passed St. Dizier and entered at last upon the road to Verdun, the one road that is the life line of the city. For to understand the real problem of the defence of Verdun you must realize that there is lacking to the city any railroad. In September, 1914, the Germans took St. Mihiel and cut the railway coming north along the Meuse. On their retreat from the Marne the soldiers of the Crown Prince halted at Montfaucon and Varennes, and their cannon have commanded the Paris-Verdun-Metz Railroad ever since. Save for a crazy narrow-gauge line wandering along the hill slopes, climbing by impossible grades, Verdun is without rail communication.

It was this that made the defence of the town next to impossible. Partially to remedy the defect the French had reconstructed a local highway running from St. Dizier by Bar-le-Duc to Verdun beyond the reach of German artillery. To-day an army of a quarter of a million of men, the enormous parks of heavy artillery and field guns—everything is supplied by this one road and by motor transport.

Coming north from St. Dizier we entered this vast procession. Mile after mile the caravan stretched on, fifty miles with hardly a break of a hundred feet between trucks. Paris 'buses, turned into vehicles to bear fresh meat new motor trucks built to carry thirty-five men and travelling in companies, regiments, brigades; wagons from the hood of which soldiers, bound to replace the killed and wounded of yesterday, looked down upon you calmly but unsmilingly. From St. Dizier to Verdun the impression was that of the machinery by which logs are carried to the saw in a mill. You felt unconsciously, yet unmistakably, that you were looking, not upon automobiles, not upon separate trucks, but upon some vast and intricate system of belts and benches that were steadily, swiftly, surely carrying all this vast material, carrying men and munitions and supplies, everything human and inanimate, to that vast grinding mill which was beyond the hills, the crushing machine which worked with equal remorselessness upon men and upon things.

Now and again, too, over the hills came the Red Cross ambulances; they passed you returning from the front and bringing within their carefully closed walls the finished product, the fruits of the day's grinding, or a fraction thereof. And about the whole thing there was a sense of the mechanical rather than the human, something that suggested an automatic, a machine-driven, movement; it was as if an unseen system of belts and engines and levers guided, moved, propelled this long procession upward and ever toward the mysterious front where the knives or the axes or the grinding stones did their work.

Night came down upon us along the road and brought a new impression. Mile on mile over the hills and round the curves, disappearing in the woods, reappearing on the distant summits of the hills, each showing a rear light that wagged crazily on the horizon, this huge caravan flowed onward, while in the villages and on the hillsides campfires flashed up and the faces or the figures of the soldiers could be seen now clearly and now dimly. But all else was subordinated to the line of moving transports. Somewhere far off at one end of the procession there was battle; somewhere down below at the other end there was peace. There all the resources, the life blood, the treasure in men and in riches of France were concentrating and collecting, were being fed into this motor fleet, which like baskets on ropes was carrying it forward to the end of the line and then bringing back what remained, or for the most part coming back empty, for more—for more lives and more treasure.

It was fullnight when our car came down the curved grades into Bar-le-Duc, halted at the corner, where soldiers performed the work of traffic policemen and steadily guided the caravan toward the road marked by a canvas sign lighted within by a single candle and bearing the one word, "Verdun." All night, too, the rumble of the passing transport filled the air and the little hotel shook with the jar of the heavy trucks, for neither by day nor by night

is there a halt in the motor transport, and the sound of this grinding is never low.

It was little more than daylight when we took the road again, with a thirty-mile drive to Verdun before us: Almost immediately we turned into the Verdun route we met again the caravan of automobiles, of camions, as the French say. It still flowed on without break. Now, too, we entered the main road, the one road to Verdun, the road that had been built by the French army against just such an attack as was now in progress. The road was as wide as Fifth Avenue, as smooth as asphalt—a road that, when peace comes, if it ever does, will delight the motorist. Despite the traffic it had to bear, it was in perfect repair, and soldiers in uniform sat by the side breaking stone and preparing metal to keep it so.

The character of the country had now changed. We were entering the region of the hills between the Aisne and the Meuse, a country reminiscent of New England. Those hills are the barriers which beyond the Meuse, under the name of the Côte de Meuse, have been the scene of so much desperate fighting. The roads that sidled off to the east bore battle names, St. Mihiel, Troyon, and the road that we followed was still marked at every turn with the magic word "Verdun." Our immediate objective was Souilly, the obscure hill town twenty miles, perhaps, south of the front, from which Sarrail had defended Verdun in the Marne days and from which Pétain was now defending Verdun against a still more terrible attack.

And in France to-day one speaks only of Verdun and Pétain. Soldiers have their day; Joffre, Castelnau, Foch, all retain much of the affection and admiration they have deserved, but at the moment it is the man who has held Verdun that France thinks of, and there was the promise for us that at Souilly we should see the man whose fame had filled the world in the recent great and terrible weeks. Upward and downward over the hills, through more ruined villages, more hospitals, more camps, our march took us until after a short hour we came to Souilly, general headquarters of the Army of Verdun, of Pétain, the centre of the world for the moment.

Few towns have done less to prepare for greatness than Souilly. It boasts a single street three inches deep in the clay mud of the spring—a single street through which the Verdun route marches almost contemptuously, the same nest of stone and plaster houses, one story high, houses from which the owners had departed to make room for generals and staff officers. This and one thing more, the Mairie, the town hall, as usual the one pretentious edifice of the French hamlet, and before the stairway of this we stopped and got out.

We were at headquarters. From this little building, devoted for perhaps a century to the business of governing the commune of Souilly, with its scant thousand of people, Pétain was defending Verdun and the fate of an army of 250,000 men at the least. In the upstairs room, where the town councillors

had once debated parochial questions, Joffre and Castelnau and Pétain in the terrible days of the opening conflict had consulted, argued, decided—decided the fate of France, so the Germans had said, for they had made the fall of Verdun the assurance of French collapse.

Unconsciously, too, you felt the change in the character of the population of this village. There were still the soldiers, the eternal gray-blue uniforms, but there were also men of a different type, men of authority. In the street your guides pointed out to you General Herr, the man who had designed and planned and accomplished the miracle of the motor transport that had saved Verdun—with the aid of the brave men fighting somewhere not far beyond the nearest hills. He had commanded at Verdun when the attack came, and without hesitation he had turned over his command to Pétain, his junior in service and rank before the war, given up the glory and become the superintendent of transport. Men spoke to you of the fine loyalty of that action with un concealed admiration.

And then out of the remoteness of Souilly there came a voice familiar to an American. Bunau-Varilla, the man of Panama, wearing the uniform of a commandant and the Croix de Guerre newly bestowed for some wonderful engineering achievement, stepped forward to ask for his friends and yours of the old "*Sun* paper." I had seen him last in the *Sun* office in the days when the war had just broken out and he was about to sail for home; in the days when the Marne was still unfought and he had breathed hope then as he spoke with confidence now.

Presently there arrive the two officers whose duty it was to take me to Verdun, Captain Henri Bordeaux, a man of letters known to all Frenchmen; Captain Madelin, an historian, already documented in the history of the war making under his own eyes. To these gentlemen and their colleagues who perform this task that can hardly be agreeable, who risk their lives and give over their time with unfailing courtesy and consideration that the American newspaper correspondent may see, may report, it is impossible to return sufficient thanks, and every American newspaper reader who finds on his breakfast table the journal that tells him of the progress of the war owes something to some officer.

"Were we to see Verdun?" This was the first problem. I had been warned two days before that the bombardment was raging and that it was quite possible that it would be unsafe to go farther. But the news was reassuring; Verdun was tranquil. "And Pétain?" One could not yet say.

Even as we spoke there was a stirring in the crowd, general saluting, and I caught a glimpse of the commander-in-chief as he went quickly up the staircase. For the rest we must wait. But not for very long; in a few minutes there came the welcome word that General Pétain would see us, would see the stray American correspondent.

Since I saw Pétain in the little Mairie at Souilly I have seen many photographs of him, but none in any real measure give the true picture of the defender of Verdun. He saw us in his office, the bare upstairs room, two years ago the office of the Mayor of Souilly. Think of the Selectmen's office in any New England village and the picture will be accurate: a bare room, a desk, one chair, a telephone, nothing on the walls but two maps, one of the military zone, one of the actual front and positions of the Verdun fighting. A bleak room, barely heated by the most primitive of stoves. From the single window one looked down on the cheerless street along which lumbered the caravan of autos. On the pegs against the wall hung the General's hat and coat, weather-stained, faded, the clothes of a man who worked in all weathers. Of staff officers, of uniforms, of colour there was just nothing; of war there was hardly a hint.

At the door the commander-in-chief met us, shook hands, and murmured clearly and slowly, with incisive distinctness, the formal words of French greeting; he spoke no English. Instantly there was the suggestion of Kitchener, not of Kitchener as you see him in flesh, but in photographs, the same coldness, decision. The smile that accompanied the words of welcome vanished and the face was utterly motionless, expressionless. You saw a tall, broad-shouldered man, with every appearance of physical strength, a clear blue eye, looking straight forward and beyond.

My French companion, M. Le Roux, spoke with Pétain. He had just come from Joffre and he told an interesting circumstance. Pétain listened. He said now and then "yes" or "no." Nothing more. Watching him narrowly you saw that occasionally his eyes twitched a little, the single sign of fatigue that the long strain of weeks of responsibility had brought.

It was hard to believe, looking at this quiet, calm, silent man, that you were in the presence of the soldier who had won the Battle of Champagne, the man whom the war had surprised in the last of his fifties, a Colonel, a teacher of war rather than a soldier, a professor like Foch.

No one of Napoleon's marshals had commanded as many men as obeyed this Frenchman, who was as lacking in the distinction of military circumstance as our own Grant. Napoleon had won all his famous victories with far fewer troops than were directed from the telephone on the table yonder.

Every impression of modern war that comes to one actually in touch with it is a destruction of illusion: this thing is a thing of mechanism rather than of brilliance; perhaps Pétain has led a regiment, a brigade, or a division to the charge. You knew instinctively in seeing the man that you would go or come, as he said, but there was neither dash nor fire, nothing of the suggestion of élan; rather there was the suggestion of the commander of a great ocean liner, the man responsible for the lives, this time of hundreds of thousands, not scores, for the safety of France, not of a ship, but the man of ma-

chinery and the master of the wisdom of the tides and the weather, not the Ney, or the Murat, not the Napoleon of Arcola. The impression was of a strong man whose life was a life beaten upon by storms; the man on the bridge, to keep to the rather ridiculously inadequate figure, but not by any chance the man on horseback.

My talk, our talk with Pétain, was the matter of perhaps five minutes. The time was consumed by the words of M. Le Roux, who spoke very earnestly, urging that more American correspondents be permitted to visit Verdun, and Pétain heard him patiently, but said just nothing. Once he had greeted us his face settled into that grim expression that never changed until he smiled his word of good wishes as we left. Yet I have since found that apart from one circumstance which I shall mention in a moment I have remembered those minutes most clearly of all of my Verdun experience. Just as the photograph does not reveal the face of the man, the word does not describe the sense of strength, of responsibility, that he gives.

In a childish sort of way, exactly as one thinks of war as a matter of dash and colour and motion, one thinks of the French general as the leader of a cavalry charge or of a forlorn hope of infantry. And the French soldier of this war has not been the man of charge or of dash—not that he has not charged as well as ever in his history, a little more bravely, perhaps, for machine guns are new and something worse than other wars have had. What the French soldier has done has been to stand, to hold, to die not in the onrush but on the spot.

And Pétain in some curious way has fixed in my mind the impression of the new Frenchman, if there be a new one, or perhaps better of the French soldier of to-day, whether he wear the stars of the general or undecorated "horizon" blue of the *poilu*. The look that I saw in his eyes, the calm, steady, utterly emotionless looking straight forward, I saw everywhere at the front and at the back of the front. It embodied for me an enduring impression of the spirit and the poise of the French soldier of the latest and most terrible of French struggles. And I confess that, more than all I saw and heard at the front and in Paris, the look of this man convinced me that Verdun would not fall, that France herself would not either weary or weaken.

In Paris, where one may hear anything, there are those that will tell you that Joffre's work is done and that France waits for the man who will complete the task; that the strain of the terrible months has wearied the general who won the Battle of the Marne and saved France. They will tell you, perhaps, that Pétain is the man; they will certainly tell you that they hope that the man has been found in Pétain. As to the truth of all this I do not pretend to know. I did not see Joffre, but all that I have read of Joffre suggests that Pétain is of his sort, the same quiet, silent man, with a certain coldness of the North, a grimness of manner that is lacking in his chief.

There was a Kitchener legend in Europe, and I do not think it survives save a little perhaps in corners of England. There was a legend of a man of ice and of iron, a man who made victory out of human material as a man makes a wall of mortar and stone, a man to whom his material was only mortar and stone, even though it were human. This legend has perished so far as Kitchener is concerned, gone with so much that England trusted and believed two years ago, but I find myself thinking now of Pétain as we all thought of Kitchener in his great day.

If I were an officer I should not like to come to the defender of Verdun with the confession of failure. I think I should rather meet the Bavarians in the first-line trenches, but I should like to know that when I was obeying orders I was carrying out a minor detail of something Pétain had planned; I should expect it to happen, the thing that he had arranged, and I should feel that those clear, steel-blue eyes had foreseen all that could occur, foreseen calmly and utterly, whether it entailed the death of one or a thousand men, of ten thousand men if necessary, and had willed that it should happen. I do not believe Napoleon's Old Guard would have followed Pétain as they followed Ney. I cannot fancy him in the Imperial uniform, and yet, now that war is a thing of machines, of telephones, of indirect fire and destruction from unseen weapons at remote ranges, now that the whole manner and circumstance of conflict have changed, it is but natural that the General should change, too. Patently Pétain is of the new, not the old, but no less patently he was the master of it.

We left the little Mairie, entered our machines, and slid out swiftly for the last miles, climbed and curved over the final hill and suddenly looked down on a deep, trenchlike valley marching from east to west and carrying the Paris-Verdun-Metz Railroad, no longer available for traffic. And as we coasted down the hill we heard the guns at last, not steadily, but only from time to time, a distant boom, a faint billowing up of musketry fire. Some three or four miles straight ahead there were the lines of fire beyond the brown hills that flanked the valley.

At the bottom of the valley we turned east, moved on for a mile, and stopped abruptly. The guns were sounding more clearly, and suddenly there was a sense not of soldiers, but of an army. On one side of the road a column was coming toward us, a column of men who were leaving the trenches for a rest, the men who for the recent days had held the first line. Wearily but steadily they streamed by; the mud of the trenches covered their tunics; here and there a man had lost his steel helmet and wore a handkerchief about his head, probably to conceal a slight wound that but for the helmet had killed him.

These men were smiling as they marched; they carried their full equipment and it rattled and tinkled; they carried their guns at all angles, they wore their uniforms in the strangest of disorders; they seemed almost like miners

coming from the depths of the earth rather than soldiers returning from a decisive battle, from the hell of modern shell fire.

But it was the line on the other side of the road that held the eye. Here were the troops that were going toward the fire, toward the trenches, that were marching to the sound of the guns, and as one saw them the artillery rumble took on a new distinctness.

Involuntarily I searched the faces of these men as they passed. They were hardly ten feet from me. Platoon after platoon, company after company, whole regiments in columns of fours. And seeing the faces brought an instant shock; they all wore the same calm, steady, slightly weary expression, but there was in the whole line scarcely a young man. Here were men of the thirties, not the twenties; men still in the prime of strength, of health, but the fathers of families, the men of full manhood.

Almost in a flash the fact came home. This was what all the graves along the road had meant. This was what the battlefields and the glories of the twenty months had spelled—France had sent her youth and it was spent; she was sending her manhood now.

In the line no man smiled and no man straggled; the ranks were closed up and there were neither commands nor any visible sign of authority. These men who were marching to the sound of the guns had been there before. They knew precisely what it meant. Yet you could not but feel that as they went a little wearily, sadly, they marched willingly. They would not have it otherwise. Their faces were the faces of men who had taken the full measure of their own fate.

You had a sense of the loathing, the horror, above all the sadness that was in their hearts that this thing, this war, this destruction had to be. They had come back here through all the waste of ruined villages and shell-torn hillsides; all the men that you saw would not measure the cost of a single hour of trench fighting if the real attack began. This these men knew, and the message of the artillery fire, which was only one of unknown terrors for you, was intelligible to the utmost to each of them.

And yet with the weariness there was a certain resignation, a certain patience, a certain sense of comprehending sacrifice that more than all else is France to-day, the true France. This, and not the empty forts, not even the busy guns, was the wall that defended France, this line of men. If it broke there would come thundering down again out of the north all the tornado of destruction that had turned northeastern France into a waste place and wrecked so much of the world's store of the beautiful and the inspiring.

Somehow you felt that this was in the minds of all these men. They had willed to die that France might live. They were going to a death that sounded ever more clearly as they marched. This death had eaten up all that was young, most of what was young at the least, of France; it might yet consume

France, and so these men marched to the sound of the guns, not to martial music, not with any suggestion of dash, of enthusiasm, but quietly, steadily, all with the same look upon their faces—the look of men who had seen death and are to see it again. Instinctively I thought of what Kipling had said to me in London:

“Somewhere over there,” he had said, “the thing will suddenly grip your throat and your heart; it will take hold of you as nothing in your life has ever done or ever will.” And I know that I never shall forget those lines of quiet, patient, middle-aged men marching to the sound of the guns, leaving at their backs the countless graves that hold the youth of France, the men who had known the Marne, the Yser, Champagne, who had known death for nearly two years, night and day, almost constantly. Yet during the fifteen minutes I watched there was not one order, not one straggler; there was a sense of the regularity with which the blood flows through the human arteries in this tide, and it was the blood of France.

So many people have asked me, I had asked myself, the question before I went to France: “Are they not weary of it? Will the French not give up from sheer exhaustion of strength?” I do not think so, now that I have seen the faces of these hundreds of men as they marched to the trenches beyond Verdun. France may bleed to death, but I do not think that while there are men there will be an end of the sacrifice. No pen or voice can express the horror that these men, that all Frenchmen, have of this war, of all war, the weariness. They hate it; you cannot mistake this; but France marches to the frontier in the spirit that men manned the walls against the barbarians in the other days; there is no other way; it must be.

Over and over again there has come the invariable answer; it would have come from scores and hundreds of these men who passed so near me I could have touched their faded uniforms if I had asked—“It is for France, for civilization; it must be, for there is no other way; we shall die, but with us, with our sacrifice, perhaps this thing will end.” You cannot put it in words quite, I do not think even any Frenchman has quite said it, but you can see it, you can feel it, you can understand it, when you see a regiment, a brigade, a division of these men of thirty, some perhaps of forty, going forward to the war they hate and will never quit until that which they love is safe or they and all of their race are swallowed up in the storm that now was audibly beating beyond the human walls on the near-by hillsides.

Presently we moved again, we slipped through the column, topped the last incline, shot under the crumbling gate of the Verdun fortress, and as we entered a shell burst just behind us and the roar drowned out all else in its sudden and paralyzing crash. It had fallen, so we learned a little later, just where we had been watching the passing troops; it had fallen among them and killed. But an hour or two later, when we repassed the point where it fell, men were still

marching by. Other regiments of men were still marching to the sound of the guns, and those who had passed were already over the hills and beyond the river, filing into the trenches in time, so it turned out, to meet the new attack that came with the later afternoon.

I went to Verdun to see the forts, the city, the hills, and the topography of a great battle; I went in the hope of describing with a little of clarity what the operation meant as a military affair. I saw, and I shall hereafter try to describe this. But I shall never be able to describe this thing which was the true Verdun for me—these men, their faces, seen as one heard the shell fire and the musketry rolling, not steadily but intermittently, the men who had marched over the roads that are lined with graves, through villages that are destroyed, who had come of their own will and in calm determination and marched unhurriedly and yet unshrinkingly, the men who were no longer young, who had left behind them all that men hold dear in life, home, wives, children, because they knew that there was no other way.

I can only say to all those who have asked me, "What of France?" this simple thing, that I do not believe the French will ever stop. I do not believe, as the Germans have said, that French courage is weakening, that French determination is abating. I do not believe the Kaiser himself would think this if he had seen these men's faces as they marched toward his guns. I think he would feel as I felt, as one must feel, that these men went willingly, hating war with their whole soul, destitute of passion or anger. I never heard a passionate word in France, because there had entered into their minds, into the mind and heart of a whole race, the belief that what was at stake was the thing that for two thousand years of history had been France.

### A DYING, SHELL-RIDDEN CITY

THE VAUBAN CITADEL, IN THE SHELTER OF WHICH FALLING SHELLS CANNOT  
FIND YOU—HOUSES AND BLOCKS THAT ARE VANISHING HOURLY—  
“BUT WILLIAM WILL NOT COME”—WAR THAT IS INVISIBLE—A  
LUNCHEON UNDERGROUND WITH A TOAST TO AMERICA  
—THE LAST COURTESY FROM A GENERAL AND A  
HOST—NOTHING THAT WAS NOT BEAUTIFUL

THE citadel of Verdun, the bulwark of the eastern frontier in ancient days, rises out of the meadows of the Meuse with something of the abruptness of the skyscraper, and still preserves that aspect which led the writers of other wars to describe all forts as "frowning." It was built for Louis XIV by Vauban. He took a solid rock and blasted out redoubts and battlements. The generations that followed him dug into the living rock and created within it a whole city of catacombs, a vast labyrinth of passages and chambers and halls; even an elevator was added by the latest engineers, so that one can go from floor to

floor, from the level of the meadow to the level of the summit of the rock, possibly a hundred feet above.

By reason of the fact that many correspondents have visited this fortress since the war began the world has come to know of the underground life in Verdun, to think of the city as defended by some wonderful system of subterranean works; to think of Verdun, in fact, as a city or citadel that is defensible either by walls or by forts. But the truth is far different; even the old citadel is but a deserted cave; its massive walls of natural rock resist the shells as they would repulse an avalanche; but the guns that were once on its parapets are gone, the garrison is gone, gone far out on the trench lines beyond the hills. The Vauban citadel is now a place where bread is baked, where wounded men are occasionally brought, where live the soldiers and officers whose important but unromantic mission it is to keep the roads through the town open, to police the ashes of the city, to do what remains of the work that once fell to the lot of the civil authorities.

To glide swiftly to the shelter of this rock from a region in which a falling shell has served to remind you of the real meaning of Verdun of the moment, to leave the automobile and plunge into the welcome obscurity of this cavern —this was perhaps the most comfortable personal incident of the day. The mere shadow of the rock gave a sense of security; to penetrate it was to pass to safety.

Some moments of wandering by corridors and stairways into the very heart of the rock brought us to the quarters of our host, General Dubois; to his kind attention I was to owe all my good fortune in seeing his dying city; to him, at the end, I was to owe the ultimate evidence of courtesy, which I shall never forget.

Unlike Pétain or Joffre, General Dubois is a little man, possibly a trifle older than either. A white-haired, bright-eyed, vigorous soldier, who made his real fame in Madagascar with Joffre and with Gallieni, and when the storm broke was sent to Verdun by these men, who knew him, to do the difficult work that there was to be performed behind the battle line. There is about General Dubois a suggestion of the old, as well as the new, of the French general. The private soldiers to whom he spoke as he went his rounds responded with a "Oui, mon General," that had a note of affection as well as of discipline; he was rather as one fancied were the soldiers of the Revolution, of the Empire, of the Algerian days of Père Bugeaud whose memory is still green.

Our salutations made, we returned through the winding corridors to inspect the bakeries, the water and light plant, the unsuspected resources of this rock. In one huge cavern we saw the men who provided 30,000 men with bread each day, men working as the stokers in an ocean steamer labour amidst the glare of fires; we tasted the bread and found it good, as good as all French bread is, and that means a little better than all other bread.

Then we slipped back into daylight and wandered along the face of the fortress. We inspected shell holes of yesterday and of last month; we inspected them as one inspects the best blossoms in a garden; we studied the angle at which they dropped; we measured the miniature avalanche that they brought with them. But always, so far, there was the subconscious sense of the rock between us and the enemy. I never before understood the full meaning of that phrase "a rock in a weary land."

All this was but preliminary, however. Other automobiles arrived; the General entered one. I followed in the next and we set out to visit Verdun, to visit the ruins, or, rather, to see not a city that was dead, but a city that was visibly, hourly dying—a city that was vanishing by blocks and by squares—but was not yet fallen to the estate of Ypres or Arras; a city that in corners, where there were gardens behind the walls, still smiled; a city where some few brave old buildings still stood four square and solid, but only waiting what was to come.

Before I visited Verdun I had seen many cities and towns which had been wholly or partially destroyed, either by shell fire or by the German soldiers in their great invasion before the Marne. One shelled town is much like another, and there is no thrill quite like that you experience when you see the first. But these towns had died nearly two years ago; indeed, in most the resurrection had begun; little red roofs were beginning to shine through the brown trees and stark ruins. Children played again in the squares. It was like the sense you have when you see an old peasant ploughing among the cross-marked graves of a hard-fought battle corner—the sense of a beginning as well as of death and destruction.

But at Verdun it was utterly different. Of life, or people, of activity beginning again or surviving there was nothing. Some time in the recent past all the little people who lived in these houses had put upon wagons what could be quickly moved and had slipped out of their home that was already under sentence of death. They were gone into the distance, and they had left behind them no stragglers. The city was empty save for a few soldiers who passed rapidly along the streets, as one marches in a heavy snowstorm.

Yet Verdun was not wholly dead. Shell fire is the most inexplicable of all things that carry destruction. As you passed down one street the mark of destruction varied with each house. Here the blast had come and cut the building squarely; it had carried with it into ruin behind in the courtyard all that the house contained, but against the wall the telephone rested undisturbed; pictures—possibly even a looking glass—hung as the inhabitants had left it, hung as perhaps it had hung when the last woman had taken her ultimate hurried glance at her hat before she departed into the outer darkness.

But the next house had lost only the front walls; it stood before you as if it had been opened for your inspection by the removal of the façade. Chairs,

beds—all the domestic economy of the house—sagged visibly outward toward the street, or stood still firm, but open to the four winds. It was as if the scene were prepared for a stage and you sat before the footlights looking into the interior. Again, the next house and that beyond were utterly gone—side walls, front walls, everything swallowed up and vanished—the iron work twisted into heaps, the stone work crumbled to dust; the whole mass of ruin still smoked, for it was a shell of yesterday that had done this work.

Down on the Riviera, where the mistral blows—all the pine trees lean away from the invariable track of this storm wind—you have the sense, even in the summer months, of a whole countryside bent by the gales. In the same fashion you felt in Verdun, felt rather than saw, a whole town not bent, but crumbled, crushed—and the line of fall was always apparent; you could tell the direction from which each storm of shells had come, you could almost feel that the storm was but suspended, not over, that at any moment it might begin again.

Yet even in the midst of destruction there were enclaves of unshaken structures. On the Rue Mazel, "Main Street," the chief clothing store rose immune amid ashes on all sides. Its huge plate-glass window was not even cracked. And behind the window a little mannikin, one of the familiar images that wear clothes to tempt the purchaser, stood erect. A French soldier had crept in and raised the stiff arm of the mannikin to the salute, pushed back the hat to a rakish angle. The mannikin seemed alive and more than alive, the embodiment of the spirit of the place. Facing northward toward the German guns it seemed to respond to them with a "*morituri salutamus*." "The last civilian in Verdun," the soldiers called him, but his manner was rather that of the Poilu.

We crossed the river and the canal and stopped by the ruin of what had once been a big factory or warehouse. We crawled through an open shell-made breach in the brick wall and stood in the interior. The ashes were still hot, and in corners there were smoking fires. Two days ago, at just this time, your guides told you, men had been working here; making bread, I think. At the same time we had come to the ruins—the same time of day, that is—the Germans had dropped a half-dozen incendiary shells into the building and it had burned in ten minutes. Most of the men who had been there then were still there, under the smoking mass of wreckage; the smell of burned human flesh was in the air.

A few steps away there was a little house standing intact. On the floor there were stretched four rolls of white cloth. The General and those with him took off their hats as they entered. He opened one of the packages and you saw only a charred black mass, something that looked like a half-burned log taken from the fireplace. But two days ago it had been a man, and the metal disk of identification had already been found and had served to disclose

the victim's name. These were the first bodies that had been removed from the ruins.

Taking our cars again we drove back and stopped before the Mairie, and passing under the arch entered the courtyard. The building had fared better than most, but there were many shell marks. In the courtyard were four guns. Forty-six years before another German army had come down from the North, another whirlwind of artillery had struck the town and laid it in ashes, but even under the ashes the town had held out for three weeks. Afterward the Republic of France had given these guns to the people of Verdun in recognition of their heroism.

In the courtyard I was presented to a man wearing the uniform and helmet of a fireman. He was the chief of the Verdun fire department. His mission, his perilous duty, it was to help extinguish the fires that flamed up after every shell. In all my life I have never seen a man at once so crushed and so patently courageous. He was not young, but his blue Lorraine eyes were still clear. Yet he looked at you, he looked out upon the world with undisguised amazement. For a generation his business had been to fight fires. He had protected his little town from conflagrations that might sometimes, perhaps once, possibly twice, have risen to the dignity of a "three alarm." For the rest he had dealt with blazes.

Now out of the skies and the darkness and out of the daylight, too, fire had descended upon his town. Under an avalanche of incendiary shells, under a landslide of fire, his city was melting visibly into ashes. He had lived fire and dreamed fire for half a century, but now the world had turned to fire—his world—and he looked out upon it in dazed wonder. He could no longer fight this fire, restrain it, conquer it; he could only go out under the bursting shells and strive to minimize by some fraction the destruction; but it was only child's play, this work of his which had been a man's business. And there was no mistaking the fact that this world was now too much for him. He was a brave man; they told me of things he had done; but his little cosmos had gone to chaos utterly.

We entered our cars again and went to another quarter of the city. Everywhere were ashes and ruin, but everywhere the sense of a destruction that was progressive, not complete: it still marched. It was as Arras had been, they told me, before the last wall had tumbled and the Artois capital had become nothing but a memory. We climbed the slope toward the cathedral and stopped in a little square still unscathed, the Place d'Armes, the most historic acre of the town. After a moment I realized what my friends were telling me. It was in this square that the Crown Prince was to receive the surrender of the town. Along the road we had climbed he was to lead his victorious army through the town and out the Porte de France beyond. In this square the Kaiser was to stand and review the army, to greet his victorious son. The

scene as it had been arranged was almost rehearsed for you in the gestures of the French officers.

"But William has not come," they said, "and he will not come now." This last was not spoken as a boast, but as a faith, a conviction.

Still climbing we came to the cathedral. It is seated on the very top pinnacle of the rock of Verdun, suggesting the French cities of Provence. Its two towers, severe and lacking ornamentation, are the landmarks of the countryside for miles around. When I came back to America I read the story of an American correspondent whom the Germans had brought down from Berlin to see the destruction of Verdun. They had brought him to the edge of the hills and then thrown some incendiary shells into the town, the very shells that killed the men whose bodies I had seen. The black smoke and flames rushed up around these towers and then the Germans brought the correspondent over the hills and showed him the destruction of Verdun. He described it vividly and concluded that the condition of the town must be desperate.

They are a wonderful people, these Germans, in their stage management. Of course this was precisely the thing that they desired that he should feel. They had sent their shells at the right moment, the whole performance had gone off like clockwork. Those poor blackened masses of humanity in the house below were the cost that was represented in the performance. And since there is much still left to burn in Verdun, the Germans may repeat this thing whenever they desire.

But somewhere three or four miles from here, and between Verdun and the Germans, are many thousands of Frenchmen, with guns and cannon, and hearts of even finer metal. They cannot even know that Verdun is being shelled or is burning, and if it burns to ultimate ashes it will not affect them or their lines. This is the fallacy of all the talk of the destruction of Verdun city and the desperate condition of its defenders. The army left Verdun for the hills when the war began; the people left when the present drive began in February. Even the dogs and cats, which were seen by correspondents in earlier visits, have been rescued and sent away. Verdun is dead, it is almost as dead as are Arras and Ypres; but neither of these towns after a year and a half bombardment has fallen.

The correspondent who was taken up on a hill by the Germans to see Verdun burn, after it had been carefully set on fire by shell fire, was discovered by French gunners and shelled. He went away taking with him an impression of a doomed city. This picture was duly transmitted to America. But two days later, when I visited the city, there was no evidence of desperation, because there was no one left to be desperate. Doubtless on occasion we shall have many more descriptions of the destruction of this town, descriptions meant to impress Americans or encourage Germans. The material for such

fires is not exhausted. The cathedral on the top of the hill is hardly shell-marked at all, and it will make a famous display when it is fired as was Rheims, as were the churches of Champagne and Artois. But there is something novel in the thought of a city burned, not to make a Roman or even German holiday, but burned to make the world believe that the Battle of Verdun had been a German victory.

For two hours we wandered about the town exploring and estimating the effect of heavy gunfire, for the Germans are too far from the city to use anything but heavy guns effectively. The impressions of such a visit are too numerous to recall. I shall mention but one more. Behind the cathedral are cloisters that the guide books mention; they inclose a courtyard that was once decorated with statues of saints. By some accident or miracle—there are always miracles in shelled towns—one of these images, perhaps that of the Madonna, has been lifted from its pedestal and thrown into the branches of a tree, which seems almost to hold it with outstretched arms.

At length we left the town, going out by the Porte de France, which cuts the old Vauban ramparts, now as deserted as those of Paris, ramparts that had been covered with trees and were now strewn with the débris of the trees that had fallen under the shell fire. In all this time not a shell had fallen in Verdun; it was the first completely tranquil morning in weeks; but there was always the sense of impending destruction, there was always the sense of the approaching shell. There was an odd subconscious curiosity, and something more than curiosity, about the mental processes of some men, not far away, who were beside guns pointed toward you, guns which yesterday or the day before had sent their destruction to the very spot where you stood.

Yet, oddly enough, in the town there was a wholly absurd sense of security, derived from the fact that there were still buildings between you and those guns. You saw that the buildings went to dust and ashes whenever the guns were fired; you saw that each explosion might turn a city block into ashes, and yet you were glad of the buildings and there was reassurance in their shadows. Now we travelled in the open country; we began to climb across the face of a bare hill, and it was the face that fronted the Germans.

Presently the General's car stuck in the mud and we halted, for a minute perhaps; then we went on; we passed a dead horse lying in the road, then of a sudden came that same terrible grinding, metallic crash. I have never seen any description of a heavy shell explosion that fitted it. Behind us we could see the black smoke rising from the ground in a suburb through which we had just come. I saw three explosions. A moment later we were at the gate of Fort de la Chaume, and we were warned not to stop, but to hasten in, for the Germans, whenever they see cars at this point, suspect that Joffre has arrived, or President Poincaré, and act accordingly. We did not delay.

Fort de la Chaume is one of the many fortifications built since the Franco-

Prussian War and intended to defend the city. Like all the rest, it ceased to have value when the German artillery had shown at Liège and at Namur that it was the master of the fort. Then the French left their forts and went out to trenches beyond and took with them the heavy guns that the fort once boasted. To-day Fort de la Chaume is just an empty shell, as empty as the old Vauban citadel in the valley below. And what is true of this fort is true of all the other forts of that famous fortress of Verdun, which is no longer a fortress, but a sector in the trench line that runs from the North Sea to Switzerland.

From the walls of the fort staff officers showed me the surrounding country. I looked down on the city of Verdun, hiding under the shadow of its cathedral. I looked across the level Meuse Valley, with its little river; I studied the wall of hills beyond. Somewhere in the tangle on the horizon was Douaumont, which the Germans held. Down the valley of the river in the haze was the town of Bras, which was French; beyond it the village of Vacherauville, which was German. Beyond the hills in the centre of the picture, but hidden by them, were Le Mort Homme and Hill 304.

Verdun is like a lump of sugar in a finger bowl, and I was standing on the rim. It seemed utterly impossible that any one should even think of this town as a fortress or count its ashes as of meaning in the conflict.

Somewhere in the background a French battery of heavy guns was firing, and the sound was clear; but it did not suggest war, rather a blasting operation. The German guns were still again. There was a faint billowing roll of gunfire across the river toward Douaumont, but very faint. As for trenches, soldiers, evidences of battle, they did not exist. I thought of Ralph Pulitzer's vivid story of riding to the Rheims front in a military aëroplane and seeing, of war, just nothing.

The geography of the Verdun country unrolled before us with absolute clarity; the whole relation of hills and river and railroads was unmistakable. But despite the faint sound of musketry, the occasional roar of a French gun, I might have been in the Berkshires looking down on the Housatonic. Six miles to the north around Le Mort Homme that battle which has not stopped for two months was still going on. Around Douaumont the overture was just starting, the overture to a stiff fight in the afternoon, but of all the circumstances of battle that one has read of, that one still vaguely expects to see, there was not a sign. If it suited their fancy the Germans could turn the hill on which I stood into a crater of ruin, as they did with Fort Loncin at Liège. We were well within range, easy range; we lived because they had no object to serve by such shooting, but we were without even a hint of their whereabouts.

I have already described the military geography of Verdun. I shall not attempt to repeat it here, but it is the invisibility of warfare, whether examined from the earth or the air, which impresses the civilian. If you go to the

trenches you creep through tunnels and cavities until you are permitted to peer through a peephole, and you see yellow dirt some yards away. You may hear bullets over your head, you may hear shells passing, but what you see is a hill-side with some slashings. That is the enemy. If you go to an observation post back of the trenches, then you will see a whole range of country, but not even the trenches of your own side.

From the Grand Mont east of Nancy I watched some French batteries shell the German line. I didn't see the French guns, I didn't see the German trenches, I didn't see the French line. I did see some black smoke rising a little above the underbrush, and I was told that the shells were striking behind the German lines and that the gunners were searching for a German battery. But I might as well have been observing a gang of Italians at blasting operations in the Montclair Mountains. And the officer with me said: "Our children are just amusing themselves."

From Fort de la Chaume we rode back to the citadel; and there I was the guest of the General and the officers of the town garrison; their guest because I was an American who came to see their town. I shall always remember that luncheon down in the very depths of this rock in a dimly lighted room. I sat at the General's right, and all around me were the men whose day's work it was to keep the roads open, the machinery running in the shell-cursed city. Every time they went out into daylight they knew that they might not return. For two months the storm had beaten about this rock, it had written its mark upon all these faces, and yet it had neither extinguished the light nor the laughter; the sense of strength and of calmness was inescapable, and never have I known such charming, such thoughtful hosts.

When the champagne came the old General rose and made me a little speech. He spoke in English, with absolute correctness, but as one who spoke it with difficulty. He welcomed me as an American to Verdun, he thanked me for coming, he raised his glass to drink to my country and the hope that in the right time she would be standing with France—in the cause of civilization. Always in his heart, in his thought, in his speech, the Frenchman is thinking of that cause of civilization; always this is what the terrible conflict that is eating up all France means to him.

Afterward we went out of this cavern into daylight, and the officers came and shook hands with me and said good-bye. One does not say *au revoir* at the front; one says *bonne chance*—"good luck; it may and it may not—we hope not." We entered our cars and were about to start, when suddenly, with a blinding, stunning crash, a whole salvo landed in the meadow just beyond the road, we could not see where, because some houses hid the field. It was the most suddenly appalling crash I have ever heard.

Instantly the General ordered our drivers to halt. He explained that it might be the beginning of a bombardment or only a single trial, a detail in the

intermittent firing to cut the road that we were to take. We sat waiting for several moments and no more shots came. Then the General turned and gave an order to his car to follow, bade our drivers go fast, and climbed into my car and sat down. The wandering American correspondent was his guest. He could not protect him from the shell fire. He could not prevent it. But he could share the danger. He could share the risk, and so he rode with me the mile until we passed beyond the danger zone. There he gave me another *bonne chance* and left me, went back to his shell-cursed town with its ruins and its agonies.

I hope I shall see General Dubois again. I hope it will be on the day when he is made Governor of Strassburg.

As we left Verdun the firing was increasing; it was rolling up like a rising gale; the infantry fire was becoming pronounced; the Germans were beginning an attack upon Le Mort Homme. Just before sunset we passed through the Argonne Forest and came out beyond. On a hill to the north against the sky the monument of Valmy stood out in clear relief, marking the hill where Keller- man had turned back another Prussian army. Then we slipped down into the Plain of Châlons, where other Frenchmen had met and conquered Attila. At dark we halted in Montmirail, where Napoleon won his last victory before his empire fell. The sound of the guns we had left behind was still in our ears and the meaning of these names in our minds. Presently my French companion said to me: "It is a long time, isn't it?" He meant all the years since the first storm came out of the north, and I think the same thought is in every Frenchman's mind. Then he told me his story.

"I had two boys," he said; "one was taken from me years ago in an accident; he was killed and it was terrible. But the other I gave.

"He was shot, my last boy, up near Verdun, in the beginning of the war. He did not die at once and I went to him. For twenty days I sat beside him in a cellar waiting for him to die. I bought the last coffin in the village, that he might be buried in it, and kept it under my bed. We talked many times before he died, and he told me all he knew of the fight, of the men about him and how they fell.

"My name is finished, but I say to you now that in all that experience there was nothing that was not beautiful." And as far as I can analyze or put in words the impression that I have brought away from France, from the ruin and the suffering and the destruction, I think it is expressed in those words. I have seen nothing that was not beautiful, too, because through all the spirit of France shone clear and bright.



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